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INTRODUCTION
Laura Lale Kabis-Kechrid
Grievances have been growing over Jordan’s 
socio-economic and political problems, including 
high public debt, a significant current account defi-
cit, and high unemployment. In June 2018, former 
Prime Minister Hani al-Mulki was forced to resign 
after mass protests swept the country in response to 
a new income tax law proposal. Jordan’s socio-eco-
nomic challenges are further augmented by its chal-
lenging neighborhood. This includes the conflicts 
in neighboring Syria and Iraq, the threat posed by 
extremist actors in the region as well as the impact 
which the Gulf Cooperation Council’s crisis over the 
blockade of Qatar has had on Jordan. As a result of 
these developments, Jordan has been facing a sig-
nificant influx of refugees on the one hand, and a 
more difficult environment to conduct trade and 
attract foreign direct investment (FDI) on the other. 
In addition, the US’ announcement of the so-called 
“Deal of the Century” for the Israel/Palestine conflict 
has heightened concerns in Amman that a two-state 
solution to the conflict may no longer be a viable 
option. This would have serious consequences for 
Jordan, which currently hosts more than two million 
registered Palestinian refugees. Given the strategic 
importance of Jordan, it is in the European Union’s 
own interest to support Jordan and ensure that the 
growing socio-economic challenges, as well as the 
various regional challenges, do not lead to a (further) 
destabilization of the country.
This edited volume brings together papers written by 
the participants of the workshop series “Promotion 
of Think Tank Work on Socio-Economic Reforms and 
Jordan’s Foreign Policy”, held in Berlin in April and in 
Amman in June 2019. The workshops were conducted 
as part of DGAP’s project on strengthening think 
tanks and similar institutions in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region and in Europe.
The authors analyze key challenges to Jordan’s 
socio-economic development and assess poten-
tials for improved cooperation with the EU, while a 
smaller faction discusses the implications of regional 
developments. The volume offers recommendations 
for the Jordanian government as well as the EU and 
its member states.
Among the recommendations are the following: 
High energy costs are a key factor hindering Jor-
dan’s economic growth and the competitiveness of 
its companies on the international market. The Jor-
danian government should, therefore, further sup-
port the development of renewable energy sources 
and prioritize decentralized, small-scale renew-
able energy systems to achieve energy security and 
reduce energy costs. In addition, targeted policies 
to improve employment are considered crucial to 
foster socio-economic development. These include 
more inclusive flexible work schemes, state-spon-
sored employment programs and greater stimulation 
of Jordan’s entrepreneurial potential through simpli-
fied business registration procedures, easier access 
to financing for micro, small and medium enterprises 
(MSMEs), and incentives for MSMEs to grow and for-
malize their businesses.
The EU should support Jordan’s economic devel-
opment through different means, e.g. by suppor-
ting vocational training programs and private sector 
employment as well as by enhancing the bankability 
of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and start-
ups. In addition, Brussels and Amman should encour-
age more Jordanian producers to make use of the 
EU-Jordan Free Trade Agreement as this would ben-
efit the country’s economy. At the same time, the EU 
should set incentives and use development programs 
as leverage to achieve better cooperation by those 
political forces in Jordan which currently undermine 
socio-economic reform efforts. To do so more effec-
tively, the EU should improve its understanding of 
political processes in Jordan by combining political 
economy analysis (PEA) with elite research. As Jor-
dan’s socio-economic situation is also strained by the 
presence of a very large number of refugees, the EU 
and its member states should facilitate the resettle-
ment of refugees by granting humanitarian visas.
The support of the EU and the international commu-
nity is even more pressing in light of the US admin-
istration’s announcement that it will defund the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestin-
ian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). As UNRWA 
has been essential in alleviating the impact of host-
ing a vast number of Palestinian refugees in Jordan, 
Amman should work with the international commu-
nity to secure funding for UNRWA to counter-bal-
ance the US’ funding cut. Since a two-state solution 
to the Israel/Palestine conflict appears increasingly 
unlikely, Jordan should develop a plan to respond to 
the circumstances. As part of this, it should increase 
cooperation with other Arab states, seek the blessing 
of the Arab League and the Islamic Conference Orga-
nization to recognize the Palestinian passport as a 
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travel document for all refugees, and reduce bilateral 
relations with Israel.
The Contributions in Summary
Chapter I: Socio-Economic Challenges and 
Reforms in Jordan
POLITICAL ECONOMY
“The Blind Spot of International Donors – How the 
Jordanian Political Elite Undermines Socio-Economic 
Reform”: Tomisha Bino draws attention to the highly 
personalized, informal and nontransparent nature 
of Jordan’s political system and the undermining 
effect which political corruption has on the country’s 
socio-economic reform efforts. She argues that by 
combining political economy analysis (PEA) with elite 
research, international donors could identify more 
targeted incentives and leverages to improve the 
cooperation of currently obstructive political insti-
tutions in Jordan when designing and implementing 
development programs.
ENERGY
“Energy Policy in Jordan – Achieving Security and 
Economic Development through Domestic Renew-
able Energy”: Nadim Abillama acknowledges that 
Jordan has taken steps to support the development 
of renewable energy sources in its quest to achieve 
energy security. He argues, however, that the coun-
try needs to address ongoing challenges at the insti-
tutional, economic and financial level if it wants to 
achieve its goal of a twenty-percent share of renew-
able energy by 2025. For this reason, he calls for pub-
lic and private sector investments in research and 
development, as well as government guarantees that 
demand will be sustained in the long-run. In addi-
tion, domestic companies should upgrade their pro-
duction lines.
“Improving Competitiveness and Trade Balance 
through Decentralized Renewable Energy – The Case 
of Jordan”: Jessica Obeid focuses on Jordan’s energy 
policies and the negative impact which high energy 
costs have on economic growth and trade. Assessing 
the Jordanian government’s response to the issue, 
she argues that decentralized small-scale renew-
able energy systems should be promoted to immedi-
ately decrease energy costs. To this end, investment 
should be geared toward decentralized solutions, and 
the different energy systems should be integrated 
into a modernized grid.
EMPLOYMENT
“From Survival Strategy to Innovation – Creating 
an Enabling Business Environment for Micro, Small 
and Medium Enterprises in Jordan”: Sophie Schmid 
assesses current barriers to the creation and growth 
of MSMEs in Jordan. She argues that improving the 
current conditions could not only set incentives to 
formalize businesses but also be a catalyst for eco-
nomic growth and innovation in Jordan. There-
fore, business registration processes and fee struc-
tures should be simplified, the tax system should 
be adjusted, and targeted micro-lending regula-
tions should be adopted that can facilitate access to 
financing.
“The ‘Employer of Last Resort’ – A Route to Women’s 
Empowerment in Rural Jordan”: Salam Abukhadrah 
addresses the low rates of female participation in the 
Jordanian labor market. She advocates the introduc-
tion of a state-sponsored “Employer of Last Resort” 
(ELR) program, which aims to ensure employment for 
involuntarily unemployed women, especially in rural 
areas.
“Promoting Flexible Work Regulation in Jordan to 
Achieve Comprehensive Youth Economic Empower-
ment”: Bara’ah Bathaina critically assesses the Flex-
ible Labor Regulation, which was introduced in Jor-
dan in 2017. She argues that while the government 
has taken an important step to foster employment, 
especially among youths, by introducing flexible 
work schemes, adjustments need to be made in order 
to maximize the full potential of the regulation. This 
includes broadening the scope of workers and com-
panies that are eligible, increasing efforts to promote 
the flexible work model, and conducting studies on 
its implementation and effectiveness.
YOUTH INCLUSION
“Revisiting Pillar 4 – A Young and Equal City of the 
Amman Resilience Strategy through the Lens of Parti-
cipatory and Inclusive Approaches”: Rana Aytug anal-
yses the plan put forward by the Greater Municipality 
of Amman (GAM) to foster urban resilience. Focus-
ing on the fourth pillar of the strategy, she argues 
that GAM should reduce barriers to youth involve-
ment, support the establishment of a youth council, 
and use public spaces across Amman for formal and 
informal initiatives to effectively implement a truly 
bottom-up, participatory and inclusive approach.
Jordan’s Socio-Economic Woes and Foreign Policy 
9No. 5 | January 2020 – first published in July 2019
REPORT
“Youth Services Sustainability in Zaatari Refugee 
Camp”: Bothaina Qamar emphasizes the importance 
of providing youth services for refugees. She warns 
that recent budget cuts and the subsequent closure 
of many youth programs in Zaatari Camp could have 
a negative impact at the communal as well as national 
level. Building on the best practices of the previous 
nine years, she advocates strengthening national 
grassroots initiatives for youth services in the camp, 
adopting funding streams and partnership models 
which pool funding and capacities and engage the 
private sector, and promoting Jordanian and Syrian 
youth leadership capacities through the formation of 
cooperatives between Syrian refugees and Jordani-
ans.
Chapter II: International Cooperation
THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES
“Avoiding the Nightmare of Jordan’s Destabilization 
– A Holistic Approach for EU Institutions and Mem-
ber States to Support a Key Ally in the Middle East”: 
Emphasizing the importance of Jordan as a key ally 
of the EU and its member states in the Middle East, 
Eugenio Dacrema outlines three courses of action the 
EU can take to help the country avoid (further) desta-
bilization. In the short term, European leaders should 
support the Jordanian government in its opposition 
to the so-called “Deal of the Century” proposed by 
the Trump administration to address the Israel-
Pales tine conflict. They should include Jordan in their 
own initiatives and develop common policies on the 
issue. In the medium to long term, the EU should fur-
ther Jordan’s economic development by enhancing its 
support for vocational training programs and private 
sector employment and by increasing its efforts to 
improve the bankability of small and medium enter-
prises (SMEs) as well as start-ups.
“Realizing the Opportunity of the Recently Improved 
EU-Jordan Association Agreement – How More Jorda-
nian and Non-Jordanian Producers Can Take Part”: 
Mohammed Al-Husari argues that the EU-Jordan 
Free Trade Agreement, which was signed in 2016 and 
adjusted in 2017 and 2018, offers great potential for 
Jordan’s economic development, yet more Jordanian 
producers should be effectively encouraged to export 
to the EU. Required for this are policies that draw 
in foreign direct investment (FDI) from  ex porters 
to the EU from other countries who are currently 
not exempt from tariffs; improve the energy costs 
of Jordanian producers; and improve research and 
development cooperation between science labs and 
research institutions in Jordan. In addition, possible 
exporters to the EU should be supported with pref-
erential credit and financing opportunities.
“The International Community’s Responsibility to Pro-
tect in Action – The Double-Speed Dynamics of Grant-
ing Humanitarian Visas for Exiled Populations in Jor-
dan”: In light of the social, economic, and political 
challenges which Jordan is facing as a host country to 
a very large number of refugees, Hela Manadile calls 
on European countries to offer humanitarian visas 
for refugees in Jordan. She argues that this would 
allow European countries to assess the legitimacy 
of asylum requests before people arrive in Europe. It 
would also reduce the number of people who seek to 
reach the continent via illegal routes, curtail human 
smuggling and trafficking, and, as a result, decrease 
the number of refugees who lose their lives in the 
Mediterranean.
ISRAEL/PALESTINE
“Jordan’s Options in the Wake of the Failure of the Two-
State Solution”: In light of Israeli domestic political 
developments as well as the Trump administration’s 
approach to the Israel-Palestine conflict, Hassan 
Barari urges the Jordanian leadership to acknowledge 
that a two-state solution may no longer be a viable 
option. As a result, Jordan should reduce its bilateral 
relations with Israel and strengthen its alliance with 
other Arab countries. This course of action should 
include seeking the support of the Arab League as 
well as the international community to secure con-
tinuing funding for UNRWA. In addition, the govern-
ment should communicate clearly that it would not 
play an active role in the West Bank and insist on the 
right of Palestinians to return.
“Palestinian Voices and Agency in the Time of the ‘Deal 
of the Century’ – Building Stronger Narratives and 
Networks”: Tamara Taher critically asserts that Pales-
tinian voices are frequently sidelined in international 
and regional political discussions on the resolution of 
the Israel-Palestine conflict. In response, she advo-
cates greater transnational cooperation between 
actors and civil society organizations (CSOs) which 
promote Palestinian narratives, e.g. on collective 
memory and human rights. This cooperation could, 
for instance, focus on cultural and educational pro-
jects to increase their visibility.
Chapter I: Socio-
Economic Challenges and 
Reforms in Jordan
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POLITICAL ECONOMY
THE BLIND SPOT OF 
INTERNATIONAL DONORS – HOW 
THE JORDANIAN POLITICAL ELITE 
UNDERMINES SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
REFORM
Tomisha Bino
Political corruption in Jordan is undermining develop-
ment efforts and socio-economic reforms. Despite offi-
cial recognition of the importance of socio-economic 
reforms to ensure political stability and counter the 
adverse effects of political corruption, little has been 
done to seriously tackle it. International donors under-
stand the necessity of “thinking politically” for the 
successful implementation of development programs. 
This is why it has become standard practice to include 
political economy analysis (PEA) as an additional tool 
for country assessments and program design. How-
ever, given its current application as a one-off form of 
consultancy often produced under time pressure, PEA 
has come under criticism in recent years for not deliv-
ering on its promise of helping donors to design and 
implement more effective development programs. Aug-
menting PEA with more durable approaches that take 
a longer view on the context, such as elite research, 
can provide deeper insights into the political pro-
cesses of a country. This is especially true for recipient 
countries with highly personalized political systems, 
such as Jordan, where power structures are informal 
and non-transparent. Equipped with this knowl-
edge, donors can create better incentives and identify 
leveraging opportunities to ensure the cooperation of 
obstructive political institutions. Such an approach is 
particularly suitable for Jordan as donors have more 
leverage over processes due to the country’s aid depen-
dency. Jordan is also a relatively less repressive state 
compared to many of its neighbors, and there is some 
room to renegotiate old structures.
1 Sufyan Alissa, “Rethinking Economic Reform in Jordan: Confronting Socioeconomic Realities,” Carnegie Papers No. 4, July 2007 <https://carnegie-mec.
org/2007/07/31/rethinking-economic-reform-in-jordan-confronting-socioeconomic-realities-pub-19465> (accessed July 5, 2019).
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.; Marwan Muasher, “A Decade of Struggling Reform Efforts in Jordan: The Resilience of the Rentier System,” Carnegie Papers, May 2011 <https://
carnegieendowment.org/files/jordan_reform.pdf> (accessed July 5, 2019); and O. Schlumberger and A. Bank, “Jordan: Between Regime Survival and 
Economic Reform,” in Volker Perthes (ed.), Arab Elites: Negotiating the Politics of Change (Boulder, CO: 2004), pp. 35-60.
4 Alissa, “Rethinking Economic Reform.”
Despite the technically sound design of many devel-
opment programs, international donors have seen 
varying degrees of success in their implementation. 
In recent years, most donors and aid agencies have 
understood that successful implementation of devel-
opment programs cannot be guaranteed by the qual-
ity of the technical aspects alone, but that underlying 
political processes and the interests of political-
ly-relevant elites (PRE) are the central determinants 
of whether they succeed or are blocked. Jordan is one 
of the countries where development programs have 
had difficulty achieving desired outcomes due to the 
problems of corruption and elite capture.
King Abdullah II of Jordan has made economic 
reform a key priority since ascending to the throne, 
but despite the “more consolidated reform effort 
under [his] new regime,”1 the promised reform has 
not materialized. As the economist Sufyan Alissa has 
pointed out, “there is little doubt that Jordan has 
been engaging in broad – though selective, slow, and 
uncoordinated – economic reform,” but that reforms 
“avoided addressing controversial issues such as the 
inefficiency of the bureaucracy and the size of the 
public administration.”2
It has abundantly been made clear by Alissa and other 
experts that political, economic, and tribal elites have 
been the main obstacle to the realization of sorely 
needed socio-economic reforms.3 Reforms are sup-
pressed or incompletely implemented due to resis-
tance from members of the PRE, who stand to be 
negatively affected by them.4 This can be seen, for 
example, in the underwhelming results of Jordan’s 
donor-supported decentralization efforts, where 
existing elite networks were widened and replicated 
on the local level, instead of creating more autono-
mous structures.
Although the existence of widespread PRE political 
corruption, clientelism, and rent-seeking behavior 
is well-documented and the devastating effects this 
has on social and economic reform are undisputed, 
anti-corruption measures have been lukewarm. 
Despite the creation of the Jordanian anti-corruption 
commission (ACC) and the drafting of a new anti-cor-
ruption law in 2006, the ACC has “had no real teeth 
Chapter I: Socio-Economic Challenges and Reforms in Jordan
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and has been largely ineffective over the years.”5 To 
make matters worse, one of the most high-profile 
cases handled by the ACC – the trial and conviction of 
ex-intelligence chief Mohammad Dahabi – is rumored 
to have been motivated by political score-settling, 
casting further doubt over the intentions and sincer-
ity of the state’s efforts in tackling corruption.
One of the reasons that makes tackling PRE corrupt 
practices so problematic is that Jordan’s PRE are 
and have been the most important pillar of the king-
dom’s stability over the years. The PRE in Jordan are 
defined here as “a ruling coalition of security and for-
eign policy professionals that include the monarchy, 
the political elite, and the military”6 as well as busi-
ness elites. Furthermore, in some cases, donors and 
aid agencies might be reluctant to shine too strong 
a spotlight on the issue of elite capture and cor-
rupt practices of the PRE in fear of upsetting ongo-
ing partnerships, where a member of the PRE might 
have helped facilitate a program or “opened doors.” 
Such behavior is unsustainable and only hurts devel-
opment programs as it allows the PRE to pick and 
choose the programs that suit their interests best.
The failure to deliver on promises of socio-economic 
reforms has resulted in a domestic threat to the 
political stability of Jordan. In her opening speech at 
the recent Jordan investment conference in London,7 
the then-International Development Secretary Penny 
Mordaunt, proclaimed: “We all agree; Jordan’s pros-
perity is critical to the international community.”8 If 
the continued stability of Jordan is the desired out-
come of Jordanian and international policymakers, 
5 Muasher, “A Decade of Struggling Reform Efforts.”
6 L. Tal, Politics, the Military, and National Security in Jordan, 1955-1967 (New York, 2002), p. xiii.
7 Officially known as “Jordan: Growth and Opportunity, the London Initiative.”
8 Penny Mordaunt, “Speech: Jordan: Growth and Opportunity, the London Initiative,” UK Department for International Development, February 28, 2019 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/jordan-growth-opportunity-the-london-initiative-28-february-2019> (accessed July 5, 2019).
9 C. Bliler, “Jordan’s Urgent Need to Reform,” The National Interest, July 9, 2015 <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/jordans-urgent-need-
reform-13289> (accessed July 5, 2019).
10 “Jordan Government Debt to GDP,” Trading Economics <https://tradingeconomics.com/jordan/government-debt-to-gdp> (accessed July 5, 2019).
then their policy aims must be to help Jordan to build 
a prosperous and equitable society.
In terms of prosperity, most Jordanians have seen 
their living standards decline steadily since 1989, 
when the value of the Jordanian Dinar started to fall 
sharply in the aftermath of the disengagement from 
the West Bank and the ensuing economic troubles. 
Unemployment – especially among youth – is high 
due to the weakening of the social contract, whereby 
the public sector was expected to provide employ-
ment. Unlike its wealthy neighbors, Jordan cannot 
afford a bloated public sector that can sustain its 
populace and secure state legitimacy. Yet despite 
official recognition of this, “state overreach has 
crowded out the growth of a viable and independent 
private sector, hindering opportunities for job cre-
ation.”9 Just as the PRE is crucial for stability, Jordan’s 
social contract is a crucial element to PRE survival, as 
it is the vehicle by which members of the PRE distrib-
ute rents among their support bases, which in turn 
secure their loyalty to the monarchy. This is coupled 
with a weak private sector and limited foreign invest-
ment, two avenues that could potentially create jobs. 
Here, the hand of the PRE is also visible as it has a 
vested interest in keeping the private sector weak, so 
as to retain central control over revenue production 
and impede the growth of alternative and indepen-
dent power bases.
The Jordanian state has also been unable to create an 
equitable society. Public debt has continued to grow 
despite the harsh and unpopular austerity measures 
put forth to address it. Between 2009 and 2018, Jor-
dan’s public debt to GDP ratio jumped from 64.78 
percent to 94.23 percent.10 Austerity measures are 
never popular, but the reason they have been such 
a bitter pill to swallow is that most Jordanians view 
the rising public debt as a result of corruption and 
mismanagement of public funds by the PRE, who are 
perceived to have enriched themselves at the cost of 
the average Jordanian. Generally, when speaking of 
corruption, the focus has been on what a person has 
“taken” and not so much at what has been “denied.” 
Corrupt members of the PRE in Jordan have not only 
been accused of embezzling public funds and bribery, 
they have also opposed socio-economic reforms and 
Policy-relevant elites 
pose an obstacle to socio- 
economic reforms
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blocked new entrants to the business sector in order 
to protect their political power and privileged access 
to economic opportunity.
Today, as Jordan finds itself at a critical juncture, 
there is a crucial need for more serious anti-corrup-
tion initiatives addressing some of the PRE’s most 
detrimental practices, which have resulted in the 
gradual and severe erosion of trust between the state 
and the Jordanian people. As many of Jordan’s tradi-
tional international and regional partners appear to 
be attempting to leverage aid and security arrange-
ments in return for foreign policy alignment, the PRE 
will require strong public support and trust if it can 
stand firm in the face of mounting pressure.
Making the Most of Political Economy Analysis 
(PEA) 
In response to the recognition of taking the political 
context into consideration when designing develop-
ment programs, international donors and aid agen-
cies have developed PEA tools to help inform the 
design of development programs. However, PEA tools 
have only had limited success in achieving a change 
in the approach to development projects on an orga-
nizational level. Instead of encouraging development 
staff to “think politically” about the context of their 
programs, PEA has increasingly become an add-on or 
an off-the-shelf consultancy product. In most cases, 
PEA are created under time pressure and often have 
limited scope and depth. They provide a snapshot of 
the political context at the time, while what is needed 
is an understanding of the development and pro-
cesses that produced the context. PEA has also been 
criticized for being too “economic” and less “politi-
cal.” For Jordan, such an approach will surely miss the 
bigger picture, as the core elites’ power and interests 
in terms of national security, political power, and the 
economy are entangled.
In the specific case of Jordan, where politics is highly 
personalized and there is an overlap of interests 
across different sectors, a PEA would have to pay 
special attention to the complex and deeply rooted 
PRE networks in order to understand the politi-
cal processes at play. However, due to the current 
one-off nature of PEA, producing deep and durable 
insights is a challenge. Such insights can only be 
gained through elite research methods that not only 
examine the current makeup of PRE, but track their 
evolution over time and identify internal dynamics of 
the PRE, such as recruitment and interest factions, 
as well as their survival strategies. In the case of 
Jordan, elite research can also provide insights into 
political changes and foreshadow political develop-
ments given that the incumbent PRE are regularly 
reshuffled. Understanding a certain PRE member’s 
background, connections, and interests can reveal 
much about why they have been rotated in or out of 
a certain posting and the effects that might have on 
specific development programs.
Recommendations
 - Augment PEA with insights from elite research
Despite its shortcomings, PEA still provides a firm 
base for assessing the political context in a country. 
However, in the case of Jordan, it must be supple-
mented with PRE-focused research. Elite research 
is an established field in the social sciences that is 
a valuable resource for development programs. 
Through cooperation with elite research experts and 
academics with regional or country-specific exper-
tise, donors and aid agencies can better understand 
not only the context, but also the individuals who will 
shape and supervise their programs.
 - Use elite research to identify reform-minded PRE
Elite research can also help donors and aid agencies 
identify reform-minded members of the PRE who 
could subsequently serve as reliable local partners 
for the implementation of development programs. 
This can work particularly well in the case of Jordan 
where the PRE is not completely static. Incumbent 
PRE are regularly rotated and new members have 
been recruited on several occasions. By identifying 
cooperative and reform-minded newly appointed 
or incoming PRE, donors and aid agencies can bet-
ter decide which programs are more likely to suc-
ceed. However, this approach can only be seen as 
an interim solution while parallel anti-corruption 
initiatives take root, as it runs the risk of creating 
new rent-seeking structures. For this reason, elite 
Failing to deliver 
 socio-economic reforms 
threatens Jordan’s stability 
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research must be conducted in an ongoing and iter-
ative manner.
 - Link development programs identified as particu-
larly susceptible to subversion by the PRE to other 
bilateral programs to create incentives and leverage
Development programs do not exist in a vacuum and 
are usually one element of a broader set of coop-
eration initiatives by the donor countries, such as 
defense partnerships or trade agreements, which 
are the result of a defined strategy. By adopting a 
whole-of-government approach to development, 
donor countries can create incentives to ensure PRE 
cooperation or use the approach to create leverage 
over them. For example, Germany’s aid agency, GIZ, 
runs several programs in Jordan targeting a variety 
of sectors, from governance to water management. 
Germany also delivers military aid to Jordan as part 
of its Ertüchtigungsinitiativen or “strengthening 
initiatives,” which are meant to help Jordan defend 
itself and safeguard its stability. This is one tool in 
the larger toolbox of stabilization approaches. In this 
example, Germany could leverage the delivery of 
further military aid to ensure better conditions for 
the implementation of development aid programs. 
Such an approach would also be well-suited for a 
whole-of-government approach because the Ger-
man Federal Ministry of Defense and the Federal 
Foreign Office already have a comparable arrange-
ment through their Vernetzter Ansatz or “networked 
approach” to stabilization efforts.
Tomisha Bino is a program analyst at the UN 
Institute for Disarmament Research in Geneva, 
Switzerland. At the time of the workshop, she 
worked as a researcher at the Conflict Analysis 
and International Crisis Management Department 
of the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel Univer-
sity. Her research interests include political elites 
and stabilization, as well as disarmament and 
arms control policy in the Middle East.
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ENERGY
ENERGY POLICY IN JORDAN 
– ACHIEVING SECURITY AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
THROUGH DOMESTIC RENEWABLE 
ENERGY
Nadim Abillama
Continuous efforts by the Jordanian government to 
achieve energy security by reducing its dependence on 
hydrocarbon imports for electricity production have 
led it to support the development of renewable energy 
sources. These include hydropower and shale oil as well 
as solar and wind energy. Although the government 
has adapted its legislation and regulatory frameworks 
to better facilitate domestic and foreign investments, 
challenges remain in terms of national grid capacity 
and a lack of incentives for the local production of 
solar and wind plant components that would support 
domestic employment. International organizations 
and financial institutions have provided financial sup-
port and offset risks associated with the development 
of a new sector in a region as unstable as the Middle 
East, but private investors (banks, investments funds, 
and others) have not been sufficiently supportive. To 
address these issues, renewable energy stakeholders 
should be better integrated through the establish-
ment of a one-stop-shop, investment in research and 
development activities should be improved, and grid 
enhancement should be pushed. In addition, the Jor-
danian government should communicate the project 
pipeline clearly to provide domestic companies with 
guarantees for investing in upgrades of their produc-
tion lines. 
Energy policy remains a central issue in global pol-
icy-making, impacting both social and political sys-
tems. As well as guaranteeing access to electricity 
for citizens and businesses, energy policy defines a 
country’s environmental and industrial policy and, 
more broadly, its economic policy. In parallel, a sig-
nificant number of countries are currently engaged 
in energy transitions, progressively shifting from 
conventional energy sources (coal, oil, natural gas, 
1 Author’s discussion with experts from EDAMA and the Royal Scientific Society.
2 “Renewables in the Arab world: maintaining momentum,” APICORP Energy Research, May 2018 <http://www.apicorp-arabia.com/Research/
EnergyReseach/2018/APICORP_Energy_Researc h_V03_N08_2018.pdf> (accessed July 16, 2019).
3 “Background Paper: Country Fact Sheet, Jordan. Energy and Development at a Glance,” MENA SELECT, 2017 <https://menaselect.info/uploads/
countries/jordan/Country_Fact_She et_Jordan.pdf> (accessed July 16, 2019).
etc.) towards sources generating lower amounts of 
CO2 in order to mitigate the adverse impact of cli-
mate change.
The Middle East region features significant dispari-
ties in terms of natural resource distribution. While 
some Gulf states (Kuwait, Qatar, or Saudi Arabia) have 
benefited from the wealth generated by their incred-
ible natural resources that offer long-term energy 
security, others such as Jordan have had to contin-
uously adapt in order to secure sufficient supply for 
their domestic energy production. Moreover, the 
Kingdom’s geography makes it particularly vulnerable 
to climate change, more specifically water scarcity, 
droughts, and desertification.
As a result, Jordan imports around 96 percent of its 
energy for electricity production, which is currently 
dominated by fossil fuels, crude oil, and natural gas. 
The main suppliers are the wealthy Gulf states on 
whom Jordan has become increasingly dependent, 
which further impacts the Kingdom’s regional pol-
icy. While the OECD average domestic expenditure 
on imports for electricity generation is 4-5 percent, 
Jordan currently spends 8.5 percent of its GDP on 
energy imports,1 causing pressure on the public bud-
get.
Attempts to phase out energy subsidies in Jordan 
were made as early as the 1990s. However, the gov-
ernment was only able to implement a progressive, 
three-year phasing out of energy subsidies in 2015. In 
order to address the high inflation rates that followed 
the cuts in energy subsidy spending, the government 
introduced a variety of mitigating measures aimed at 
lower-income citizens, including public sector salary 
increases, food subsidies, and tax rebates. The pro-
gram was a success in limiting direct and indirect 
inflation caused by the increase in fuel prices. Supply 
disruptions following the Arab Spring led to a sud-
den increase in import prices for natural gas, which 
rendered the earlier socio-economic mitigation 
measures insufficient. Moreover, electricity demand 
has been increasing annually by over 7 percent since 
20072 with an extra 300 MW capacity needed every 
year.3
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Policy and the Legal Framework Governing the 
Jordanian Renewable Energy Sector
The need to seek alternative energy sources was 
clearly articulated in 2007 with the launch of the Jor-
dan National Energy Strategy Plan.4 Its objective is 
to reduce the country’s dependence on fossil fuels 
from its neighbors by developing alternative energy 
sources, including nuclear, shale oil, and renewables. 
The plan initially aimed at achieving a share of 7 per-
cent of electricity generated from renewable energy 
sources by 2015, and 10 percent by 2020. The share is 
currently 11 percent and a new target of 20 percent 
has been set for 2025.5
The government has expended significant efforts in 
establishing a legal framework to enable an increased 
share of renewable energy in national electricity 
production. The Renewable Energy and Energy Effi-
ciency Law (REEEL) was adopted in 2012,6 creating 
a favorable environment to attract international 
investment in the Jordanian renewable energy sec-
tor.7 For example, a direct proposal scheme was 
developed allowing investors to address the Minis-
try of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR) with-
out going through a competitive bidding process as 
long as the tariffs offered were equal to or below the 
indicative prices set by the Ministry. This is a type 
of feed-in that has enabled Jordan to obtain highly 
competitive prices. Moreover, the law also estab-
lished the Jordan Renewable Energy and Energy Effi-
ciency Fund (JREEEF) to channel public and private 
investment into the renewable energy sector.
4 Jordan Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Database, National Energy Research Center (NERC), Royal Scientific Society.
5 “Jordan to produce 20 per cent of energy from renewables by 2025,” Power Technology, June 4, 2019, <https://www.power-technology.com/comment/
jordan-renewable-energy-2019/> (accessed July 9, 2019).
6 “Background Paper,” MENA SELECT.
7 “Implementation Completion and Results Report on a Grant from the Global Environment Facility Trust Fund in the Amount of US$6.00 Million to the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for a Promotion of a Wind Power Market Project,” World Bank, March 29, 2016 <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/
en/152051485960685155/p df/ICR3759-P093201-Box394878B-PUBLIC-disclosed-4-7-16.pdf > (accessed July 16, 2019)
Challenges Preventing the Faster Development of 
Renewable Energy Sources
Despite its efforts to enable investment in renew-
able energy projects, Jordan still faces significant 
impediments to achieve its goal of using 20 percent 
renewable energy by 2025. The main obstacles are 
as follows:
Insufficient Integration of the Main Stakeholders 
to Implement the National Energy Strategy Plan
The main actors – MEMR, JREEEF, and the Energy 
and Minerals Regulatory Commission (EMRC) – are 
not integrated sufficiently with non-governmental 
actors, including chambers of commerce, business 
associations, academic institutions for research and 
development, and the banking sector. The JREEEF 
has not been given the autonomy it requires to chan-
nel investments from international finance institu-
tions (IFIs) or private investors into renewable energy 
projects. Nor does the JREEEF currently have the 
capacity to act as a fund to integrate all the invest-
ments the country receives in order to achieve the 
objectives of the National Energy Strategy regarding 
renewable energy sector development.
Lack of a Clear Strategy to Develop Local Manufac-
turing of Wind and Solar Technology Components
Jordan has existing producers of solar photovol-
taic (PV) cables and connection boxes as well as 
civil works, infrastructure, and material companies. 
Moreover, there is a widespread availability of raw 
materials such as glass to produce PV modules.
In wind technology, Jordan has similar strengths 
that have benefited domestic cable production as 
well as steel companies which provide raw materi-
als. However, the manufacturing of core components 
such as rotor blades is not currently possible and 
would require significant investment to be produced 
domestically. Besides, the government has imposed 
a 20 percent local content requirement for all wind 
projects. However, this rate includes Energy, Pro-
curement, and Construction (EPC) and operations 
The limited grid capacity is 
a serious constraint
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and maintenance costs,8 which limits the incentives 
for Jordanian companies to enter this market.9
Another serious constraint is the limited grid capac-
ity. The government has announced the development 
of the Green Corridor project to upgrade the national 
grid, whose limited capacity hinders the development 
of grid-connected plants, limiting potential contribu-
tions from the private sector through wheeling (the 
transfer of electrical energy from a privately-owned 
plant into the grid for a value deducted from the 
owners’ electricity bill). The project is facing seri-
ous investment challenges because Jordan’s National 
Electric Power Company (NEPCO), which owns 
the grid, is not able to finance grid enhancement. 
Through the use and development of renewables, 
buyers are exiting the national grid and thus reduc-
ing NEPCO’s income. This further limits the invest-
ment capacity of NEPCO, which is already indebted. 
This situation also creates obstacles to the develop-
ment of alternatives to the single-buyer model which 
governs the Jordanian electricity market. Electric-
ity producers sell to NEPCO according to a Power 
Purchase Agreement (PPA) price. However, recent 
renewable energy projects are becoming increasingly 
bankable and are able to provide extremely low elec-
tricity prices which NEPCO would have to purchase, 
limiting its income even further.
In parallel, the issue of cross-subsidies remains a sig-
nificant obstacle to the ability of Jordanian industrial 
companies to achieve higher competitiveness levels 
through lower electricity prices. The current model 
aims to use tax income generated by large buyers of 
electricity to redistribute among households, in an 
attempt to avoid constraining the national budget by 
mitigating the amount that individuals have to pay for 
electricity.
The Financial Sector is not Acting Sufficiently to 
Promote Investment in Renewable Energy Projects
The intense involvement of international financial 
institutions and development banks (World Bank, 
the EBRD, etc.) has contributed to the promotion of 
large-scale projects by covering risks associated with 
the development of the renewable energy sector, 
despite uncertainties.10 These actors have been key 
8 “Evaluating Renewable Energy Manufacturing Potential in the Arab Region: Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Emirates,” International Renewable Energy 
Agency, 2018 <https://irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2018/Oct/IRENA-ESCWA_Manufacturing_potential_2018.pdf> (accessed July 
16, 2019).
9 “Promoting Renewable Energy Investments for Climate Change Mitigation and Sustainable Development,” Economic and Social Commission for 
Western Asia in collaboration with Economic Commission for Europe, 2018 <https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/energy/se/pdfs/reg_adv/proj/
Promoting.RE_Project.Document.pdf> (accessed July 16, 2019).
10 “The critical role of multilateral institutions in MENA’s renewable sector,” APICORP Energy Research, July 2018 <http://www.apicorp-arabia.com/
Research/EnergyReseach/2018/APICORP_Energy_Researc h_V03_N10_2018.pdf> (accessed July 16, 2019).
to the initial development of the renewable energy 
sector as commercial banks were reluctant to invest 
in a market that offered financial risks: regional 
instability, a new market, uncertain financial sustain-
ability of projects, and so on. Moreover, these insti-
tutions regularly offered capacity building, including 
the development of a legal and regulatory framework 
governing the sector.
However, commercial banks still have limited involve-
ment in supporting renewable energy projects. This 
has to do with limited knowledge of the sector, but 
also a lack of incentives and guarantees provided 
by the government to secure investments. Com-
mercial banks should become more active, provided 
that long-term visibility is offered by government 
agencies in terms of risks and growth potential. The 
Central Bank of Jordan has put in place a JD 4 mil-
lion financial facility to be lent through commercial 
banks.
Another financial constraint on the development of 
the sector is related to electricity subsidies. These 
currently target lower-income consumers and are 
mainly paid at the expense of large consumers such 
as industrial companies whose competitiveness suf-
fers from high electricity prices, directly impacting 
on their revenues, exports, and capacity to hire Jor-
danians. The development of wheeling would signifi-
cantly increase NEPCO’s deficit in the short term.
Recommendations
As a result, for both solar PV and wind technologies, 
the government should, together with the private 
sector, maximize the local content potential associ-
ated with renewable energy projects. This includes 
investments in research and development in priority 
areas. In parallel, the government should offer clear 
Commercial banks’ 
involvement is still limited
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guarantees that demand will be sustained in the long 
term through enhanced transparency efforts related 
to the project pipeline. Domestic companies should 
invest in the upgrade of their production lines and 
respond to strong market demand.
 - At the institutional level: better integrate renew-
able energy stakeholders to develop the renewable 
energy sector through the establishment of a one-
stop-shop
This should be coordinated by central government 
and all the involved ministries, departments, agen-
cies, and non-governmental organizations (including 
chambers of commerce, industry associations, NGOs, 
and free zones) to ensure that all stakeholders are 
aligned on priorities and actions.
Moreover, the renewable energy strategy should be 
clear not only concerning production targets, but 
also have an integrated approach to the sector. This 
includes supporting domestic companies by pro-
viding legal and business advice, access to finance, 
channeling international and domestic investment, 
and making information available to domestic stake-
holders (mainly chambers of commerce and private 
companies).
 - Communicate the project pipeline clearly to provide 
domestic companies with guarantees for investing 
in upgrades of their production lines
Domestic companies interested in investing and 
contributing to the development of the renewable 
energy sector in Jordan should be given long-term 
visibility, enabling them to invest and hire qualified 
personnel. Joint ventures should be established with 
international companies already present in Jordan, 
whose experience would benefit domestic compa-
nies through technology transfers. It would also pro-
vide incentives for local companies to diversify their 
activities outside energy, procurement, and con-
struction, and operations and maintenance.
 - Invest in research and development activities to 
build manufacturing capabilities for higher val-
ue-added components for solar PV and wind gen-
eration
This requires deeper coordination and coopera-
tion with academic institutions. The development 
of solar cells or wind turbines, which are the high-
est value-added parts, remains expensive in terms 
of research and development in a market the size of 
Jordan, as well as with the presence of competitive 
international competitors who currently build these 
parts. However, the knowledge acquired by Jorda-
nian companies in recent years provide them with 
the capacity to adapt and redesign imported parts for 
both domestic and regional markets. This would lead 
to lower amounts of investment in terms of research 
and development for a promising return in the short- 
and medium-term.
 - Improve grid enhancement to support the sector’s 
growth
The development of the Green Corridor project to 
increase grid capacity would unlock Jordan’s capacity 
to build new solar and wind energy farms.
 - Better package financial instruments to further 
develop the renewable energy sector so as to benefit 
domestic companies
There is insufficient financial education about the 
available financial instruments and limited capabil-
ities to adapt hybrid finance to renewable energy 
projects. The Central Bank and the MEMR can coor-
dinate a national campaign to raise awareness of 
the available instruments for domestic companies 
and investors. Furthermore, incentives should be 
maintained for international financial institutions 
and development banks to continue benefiting from 
attractive interest rates, despite regional instability 
and economic uncertainty.
Nadim Abillama is a senior public policy analyst 
at the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) working on 
the European and Middle East markets. He stud-
ied EU public policy at the College of Europe in 
Bruges.
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IMPROVING COMPETITIVENESS 
AND TRADE BALANCE THROUGH 
DECENTRALIZED RENEWABLE 
ENERGY – THE CASE OF JORDAN
Jessica Obeid
Energy is a main driver of economic development, yet 
its cost can hinder growth in productive sectors and 
export trade, especially in energy-importing econo-
mies. The energy sector has also been a major contrib-
utor to Jordan’s public debt. To alleviate this, the Jorda-
nian government has implemented phased removal of 
electricity subsidies and heavily invested in regulations 
and funds promoting renewable energy. The focus is on 
implementing utility-scale renewable energy projects, 
which resulted in a 7.9 percent renewable energy share 
of total electricity generation in 2018. Yet this share 
will remain relatively low for a significant period of 
time, with only a minor impact on electricity prices in 
the short- and medium-term. Thus, energy models that 
immediately and significantly reduce electricity bills, 
such as decentralized small-scale renewable energy 
systems, should be emphasized. Financing mechanisms 
should be improved and should prioritize decentral-
ized generation for productive sectors. A framework to 
attract investments in decentralized solutions should 
be clearly defined. The electricity utility company 
should change its role from a provider of energy to an 
enabler of a thriving electricity market, facilitating the 
integration of the different energy systems into a mod-
ernized grid. Moreover, grants and aid flowing into 
Jordan for energy projects should plan for “energy for 
trade,” providing incentives for small-scale renewable 
energy in productive sectors with export potential.
Energy is a main driver of economic development.11 
The causal linkages between energy consumption 
and economic growth have long been studied; the 
results depend on several factors such as the income 
level and energy context of a certain economy. In 
recent years, energy efficiency has contributed in 
some areas to a decoupling of energy consumption 
from economic growth. However, energy remains 
highly significant in achieving economic growth, 
especially since economic activities rely more and 
more on energy. Consequently, the demand for 
energy is increasing and becoming a heavy burden 
11 S. Carley and S. Lawrence, Energy-Based Economic Development (London, 2014), p. 16.
12 O. Esen and M. Bayrak, “Does More Energy Consumption Support Economic Growth in Net Energy-Importing Countries?,” Journal of Economics, Finance 
and Administrative Science 42 (2017), pp.75-98 (p.75).
13 “More Debt for Jordan’s NEPCO,” MEES, April 19, 2019 <https://www.mees.com/2019/4/19/news-in-brief/more-debt-for-jordans-nepco/297dda60-
6297-11e9-b184-efe3b3b5acee> (accessed July 9, 2019).
14 NEPCO, “Bulletin 2018,” 2018, p. 1.
15 Bloomberg Finance, “Climatescope Emerging Market Outlook 2018,” 2018, p. 4.
for commercial activities and state budgets in econ-
omies that provide subsidies. The challenge increases 
for energy-importing economies that often have to 
choose between low economic growth or increased 
energy imports in an attempt to increase growth.12 
But this can be a vicious cycle for external trade, 
since increased energy imports elevate the costs 
both for governments and businesses who end up 
paying high operating costs, reducing their compet-
itiveness on the local and international market, and 
negatively impacting their ability to export. Thus, the 
cost of energy can obstruct export potential. This 
is particularly relevant to the Hashemite Kingdom 
of Jordan, a highly-indebted, net energy-importing 
Middle Eastern economy.
The energy sector, specifically electricity, is a main 
contributor to Jordan’s public debt. The Kingdom’s 
National Electric Power Company (NEPCO) has been 
blamed for the rising level of public debt, due to the 
subsidies it receives, with a total contribution to debt 
of 7.8 billion USD,13 equivalent to 19 percent of the 
Kingdom’s total public debt. To alleviate its fiscal bur-
den, Jordan started implementing a package of fiscal 
reforms some years ago, which included a phased 
removal of electricity subsidies. The Kingdom has 
also adopted aggressive renewable energy targets 
to reduce fossil fuel imports. The 2007 renewable 
energy target of 10 percent by 2020 was modified 
at the end of 2018 to 20 percent of primary energy 
demand by 2020.
Jordan has therefore heavily invested in regulations 
and funds promoting renewable energy, focusing on 
implementing utility-scale renewable energy pro-
jects, and these investments are paying off. According 
to data on electricity generation published by NEPCO 
in its 2018 Bulletin, renewable energy was calcu-
lated at 7.9 percent of the total electricity genera-
tion in 2018,14 up from 2 percent in 2013, and Jordan 
was ranked as third best investment environment in 
renewable energy by the Bloomberg Climatescope 
2018 Index.15
Jordan’s efforts in the energy sector place it at the 
forefront of renewable energy in the region, promis-
ing to improve the Kingdom’s energy security and 
decrease its reliance on fossil fuels. While invest-
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ments in utility-scale renewable energy are impor-
tant, the share of renewables will remain relatively 
low for a significant period of time, with insignifi-
cant impact on electricity prices in the short- and 
medium-term, as the Kingdom still relies on fossil 
fuel imports for more than 90 percent of its elec-
tricity generation. In fact, high energy costs are still 
reported as the largest challenge for the economy’s 
performance.16 As part of the fiscal reforms, the 
government increased electricity tariffs by approx-
imately 15 percent in 2014 and an additional 7.5 per-
cent in 2015,17 negatively impacting the competitive-
ness of productive sectors in the Kingdom.
The agricultural sector accounts for 15.5 percent of 
total electricity consumption in the Kingdom, most 
of which is for irrigation. Higher electricity costs are 
one of the key factors that have hindered famers’ abil-
ity to consider investments in advanced agriculture 
technologies, and as a result, to improve the overall’s 
sector efficiency, productivity, export opportunities, 
and returns for the economy. Similarly, in tourism, 
high operating costs driven by increased electricity 
bills have also weakened hotels’ competitiveness and 
hampered their ability to cut down on room rates, 
thus impacting the number of tourists in Jordan as 
well as how long they stay.
The problem worsens in manufacturing as the high 
cost of electricity translates into high production 
costs and reduced competitiveness. To deal with 
this, industry stakeholders have to either drastically 
reduce their profit margin just to remain on the local 
and international market, or decrease quality to cut 
down on production costs, and thus risk not meeting 
international standards. In meetings with local citi-
zens, several individuals complained about the lower 
quality of locally produced items, and expressed 
preference for imported higher-quality products. 
16 Ibid., p. 4.
17 J. Obeid, ‘Middle East Utilities vs Distributed Generation: A Losing Battle’, Castlereagh Associates, June 25, 2019 <https://castlereagh.net/middle-east-
utilities-vs-distributed-generation-a-losing-battle/> (accessed July 9, 2019).
The situation has worsened recently with several 
industries reportedly permanently closing down. 
Manufacturing exporters also expressed the drop in 
their ability to compete internationally. The business 
services sector also suffers from the same electricity 
cost issue, which weakens the prospects of Jordan’s 
positioning as a regional outsourcing hub.
The Struggle for Lower Prices
Although the situation is threatening for the econ-
omy and export trade, it also presents an opportunity 
for decentralized electricity generation from renew-
able energy sources, which would improve Jordan’s 
overall economy and its export potential through 
enhanced competitiveness on the international level. 
Several factors are currently negatively impacting the 
performance of the power sector: the lack of a solid 
energy security strategy; the lack of investments in 
energy efficiency; the persistence of the single-buyer 
model; elevated subsidies in energy and other sec-
tors; poorly-designed long-term conventional and 
renewable Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs); and 
the ill-conceived tariff restructure.
In electricity subsidy removal, the government has 
adopted a straightforward approach, hiking the elec-
tricity tariff for high-paying customers, high electric-
ity consumers, and the commercial sector, and aim-
ing to safeguard poor households and the smallest 
industries. These high-paying consumers are there-
fore considering alternative options such as rooftop 
renewable energy generation, creating high risk for 
the utility’s revenues.vii Instead of changing its role 
and revenue streams, the electricity utility com-
pany is fighting against decentralized generation. 
The Kingdom has also signed several poorly-planned 
long-term PPAs in conventional thermal energy, 
which result in an excess energy supply and the con-
servation of elevated electricity prices.
Moreover, the focus on increasing renewable energy 
capacity happened without proper planning in terms 
of design of long-term PPAs, off-taker prices, grid 
capacity, and de-risking measures. As a result of 
the ill-conceived PPAs to buy electricity from utili-
ty-scale renewable energy systems, the government 
is paying for unnecessary and non-consumed elec-
tricity generation, as it has committed itself to buy-
ing all deemed energy: the energy generated, and 
The energy sector is a main 
contributor to Jordan’s 
public debt
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power curtailed due to grid congestion or minimum 
base load capacity requirements.
Moreover, with falling renewable energy technology 
prices, the feed-in tariff contracts and the long-term 
agreements signed a few years ago are now consid-
ered expensive. The generated power is currently 
valued at approximately four times lower than the 
prices offered and agreed upon around 2012. The 
government is tied to these contracts it cannot 
change without reducing investors’ confidence, yet 
these contracts should serve as a lesson on how to 
improve the strategy of renewable energy deploy-
ment.
There are also several complications on the grid 
side for utility-scale deployment. When the share 
of renewables exceeds 10 percent of the energy mix, 
enhancements to the grid network will be neces-
sary for integrating renewable energy and mitigating 
the impact of its intermittency. As a result, network 
fixed costs will increase. Battery storage will improve 
this situation, but does not represent the optimum, 
cost-effective solution. Challenges are already arising 
for the ageing grid, while the government has yet to 
decide which power market it aspires to, and sub-
sequently which power grid it should invest in. This 
has prompted the government to halt new licensing 
for renewable energy projects of a capacity higher 
than 1 MW, from early 2019 for an undefined period. 
Although technical experts report that the grid can 
sustain higher capacities, the utility is resorting to 
the 1 MW ceiling to halt some wheeling projects. 
This may or may not impact investors’ confidence in 
the sector, but it should trigger optimization of the 
power sector strategy.
As the global cost of power generation from renew-
able (mainly solar and wind) energy falls sharply, 
rooftop forms of decentralized generation have a 
competitive advantage over utility-scale systems in 
terms of offsetting the otherwise fixed costs of trans-
mission and distribution, making decentralization the 
cheaper renewables solution. Jordan should benefit 
heavily from that, considering that most renewable 
energy projects are currently implemented in the 
south of the country, then transmitted to the center 
due to the lower cost of land and better insolation in 
the south. This arrangement requires an additional 
investment of $145 million by the government to 
implement the “Green Corridor” grid reinforcement. 
Moreover, investment in grid modernization is lack-
ing.
Shortcomings in Existing Support Mechanisms
Decentralized renewable energy systems are an 
optimal, lower-risk mechanism for increasing energy 
security and resilience, and achieving lower elec-
tricity prices. These systems promise to increase 
the competitiveness of the productive sectors and 
improve their export ability. Yet, they do need more 
focused financing and support mechanisms as the 
capital cost is too high for most businesses to bear.
The Jordan Chamber of Industry launched recently a 
100 MW solar photovoltaic (PV) project for the man-
ufacturing sector, enabling 100 small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) to receive the equivalent power 
generation of 1 MW each. It remains unclear how 
this mechanism will be implemented and how these 
industries will seek equity for their plants. The sec-
tor also comprises an estimated total of more than 
15,000 industries, which means that the project’s 
scale is too small to create a significant impact, and 
sustainable, clear support mechanisms are needed.
The government has implemented the Jordan Renew-
able Energy and Energy Efficiency Fund (JREEEF) to 
provide loan guarantees for renewable energy sys-
tems for SMEs and the residential sector. In practice, 
the fund lacks a clear implementation strategy and 
has mainly supported schools and the residential sec-
tor, aiming for a consumption ceiling of 600 kWh per 
month for beneficiaries (low-consumption, low-tar-
iff consumers). SMEs, which constitute 98 percent 
of Jordanian businesses and which report challenges 
in access to finance, have mostly been unable to tap 
into the fund.
Recommendations
In its Vision 2025, and its aspiration to improve 
exports, the government of Jordan should be mindful 
of the high electricity costs as a barrier to the King-
Decentralized renew-
able energy systems can 
 increase energy security 
and resilience
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dom’s competitiveness on the international level. 
While the efforts to promote large-scale renewable 
energy systems, improving energy security, and 
reducing reliance on fossil fuel exports in the long-
term are to be commended, the overall challenges 
in the power sector should drive the government to 
encourage decentralized power generation, re-assess 
the role and business model of its national electric-
ity utility, and optimize foreign grants in the energy 
sector.
 - Decentralize energy models
Energy models that offer short- and medium-term 
significant reduction of electricity bills, such as 
decentralized small-scale renewable energy systems, 
should be emphasized.
 - Improve financing mechanisms and prioritize 
decentralized generation in productive sectors
A framework to attract investments in decentralized 
solutions should be clearly defined. The JREEEF fund 
should become an independent entity and should 
focus on the productive sectors, enabling a large 
share of SMEs to tap into the fund.
 - Change the role of the electricity utility from a pro-
vider of energy to an enabler of a thriving electricity 
market
This would facilitate the integration of different 
energy systems into the grid, and maximize the 
value of renewable energy systems’ implementation. 
Decentralized renewable energy generation should 
not be perceived as a threat to the electricity utility, 
but an enabler of environmentally-friendly, cost-ef-
fective power generation, decreasing the burden of 
subsidies and increasing the competitiveness of the 
national economy. Endorsing these systems enables 
the utility to find new revenue streams, adopt opti-
mal tariff restructures, and invest in grid moderniza-
tion instead of expansion.
 - Plan grants and aid flowing into Jordan for energy 
projects for “energy for trade”
Incentives should be provided for small-scale renew-
able energy in the industrial and commercial sectors, 
and solar systems for water pumps and agriculture 
storage facilities. Aid for Jordan amounted to $3.65 
billion in 2017,ix compared to foreign direct invest-
ments of $1.7 billion.x Aid is highly significant in Jor-
dan, and while it is not clear what share of grants 
was committed to energy, the sector is gaining more 
focus, and the government should communicate to 
donors and aid agencies the importance of pledging 
funds for energy project implementation in produc-
tive sectors with export potential. In turn this can 
be capitalized upon to enhance exports and Jordan’s 
competitiveness on the global market.
Jessica Obeid is an independent energy con-
sultant who has worked with the public and 
private sectors and international organizations 
on the power sector in the Middle East. She pre-
viously served as a resident fellow at Chatham 
House in London, within the energy, environment 
and resources department, where her research 
focused on diversification of the power sector and 
the threats and opportunities of electricity utili-
ties.
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EMPLOYMENT
FROM SURVIVAL STRATEGY 
TO INNOVATION – CREATING 
AN ENABLING BUSINESS 
ENVIRONMENT FOR MICRO, SMALL 
AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES IN 
JORDAN
Sophie Schmid
Despite the fact that Micro, Small, and Medium Enter-
prises (MSMEs) make up 99 percent of all registered 
enterprises in Jordan and employ 77 percent of the pri-
vate sector workforce, their contribution to the GDP is 
still comparably low. Moreover, MSMEs make up the 
vast majority of all unregistered and unlicensed enter-
prises within Jordan’s constantly growing unofficial 
sector. This means that the Kingdom’s large number of 
MSMEs not only represents untapped tax revenues for 
the state, but also holds potential for significant eco-
nomic growth. It is vital for policymakers to facilitate 
processes and adapt regulations in the fields of admin-
istration, financing, taxation, and compliance in order 
to reduce everyday hurdles for entrepreneurs in both 
setting up a business and expanding it. An enabling, 
rather than a stagnant business environment will not 
only reduce incentives for remaining in the informal 
sector, but also galvanize entrepreneurship as a source 
of economic growth and innovation in the Kingdom, 
instead of being a mere survival strategy.
Although Jordan’s MSMEs1 could be the backbone of 
the country’s economy and a vital source for job cre-
ation, they do not live up to their potential. Despite 
the fact that MSMEs make up 99 percent of all reg-
istered enterprises in Jordan and employ 77 percent 
of the private sector workforce, their contribution to 
overall production lies at only 30 percent,2 while they 
account for a mere fraction of total company reve-
nues. This imbalance represents a risk and opens 
1 Like many other countries, Jordan does not have an official definition of MSME. According to the policy recommendations of the Small and Medium 
Enterprises Conference held under the umbrella of the Economic & Social Council and the Jordan Chamber of Industry in December 2018, micro enterprises 
comprise 1-4 employees, small enterprises 5-19, medium enterprises 20-99, and large enterprises employ more than 100.
2 “Small and Medium Enterprises Coalition Jordan, “Towards a New Economic Model: Enhancing the role of SMEs as Motives of Economic and Social 
Development,” Economic & Social Council, Jordan Chamber of Industry, 2018.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 “The World Bank in Jordan,” World Bank <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/jordan/overview#1> (accessed July 8, 2019).
6 “Jordan Economic Monitor, Fall 2017: Towards Stronger External Trade Performance,” World Bank, 2017 <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/
handle/10986/29098> (accessed July 8, 2019).
up prospects at the same time: as 55 percent of all 
MSMEs are concentrated outside of Amman, they 
are able to reach pockets of poverty in rural areas, 
contribute significantly to local development, and 
promote economic decentralization.3 The fact that 
unregistered and unlicensed MSMEs make up the 
vast majority of the unofficial sector – which rep-
resents about 26 percent4 of the Jordanian economy 
– means that the government fails to benefit from 
substantial tax revenue each year. 
Jordan’s economy has been troubled by numerous 
challenges and setbacks over the past years: govern-
ment debt at 94.3 percent of GDP in 2018, an unem-
ployment rate of 18.7 percent in Q1-2019, a stagnating 
GDP growth of around 2.4-2.5 percent, rising energy 
costs, and a bloated public sector. 5With close to sev-
enty percent of the country’s population below the 
age of thirty, the Kingdom is a very youthful country. 
Nevertheless, close to one-third of young people in 
Jordan is neither in employment nor in education. 
In 2017, labor force participation stood only at 39.7 
percent.6
Moreover, Jordan has come to rely heavily on for-
eign financial aid, loans, and assistance funds. The 
government has committed to various International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank programs tar-
geting different economic areas and demanding a 
set of free-market policies in return. Despite partial 
success in certain sectors, the austerity measures 
announced by the government as a result of the 
financial aid programs have led to severe dissatis-
faction among citizens as well as rising inflation. The 
high influx of refugees from Iraq, and especially Syria, 
poses an additional burden on the country’s public 
services and resources.
Restrictive Regulations and Unfavorable Laws
Regarding the regulatory and administrative frame-
work, the conditions and requirements imposed 
in Jordan often constitute avoidable obstacles for 
entrepreneurs: Jordan ranked only 104 out of 190 
in the World Bank Doing Business Index 2019 and 
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reached 61 points in the distance to frontier score of 
the World Bank in 2017.7 Restrictive regulations not 
only lead to high dissatisfaction among entrepre-
neurs, but also to an increase in unregistered and 
unlicensed MSMEs. The incentives for MSMEs to 
remain informal seem to be higher than to transition 
to the formal sector.
Thanks to the new e-government system, however, 
the registration process for limited liability compa-
nies in Jordan has been simplified in recent years 
and usually only takes several days. Since late 2018, 
the registration of an LLC can be carried out online, 
registration fees can be paid electronically, and each 
year’s financial report can be submitted at the e-tax 
department. At any point, though, this process can 
be delayed in order to obtain a “special approval” for 
security reasons, carried out by the Ministry of Inte-
rior and the Intelligence Department. This security 
check has neither a legal basis nor transparent cri-
teria or a clear time frame, and opens the door for 
arbitrariness and corruption.
According to startup-founder Sadeq Rasheed, 
remaining obstacles in the registration process also 
include signing up for the company’s trade mark 
(taking approximately nine months) or buying the 
“.jo” domain, which costs JD 100 the first time and an 
additional JD 50 for each annual renewal. On top of 
a great deal of expensive paperwork and the mini-
mum capital requirements, the costs of registration 
7 This score measures a country’s business environment over time from a scale from zero to 100, 100 being the maximum.
8 The Jordan Vision 2025 is an extensive strategic plan for the country’s near future and determines the integrated economic and social framework that 
will govern the economic and social policies of the coming years. It was launched by the Jordanian government in May 2015.
9 A moveable assets law provides lenders with the ability to register effective security over moveable assets. The law legalizes and regulates the 
registration of movable assets as collaterals for obtaining credit from financial institutions. Such a law makes it easier for small businesses to obtain credit 
using other forms of assets such as cars, machinery, and so on.
10 A survey conducted in January 2019 by the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology together with the World Bank Group and GIZ 
interviewed 230 Jordanian startup founders from over ten sectors, the majority being from the ICT sector. Its results were published in a PowerPoint 
presentation, “Jordan Startup Ecosystem Survey Results,” January 16, 2019.
11 “Jordan 2013,” World Bank Group Enterprise Surveys <http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/data/exploreeconomies/2013/jorda n#corruption> (accessed 
July 8, 2019).
12 Ghassan Omet et al., “Entrepreneurship in Jordan: Regional Analysis and Envisaged Role,” Research Journal of Business and Management 2 (September 
2015), p. 323.
13 “Jordan 2025: A National Vision and Strategy.”
and licensing a business are often too high for MSME 
founders.
In addition to the regulatory structure, the legislative 
framework for economic growth does not provide 
legal incentives for founding a business or invest-
ing in the private sector. Although anticipated in 
the Jordan Vision 2025,8 there are still no accessible, 
transparent, and predictable laws regulating MSMEs 
or startups in Jordan. The movable assets law9 was 
passed in May 2018, but has not yet been imple-
mented. According to a recent survey,10 laws govern-
ing investment in startups are very unfavorable (38 
percent), the social security law for entrepreneurs is 
somewhat to very unfavorable (26 percent), and the 
customs law and regulations are very unfavorable (35 
percent).
Deficiencies in Funding and Financing
Since access to finance has been described as the 
main obstacle for firms in Jordan according to the 
World Bank “Enterprise Surveys,”11 this must be facil-
itated and alternative financing options should be 
provided. Jordanian entrepreneurs usually belong 
to the low-income category and only have a startup 
capital of JD 5,000 or less.12 However, 96 percent of 
all firms in Jordan are said to be “micro” firms, with 
fewer than ten employees, while accounting for just 8 
percent of total company revenues.13 For these busi-
nesses, there are usually a number of institutions 
providing access to capital – the most prominent in 
Jordan being private Microfinance Institutions (MFI) 
and commercial banks. In recent years, the Jordanian 
government has introduced several strategies aimed 
at stimulating the private sector and promoting pri-
vate investment opportunities, the most prominent 
being the Jordan Economic Growth Plan (JEGP) 2018-
22. Since 2004, non-profit micro-finance companies 
as well as NGOs have been exempted from all taxes, 
and Jordan established a Credit Bureau in 2015.
Accessible and transparent 
laws regulating MSMEs are 
lacking
Chapter I: Socio-Economic Challenges and Reforms in Jordan
25No. 5 | January 2020 – first published in July 2019
REPORT
Despite these efforts, Jordanian MSMEs are still 
struggling to access credit and finance: there is no 
specific micro-lending regulation, no effective regu-
lations protecting minority investors, and no efficient 
bankruptcy and insolvency system. One of the main 
problems concerning access to finance lies in the 
fact that many entrepreneurs in Jordan lack a formal 
financial history or have incomplete credit data, and 
are primarily dependent on cash transactions. Only 
25 percent of Jordanians aged over fifteen report 
having an account at a financial institution, which 
makes them ineligible for most bank loans.14
Another key issue for MSMEs’ access to funding is 
described as the “missing middle” financing gap: Jor-
danian entrepreneurs seeking between USD 50,000 
and 2 million are often too big for micro-finance 
loans and too small and risky for commercial banks. 
15Although banks’ interest rates tend to be lower than 
those of MFIs, SME loans account for only 13 percent 
of the total commercial loans in Jordan and usually 
result from collateral rather than creditworthiness.16
When it comes to alternative funding sources such 
as incubators, accelerators, or funds, there is a sig-
nificant gap in Jordan. According to Sadeq Rasheed, 
existing Jordanian early-stage seed investment com-
panies, business accelerators, and other institutions 
such as OASIS500, ZINC, or the King Hussein Busi-
ness Park are not only already fully occupied for the 
coming years, but simply do not provide a sufficient 
amount of funding. Furthermore, in order to qualify 
for many of these institution’s programs, entrepre-
neurs must not only present an innovative business 
idea, but should also have a certain academic or 
vocational background.
Another major issue mentioned by MSME owners in 
Jordan is the lack of foreign investment and insuffi-
cient access to foreign markets. Despite the govern-
ment introducing various measures to improve the 
business environment for foreign investment, such 
as easing visa procedures or establishing the Jordan 
Investment Commission (JIC), many foreign investors 
are still dependent on a Jordanian partner holding 50 
percent of the shares, while several economic sectors 
are not accessible for foreign investors at all.
14 Adam Schiff et al., “Entrepreneurship Environment Assessment in Jordan,” Silatech Research and Policy Report, University of Minnesota, Humphrey 
School of Public Affairs, May 2015 <https://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/handle/11299/172490/Schiff%2C%20Schmidt%2C%20Troncoso-%20
Entrepreneurship%20Assessment%20in%20Jordan%20May.pdf?se quence=1> (accessed July 8, 2019).
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 See footnote 10.
18 “Challenges of Starting a Small Business in Jordan.” Jordan Strategy Forum (JSF), May 2013 <http://jsf.org/sites/default/files/Challenges percent20of 
percent20Starting percent20a percent20Small percent20Business percent20in percent20Jordan_1.pdf> (accessed July 8, 2019).
Promoting Stagnation through Taxes
According to 51 percent of Jordanian startup  founders 
in the abovementioned survey,17 government policy 
perceptions on taxes are “very unfavorable,” while 
73 percent of all participants identified Jordanian tax 
law as the least favorable of all government policy 
perceptions. Entrepreneurs criticize irrelevant tax 
laws, high indirect taxes, as well as a lack of training 
and knowledge among entrepreneurs for compre-
hending the highly complex taxation system.
At the same time, the Jordanian state loses signifi-
cant amounts of tax revenue due to widespread tax 
evasion, especially among MSMEs. According to the 
Ministry of Finance’s Income and Sales Tax Depart-
ment, the total tax losses in 2016 stood at USD 4.2 bil-
lion.18 Even though MSMEs are exempted from sales 
tax up until JD 70,000 annual revenue, this most likely 
hinders entrepreneurs’ motivation to expand their 
annual income. Furthermore, irrelevant tax laws cre-
ate additional admin compliance costs. In this regard, 
Jordan is a good example of how tax policies can neg-
atively impact productivity.
Recommendations
In a country like Jordan, where economic and politi-
cal stability are particularly intertwined, and the lat-
ter is directly related to its dependence on foreign 
financial aid, it is of utmost importance to strengthen 
the private sector and focus on job creation. In order 
for Jordan’s already existing vast network of MSMEs 
to expand and become a vital source of job cre-
ation and income, the Jordanian government needs 
to introduce a set of easily implementable reforms 
If enabled, MSMEs can be a 
vital source of job creation 
and income
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within the areas of administration, funding, and tax-
ation to improve both the quality and the quantity of 
entrepreneurship in the country. It is equally import-
ant to create incentives for unregistered MSMEs to 
transition into the formal sector. All measures should 
focus on the great potential of MSMEs to support 
economic decentralization in rural areas.
 - The Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Supply should 
simplify business registrations and fee structures
Business registrations and fee structures should be 
simplified by developing standard application proce-
dures, lowering the minimum capital requirements, 
and passing a set of laws regulating MSMEs and 
startups. These goals can be met by a set of tools, 
among them a flat fee for business registration and 
the “ex-post” (after the fact) method. The fees for 
registering and licensing a business should not be a 
tool for collecting money for the state, especially in a 
country like Jordan where small or even micro enter-
prises are the majority. Instead, a flat fee for MSME 
registration, licensing, trademarks, and domains 
should be introduced, regardless of capital amount, 
and based on a threshold capital amounting to 1 per-
cent of GNP per capita.19 When applying the “ex-post” 
method when evaluating the security of a business, 
the business can start operating immediately after 
being registered without interrupting the registra-
tion process through arbitrary “special approvals.” 
Although this measure does not mean these security 
checks will not be carried out at a later point in time, 
it will at least allow the business to start operating. 
Jordan has to adopt accessible, transparent, and 
predictable laws regulating MSMEs or startups and 
implement the movable assets law to obtain credit 
from financial institutions.
 - Relevant ministries and institutions, such as the 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Planning and 
International Cooperation, as well as the Bank of 
Jordan and the World Bank Group, should facilitate 
access to finance by promoting various financing 
options while ensuring the regulatory protection of 
lenders and creating incentives for foreign invest-
ment
By imposing specific micro-lending regulations, the 
Jordanian government would not only ensure a legal 
framework that guarantees stability, competition, 
and efficiency in the financial market, but also pro-
tect minority investors. Micro-finance regulations 
19 According to “Challenges of Starting a Small Business in Jordan” by JSF, the World Bank found that the cost of starting up a business for the top ten 
countries in terms of cost does not exceed 1 percent.
broaden the range of criteria for credit-worthiness 
and separate by risk type. They differentiate between 
the various pledges of loan applicants – by collateral, 
reputation, or attitude – and provide an alternative 
to bank loans by strengthening credit information. 
Funding programs should be directed towards and 
tailored to entrepreneurs’ needs (according to sec-
tor, stage, size, and so on), with the introduction of 
provisions for various financing avenues to service 
differing needs among the population.
In addition, regulations need to address the “miss-
ing middle” gap: lending capital should be available 
to support each stage of development. In order to 
safeguard regulatory protection of lending institu-
tions and thereby increase their willingness to lend, 
Jordan should assess and seek to improve an efficient 
bankruptcy and insolvency system.
Beyond financing, MSME owners need non-finan-
cial services as well. Therefore, the Jordanian gov-
ernment should invest significantly in incubators 
and accelerators, which offer loans, work spaces, as 
well as mentoring, financial education, and business 
training. This way, entrepreneurs receive essential 
start-up support, build up a sustainable network, and 
benefit from best-practice examples.
In order to create incentives for foreign investment 
and provide MSME owners better access to foreign 
markets, the Jordanian government needs to reduce 
tariffs significantly on both exports and imports. 
Trade facilitation measures such as the elimination 
of trade-related transaction costs will enable entre-
preneurs to grow, diversify, and ultimately contribute 
to Jordan’s economic expansion.
 - The Ministry of Finance and the Prime Ministry 
should work to ensure a balanced tax system that 
creates incentives rather than merely cracking 
down on tax evasion
As administrative, legal, and financing procedures in 
Jordan hinder the establishment of MSMEs, current 
tax regulations actively discourage them from grow-
ing or expanding. Therefore, regulations should be 
remodeled in such a way that they support produc-
tivity, rather than punishing companies through the 
use of disproportionately high and partially arbitrary 
taxes. A tax system composed of several stage tariffs 
differentiating between an enterprise’s annual reve-
nues, rather than increasing in a linear way, would 
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relieve MSME founders of certain tax payments, 
especially at early development stages. Instead of 
cracking down on tax evasion, the tax system should 
motivate citizens to pay taxes by being affordable and 
– ideally – offer high quality services in return.
Another tool draws from the Tunisian Finance Act 
2018, which determines that profits from direct 
investment in local development areas are fully 
deducted from taxable income up to the end of a five-
year period. Hereby, the tax system would actively 
support entrepreneurship as well as decentralization 
in Jordan.
Sophie Schmid is a regional project manager at 
the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom’s 
regional office in Amman, where she works in the 
field of political education, entrepreneurship, and 
public policy. She has a background in Islamic 
Science and Arabic Studies from the University of 
Zurich and the Freie Universität Berlin.
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THE “EMPLOYER OF LAST 
RESORT” – A ROUTE TO WOMEN’S 
EMPOWERMENT IN RURAL JORDAN
Salam Abukhadrah
Despite the high educational attainment of Jordanian 
women, their participation rate in the labor mar-
ket is one of the lowest in the world. While the pub-
lic sector has been declining due to the strained eco-
nomic growth that has weakened its role as the main 
employer of women, the private sector has been reluc-
tant to employ women for fear of high social costs. The 
situation is even more critical for rural women who 
are faced with high unemployment rates and limited 
opportunities outside informal employment in the 
agricultural sector. One way to tackle this issue is the 
introduction of an Employer of Last Resort program 
(ELR). ELR programs aim to guarantee wage employ-
ment for those who are willing to work and cannot 
find employment: the involuntary unemployed. A 
bottom-up, women-centered, demand-driven, and 
self-targeting form of wage employment is a possible 
solution in rural areas of Jordan.
Jordanian women have reached impressive levels of 
educational attainment. However, this has not led 
to higher rates of women’s employment. According 
to the World Bank’s calculations for 2018, the female 
labor force participation rate in Jordan stood at 14 
percent compared to 63.5 percent for men.20 More-
over, the Jordanian Department of Statistics (DOS) 
recorded women’s unemployment rate at 27.1 percent 
in the third quarter of 2018 against 16.3 percent for 
men.21 This reveals that women’s employment is not 
only low but also decreasing: the unemployment rate 
rose by 2.8 percent from the previous year, compared 
to a 0.9 percent increase for men. Furthermore, Jor-
danian women in the rural economy experience even 
higher unemployment rates than in urban areas, 
with a recorded level of 33.8 percent in 2018.22 For 
Jordan to capitalize on its long-term investment in 
education and move towards economic growth, it 
must seriously address the alarming rates of women’s 
unemployment, especially for rural women.
20 “Labor force participation rate, female (% of female population ages 15+) (modelled ILO estimate),” World Bank, April 2019 <https://data.worldbank.
org/indicator/sl.tlf.cact.fe.zs> (accessed July 4, 2019).
21 “18.6% Unemployment Rate during the third Quarter of 2018,” Jordanian Department of Statistics, 2018 <http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/unem_2018q3/> 
(accessed July 4, 2019).
22 “Jordanian Unemployment Rate: Rural: Female,” CEIC, 2018. <https://www.ceicdata.com/en/jordan/jordanian-unemployment-rate-by-region/
jordanian-unemployment-rate-rural-female> (accessed July 4, 2019).
23 “Jordan: Young women’s employment and empowerment in the rural economy in Jordan,” International Labour Organization, Geneva, March 22, 2018.
24 R. Assaad et al., “Gender and the Jordanian labor market,” in Ragui Assaad (ed.), The Jordanian Labor Market in the New Millennium (Oxford, 2014), p. 
172. DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198702054.003.0004
25 “Women’s Participation in the Agricultural Sector, Rural Institutions and Community Life,” UN Women, REACH Initiative, Amman, 2018.
Transition from School to the Labor Market and 
Unpaid Work
The majority of young men and women in Jordan 
under the age of twenty are still enrolled in the edu-
cation system. As they grow older, the transition 
of both sexes into the labor market takes differ-
ent directions. On the one hand, male employment 
witnesses a stable and rising transition into paid 
employment, with over 90 percent of those aged 
25-29 considered economically active. However, only 
a small percentage of women experience a form of 
transition into the labor market, with more than 80 
percent of women aged 25-29 choosing to undertake 
household responsibilities.23 Unlike men, women’s 
transition into paid employment is intimately con-
nected with their marital status. Unmarried women 
with a bachelor’s degree have the highest participa-
tion rate of 79 percent of female employment.24 This 
also implies that Jordanian women are most exposed 
to the deterioration of skills during unemployment or 
complete absence from the labor market.
Furthermore, the exclusion of unpaid work from DOS 
data results in deepening women’s invisibility from 
statistics that deprive us of the tools to understand 
and challenge the harmful labor conditions that 
women face. For example, in the agricultural sector, 
many rural women are economically active in home-
based or family-based agricultural activities, which 
are not accounted for in the market. In addition to 
their household responsibilities, this means that 
women end up performing two jobs, neither of which 
is considered paid work.25 In addition, the small 
minority of women who work in paid agriculture 
usually work on commercial lands through informal 
contracts. This informality puts women at risk as 
they have no legal rights as workers. Thus, there is an 
urgent need to formalize unpaid work and informal 
contracts through sound labor market regulations.
The Structure of Employment
Jordanian women are torn between a stagnant pub-
lic sector and a private sector that seems reluctant 
to employ them. Both men and women in public 
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employment are clustered in different sectors that 
reflect both educational attainment and existing 
patriarchal norms. On the one hand, men have the 
highest participation rates in low-skilled jobs that are 
not strictly based on educational attainment, such as 
public administration and mechanics. According to 
Jordan Labor Market Panel Survey (JLMPS) data, men 
with less than secondary education counted for more 
than 42 percent of public workers in 2016.26 Women 
on the other hand are particularly concentrated in 
two public sectors: education, and health and social 
work activities. Unlike men, women’s employment in 
the public sector is correlated with women’s educa-
tional attainment. In fact, women are more likely to 
be employed in the public sector with better educa-
tion. Moreover, those sectors are regarded as female-
friendly with more tolerance towards unpaid work 
carried out by women (e.g. shorter working hours). In 
addition, jobs in these sectors are considered socially 
appropriate for women and conform to the expected 
gender roles and social norms. This results in the 
reinforcement of a gendered division of labor that 
makes it even more challenging for women to take 
on different types of jobs or to expand to different 
sectors in the economy.
Further, these sectors can be described as stagnant, 
with no increase in job creation due to tight fiscal 
policy. Therefore, the general trend of shrinking the 
role of the public sector has been most harmful to 
women who largely rely on it for their employment, 
compared to the private sector. This is particularly 
the case for women working in Jordan’s rural econ-
omy, who perceive the public sector as one of their 
few options for formal employment. The agricultural 
sector in rural Jordan presents a safety net for 25 per-
cent of the country’s total poor by providing a criti-
cal form of livelihood. It is also the main employer of 
rural women. However, it is also known to have the 
highest percentage of informal workers compared 
to other sectors. Hence, rural women require seri-
ous alternatives and different modes of employment 
beyond agriculture.
On the other hand, the private sector itself presents 
many obstacles that not only discourage women from 
applying for more competitive jobs, but also places 
26 Ragui Assaad and Colette Salemi, “The Structure of Employment and Job Creation in Jordan: 2010-2016,” Economic Research Forum Working Paper 
Series no. 1259, Cairo, 2018.
27 “Jordan,” Equal Pay International Coalition, 2018 <https://www.equalpayinternationalcoalition.org/members/jordan/> (accessed July 4, 2019).
28 “Jordanian Women’s Report on the occasion of the International Women’s Day – Statistical Perspective,” Department of Statistics, 2015 <http://
dosweb.dos.gov.jo/jordanian-womens-report-on-the-occasion-of-the-international-womens-day-statistical-perspective/> (accessed July 4, 2019).
29 R. Ayadi et al., (2018). Human capital, labour market friction and migration in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia,” EMNES Studies 5, May 2018 
<https://www.euromed-economists.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/EMNES_Study_005-Human_Capital-Labour_Market_Friction_Migration-Egypt-
Jordan-Morocco-Tunisia_v4.pdf> (accessed July 4, 2019).
them in a more vulnerable position in the labor mar-
ket compared to men. The existing gender wage 
gap is more pronounced in the private sector than 
it is in the public sector. According to the Equal Pay 
International Coalition (EPIC), the gender wage gap 
in 2018 was 14.2 percent in the private sector and 
13.8 percent in the public sector in favor of men. The 
discrepancy is even greater in sectors dominated by 
women, with a 27 percent wage gap in the health sec-
tor and a 30 percent wage gap in education.27 This is 
one of the main reasons behind lower female labor 
force participation.28
Moreover, employers in the private sector discrim-
inate against hiring women in general, and particu-
larly against married women, to avoid the additional 
costs of social and maternal benefits. In addition, 
there is a strong mismatch between women’s educa-
tion and the demands of the labor market.29 Women’s 
increased access to private sector employment has 
been mostly in terms of temporary jobs especially for 
women with secondary education at most, while edu-
cated women continue to be clustered in low-pro-
ductivity jobs in education and health. It is important 
to note that the private sector plays a weaker role in 
the rural economy and hence has a limited role as an 
employer of women. This results in a larger short-
age of work for women in rural Jordan, worsened by 
stronger social norms, weak connectivity, and other 
infrastructural problems.
In general, the Jordanian economy is not creating 
enough jobs, especially in the face of slow economic 
growth and the increased hiring of both foreigners 
(migrants) and refugees, particularly Syrians. The 
employment-to-population ratio (EPR) for Jordanians 
Only a small percentage of 
women transition into the 
labor market
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has been declining since 2009.30 That being said, the 
impact of hiring foreigners and the Syrian refugee 
crisis on Jordanian women is fairly limited, as most 
of the competition occurs in the realm of informal/
irregular private employment that affects poor and 
less educated Jordanian men the most.31
These constraints have driven many Jordanians, 
especially women, into high skilled migration. In 
2015, women counted for 47 percent of the total 
migrant population in Jordan.32 Furthermore, many 
women discouraged by the labor market were driven 
to operate informal small businesses in their own 
homes; these are not formally registered and thus 
are not taxable.33
The Jordanian government needs to find ways to 
maximize the private sector’s potential as a vital 
player in the country’s economic growth and as an 
employer of women. Well-intended solutions from 
the government to encourage women’s employment 
in the private sector have proven to be insufficient 
or with modest impacts at best. For example, sub-
sidized private employment programs across the 
country have been characterized by low enrolment 
rates, high dropout rates, and low placement rates.34 
Generally, the poor use of any monitoring and evalu-
ations systems for these programs makes it not only 
difficult to assess their success, but also prevents 
any comprehensive data collection that can bet-
ter inform policymakers. The pilot program “NOW” 
was implemented by the World Bank with a rigorous 
evaluation component to test the effectiveness of job 
vouchers versus skills training on the employability 
of female community college graduates. Even though 
30 “Employment to population ratio, 15+, total (%) (modeled ILO estimate), World Bank, 2018 <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.EMP.TOTL.SP.ZS> 
(accessed July 4, 2019).
31 Ragui Assaad et al., “The Composition of Labor Supply and its Evolution from 2010 to 2016 in Jordan,” Economic Research Forum Working Paper No. 
1183, April 2018.
32 G. Naufal, “Mapping remittances from the Gulf: The case of Jordanians in the UAE,” presentation to the International Organization for Migration, 
Amman, 2017.
33 “Country gender assessment: Economic participation, agency and access to justice in Jordan,” World Bank, 2013.
34 D. F. Angel-Urdinola et al. (eds),. “Building effective employment programs for unemployed youth in the Middle East and North Africa,” The World Bank, 
2013.
35 “Increasing female participation in employment through vocational education and training in Jordan,” European Training Foundation, 2016.
the project has recorded positive results in terms of 
participants’ self-esteem, there is no indication that 
the program increased the employability of women, 
neither through subsidies nor through the training.35
One promising alternative is the introduction of wage 
employment programs to guarantee full employ-
ment. This can also harmonize fragmented efforts 
and resources from various ministries and agencies 
involved in employment policymaking. It is import-
ant to note that many of these agencies provide 
employment services, intermediation, and training 
which will not be fully optimized as long as they are 
not integrated into job creation schemes. Countries 
such as India and South Africa have successfully 
implemented wage employment programs, other-
wise known as Employer of Last Resort (ELR) pro-
grams to tackle issues of poverty, rural development, 
and gender inequality. Even though it is difficult to 
adapt global findings to a single case, these programs 
can nonetheless contribute to positive employment 
outcomes and their ability to empower women, espe-
cially in the rural economy.
Recommendations
The Jordanian government has a crucial role in find-
ing solutions to advance job creation schemes and 
encourage the private sector. This role can be sup-
ported through the introduction of ELR programs. 
These programs aim to guarantee demand-driven 
wage employment for those who are willing to work 
and cannot find employment (the involuntary unem-
ployed). This also includes capacity building and var-
ious training courses, especially in technology, to 
increase the mobility of workers from ELR programs 
into private employment. The development of ELR 
must be cyclical to encourage employment in the pri-
vate sector. This suggests a stronger presence of ELR 
projects during economic downturn to act as a buffer 
stock of employment, and the opposite in economic 
upswings. Moreover, these programs can be deliber-
ately designed to consider gender-based solutions. 
Ideally, the financing of ELR should be mainstreamed 
in the public sector budget process. Thus, the Jor-
Wage employment 
 programs could offer an 
 alternative solution
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danian government could revise its actual public 
spending through a gender lens to identify ways 
to incorporate ELR in its planning. That being said, 
given that the Jordanian economy is pursuing further 
fiscal tightening in the light of soaring debt-to-GDP 
ratios,36 it will not be realistic to assume that the Jor-
danian economy is in a position to adopt expansion-
ary public policy. Instead, leverage should be placed 
on the coordination of resources from the private 
sector, donors, and international grants, and the 
work of local and international NGOs and commu-
nity groups.
 - Advance job creation and gender equality through 
the introduction of ELR in rural Jordan
The Jordanian government should consider the 
country’s rural areas as a starting point for the pro-
gram, where its benefits can be capitalized the most. 
The implementation of a decentralized ELR program 
that gives control to local villages and communities 
seems promising. 
 - Follow a bottom-up approach by identifying key 
stakeholders
The implementation of ELR in Jordanian rural areas 
involves roles and responsibilities of several stake-
holders, from the village to the national level. Women 
are the primary stakeholders of the program and 
their demand for work is the main trigger of the pro-
ject. ELR should be implemented in a self-targeting 
manner and thus women must apply first for work 
through ELR before the exact determination of the 
project. The target group of women eligible for ELR 
are either unemployed rural women with relatively 
low levels of education, or those who belong to the 
13 percent of women exploited in informal agricul-
tural activities in commercial farms. The eligible age 
group should be between 18-30 years. One possible 
work scenario is the demand for a higher investment 
in social infrastructure. Women’s needs and demands 
for work should be further discussed at the village 
council.
 - Set up a village council
A village council should be set up as the principal 
forum for women to raise their voices and make 
demands, and can be established through elections 
supervised by the municipal council. The council 
would consist of elected members from the village 
36 “Jordan Economic Growth Plan JEGP 2018 – 2022,” The Economic Policy Council, Amman, 2017.
with reserved seats for women, farmers, representa-
tives from civil society organizations, and communi-
ty-based organizations. At this stage, people’s needs 
will be identified through consultations among stake-
holders. To ensure the relevance of the chosen ELR 
project to women’s lives, it is important to enforce 
accurate gender planning mechanisms that consider 
women’s and men’s differing needs.
 - Identify available resources and use a gender trans-
formative evaluation system
A governing council, in consultation with the village 
council, should identify available resources for the 
chosen project and ensure all funds paid to various 
implementing agencies are used efficiently for the 
allocation of work. In addition, the governing council 
should monitor and evaluate the projects taken up at 
the village level. For this purpose, the use of a gender 
transformative evaluation system is recommended, 
with a central focus on inequalities. This has strong 
potential to detect what and when gender compo-
nents were neglected from the policymaking process, 
as well as how they can be included in it.
 - Issue operational guidelines and set rules that pro-
mote gender equality
The Jordanian government should issue operational 
guidelines for the implementation of ELR projects 
and set rules that promote gender equality. These 
include: quotas to guarantee women’s participation, 
especially in jobs that are not traditionally regarded 
as “women’s work”; the enforcement of equal pay; the 
availability of childcare facilities on a worksite; and 
other provisions that enable women to take on more 
jobs. At this stage, the government can determine 
funding for projects from the fiscal budget.
 - Engage civil society
Civil society organizations can help spread awareness 
about the program and engage in various activities 
to strengthen ELR implementation. For example, 
CSOs can provide training and support for mem-
bers of the village councils, especially when it comes 
to the selection of the projects. They can also take 
part in the fight against men’s resistance to women’s 
employment that might be intensified in the context 
of job scarcity.
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 - Support the implementation of ELR in Jordan, e.g. 
by integrating ELR into the planning of the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)
There is strong cooperation between the EU and 
Jordan with regards to many persistent issues, espe-
cially when it comes to fighting unemployment and 
empowering women. Therefore, the EU can play an 
important role in ensuring the implementation of 
ELR and its follow-up. This can be reinforced through 
bilateral agreements and EU allocation of financial 
assistance directed towards ELR. Hence, ELR could 
be integrated into the planning of the European 
Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), which supports 
political and socio-economic reforms in Jordan.
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PROMOTING FLEXIBL WORK 
REGULATION IN JORDAN TO 
ACHIEV COMPREHENSIVE YOUTH 
ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT
Bara’ah Batainah
Jordan is a small middle-income country that has suf-
fered dire economic conditions. The current situation 
has led the government to promote self-employment 
programs and non-traditional work patterns as a key 
strategic approach to encourage youth participation 
in the economy. Young people, who comprise a sig-
nificant segment of the population, prefer and often 
have stable jobs based on a written contract and its 
entitlements. Nonetheless, they frequently lose their 
jobs because of harsh working conditions, inflexible 
working hours, and work pressure.37 The 2017 adop-
tion of new regulations adding flexibility to the fixed 
written contract was therefore an unprecedented step. 
However, some obstacles should be addressed regard-
ing flexible work regulation, such as the ambiguity of 
implementation. The government should promote the 
flexible work scheme widely, verify the procedures to 
benefit business owners and employees in different 
fields, and analyze the economic returns of flexible 
work to encourage the adoption of these regulations 
with a clear focus on youth.
Unemployment rates in Jordan have remained 
unprecedentedly high for the last 11 years, reaching 
18.6 percent during the fourth quarter of 2018. Over 
the past three years (2015-2017), unemployment lev-
els reached 33.29 percent, 38.5 percent, and 39.76 
percent respectively, particularly among youth aged 
15-24. This is significantly higher than the global 
youth unemployment rate for the same period, which 
was approximately 13.2 percent.38 Jordan’s chronic 
and protracted unemployment challenges include 
an increasing labor supply, structural unemployment 
among youth, low labor force participation, dispro-
portional job creation, educational system outputs 
incompatible with labor market needs, unstable 
investment trends, and migratory labor patterns. All 
these factors mean that unemployment has become a 
top priority for the government of Jordan (GoJ).
37 “Access to Decent Work in Jordan 2017,” Phenix Center <http://phenixcenter.net/en/access-decent-work-jordan-2017/> (accessed July 16, 2019).
38 “Jordan: Youth Unemployment rate from 2008 to 2018,” Statista <https://www.statista.com/statistics/812127/youth-unemployment-rate-in-jordan/> 
(accessed July 16, 2019).
39 The Economic Growth Stimulus; Plan for Jordan (2018-2022) presents a long-term national vision and strategy that identifies a set of economic and 
social goals to improve the welfare of citizens.
40 “Studying the attitudes of young people on the labor market towards entrepreneurship and the supportive institutional environment in Jordan (2018),” 
Higher Population Council, Jordan, p. 31 <https://www.hpc.org.jo/sites/default/files/Study-%20enhancing%20enterperneurial%20attitudes%20-%20AR.
pdf> (accessed July 16, 2019).
41 Ibid.
As Jordan’s youth population has grown, the govern-
ment has increased its focus on young people as it 
recognizes their role in influencing economic and 
social change. The rapid growth of the young popula-
tion has created a “youth bulge” in Jordan, which has 
led Jordanian decisionmakers to recognize the youth 
population in their development discourse, legisla-
tion, policies, and national strategies.
This recognition has been expressed in Jordan’s stra-
tegic planning and policies. The Economic Growth 
Stimulus Plan for Jordan (2018-2022)39 and Jordan 
Vision 2025 have provided new alternatives to stim-
ulate economic growth and opportunities for youth 
in the labor market. The emphasis is mainly on eco-
nomic self-reliance and a culture of self-initiative, 
encouraging young potential entrepreneurs by pro-
viding needed support, linking labor market demands 
and education, and promoting vocational training as 
well as the economic participation of young women.
Despite progress on paper, the implementation of 
some economic policies has nevertheless played a 
role in weakening the supply-demand correlation 
in the labor market and prolonged the inability to 
close the gap between educational and training out-
puts and labor market needs. At the same time, local 
development and economic models have not helped 
to create decent jobs.
In 2017, the number of Jordanian employers decreased 
by 5.2 percent, and the percentage of self-employed 
workers declined to 8.6 percent.40 Youth are less 
engaged in self-employment in comparison to the 
overall population. In fact, a 2018 analysis of attitudes 
among students in the last year at Jordanian univer-
sities, community colleges, and vocational training 
centers showed a moderate tendency or preference 
towards entrepreneurship. This indicates the lack of 
attention paid to self-employment, entrepreneur-
ship, startups, and non-traditional work, despite the 
government’s discourse.41
According to an International Labor Office survey, 
employed youth in Jordan often have stable jobs 
based on a written contract, and in 85 percent of 
cases, young employees’ contracts were unlimited 
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in duration. Most employed youth in Jordan were 
employees, wage and salaried workers, with only 2.1 
percent of young people in involuntary part-time 
employment.42
Although working hours are regulated by Jordanian 
labor law, young people still lose their jobs due to 
working hours, the number of working days, and 
work pressure.43 The conditions are aggravated by 
the lack of a safe and accessible work place, and 
costly public transportation. In 1996, Jordanian labor 
law addressed the issue of working hours in order 
to ensure a work-life balance, especially for regu-
lar workers. It limits the working week to 48 hours 
and daily working times to eight hours, excluding 
rest periods. The law allows for exceptional cases 
in which the employee may work more hours than 
those specified by law.
In practice, however, working hours and their distri-
bution are based solely on the employer’s own inter-
ests. Consequently, employees are often forced to 
choose between leaving work or working only part-
time, especially if they also want to pursue education 
or have other external responsibilities. In addition, 
workers exceed the legal daily maximum of eight 
hours in many sectors, without receiving additional 
pay.
42 “Labour market transitions of young women and men in Jordan,” International Labour Office, 2014, p. 14 <https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-
--dgreports/---dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_245876.pdf> (accessed July 16, 2019).
43 “Access to Decent Work in Jordan.”
44 Published on March 16, 2017 in the Official Newspaper No. 5450 Flexible Labor Law No. 22 of 2017, published on March 16, 2017 in the Official 
Newspaper (laws and regulations passed in the Jordanian Parliament and effective from the date of publication). 
45 Flexible Working - A career and lifestyle pathway,” Adecco <https://www.adeccogroup.com/wp-content/themes/ado- group/downloads/the-adecco-
group-flexible-working.pdf> (accessed July 8, 2019).
Flexible Regulations: A Catalyst for Economic Ben-
efits and Returns
The Flexible Labor Regulation No. 22 was published 
in the official state newspaper on March 16, 2017.44 
Adding flexibility to a fixed written contract, which 
allows for independence while fully preserving the 
entitlements and rights of young workers, was an 
unprecedented step in Jordan. According to the gov-
ernment, the regulation aimed to promote the eco-
nomic participation of various social groups, espe-
cially working women. It also aims to make the work 
environment more receptive to new opportunities.
According to the new regulation, those who have 
been employed for three consecutive years, workers 
with family responsibilities, workers with disabilities, 
and university staff can benefit from flexible employ-
ment contracts. The regulation does not diminish 
labor rights as long as these rights are commensurate 
with the number of hours worked, or unless the flex-
ible contract stipulates better rights for the worker. 
Wages are calculated on an hourly basis, and the 
number of annual and sick leave days are calculated 
as a percentage of agreed working hours.
Historically, the global flexible labor system was first 
introduced in the United Kingdom in 1971.45 It was 
Figure 1: Youth unemployment rate in Jordan from 2007 to 2017 (15-24 years)
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a response to the diversity of working conditions 
around the world, which necessitated systems com-
patible with the era of globalization, assistive tech-
nology, and other economic and social changes.
By some estimates, 20–30 percent of the work-
ing-age population in developed countries is involved 
in flexible labor to some extent. In 2017, this kind of 
work added $1.4 trillion to the US economy alone, and 
in Europe the annual figure is €270 billion.46 Across 
the globe, young people see flexible hours as posi-
tive. A global qualitative survey of those aged 18-26 
conducted for the Adecco Group47 demonstrated that 
free/flexible working hours represent an opportu-
nity for independence, and faster development of 
experience and skills. According to LinkedIn’s global 
dataset,48 independent professionals work in higher 
seniority roles sooner than their peers in open-
ended (traditional) employment.
In Jordan, the application of the flexible work scheme 
allows for increased staff efficiency through flexible 
working hours, and helps institutions that need to 
operate outside normal working hours. Additionally, 
more flexible labor regulations will help organiza-
tions grow by increasing staff while reducing oper-
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
ational costs, since it often helps to reduce capital 
expenditure rather than having the entire staff in one 
place during specified hours.
It also gives workers the ability to balance work 
requirements and family or personal responsibilities, 
which in turn leads to a revitalization of work activ-
ities, enthusiasm, and reduced fatigue or illnesses 
related to daily mobility and routine. Furthermore, 
workers perform their work at lower “time and cost” 
because of an increase in psychological and physical 
comfort and a decrease in anxiety and exhaustion.
Additionally, flexible work helps to reduce traffic 
problems and the great pressure on public or pri-
vate transportation networks, as traffic is distributed 
throughout the day due to employees having differ-
ent working hours. Adopting flexible working condi-
tions can also contribute significantly to increased 
female economic participation, allowing women 
more convenient ways work while at the same time 
fulfilling their family responsibilities, or overcoming 
challenges like transportation and mobility.
Such positive attitudes – particularly among younger 
generations – give every reason to expect the growth 
Figure 2: Who can benefit from the flexible contract 2017
Who can 
benefit from 
flexible 
contracts:
Workers been employed by the company 
for three consecutive years.
Regular University workers.
Workers with disabilities.
Workers with family responsibilities (pregnant 
womanor workers caring for a child, family member, 
older person due to disability or illness)
Graphic prepared for the author based on the Flexible Labor Law No. 22 of 2017.
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of flexible work to continue. As well as providing per-
sonal career development, accelerated learning from 
flexible work can support young people in playing an 
important social role once they have the time and 
space to participate in community activities.
Current Shortcomings and Challenges
Limited understanding of Flexible Labor Regulation 
No. 22 leads to confusion between flexible work 
and freelancing or allowing work outside offices. 
The Flexible Work Regulation defines a change in 
the employment contract between an organization 
and the employee. Freelancing is not addressed in 
national labor law and consequently is not subject 
to national employment regulations including paid 
annual leave, personal leave, or long service leave.
As there are no scientific studies that show the impor-
tance of flexible working conditions, the demand for 
flexible contracts is less common. Despite the spread 
of this model for youth employment around the 
world, there is no effective measurement in Jordan 
on the impact of flexible work, especially in regard 
to economic participation of those aged 24-35, who 
constitute the largest proportion of the labor force in 
Jordan. Nor does the regulation oblige organizations 
to apply a flexible work scheme or offer incentives 
for employers to apply such schemes. The regula-
tion states: “If the company finds that in their ben-
efit to apply the flexible working arrangements in 
terms of organizing hours/place of work, the worker 
is entitled to reduce daily working hours, distribute 
work hours according to the times that suit him/her 
or intensify working hours on a weekly or monthly 
basis.” One of the most important benefits of flexi-
ble work for young people is the amount of money 
saved on public transport and traveling expenses to 
49 “Survey towards a flexible and fair work system: legal review of flexible work,” Friedrich Ebert and the Center of Al-Karak Castle Consulting and Training, 
2017 <https://www.fes-jordan.org/fileadmin/user_upload/general/Jordan_Topics/Final_Repo rt_Arabic.pdf> (accessed July 8, 2019).; Adecco group, 
“Flexible Working”; “The reality of the application of flexible work in Jordan, Ministry of Labor.
and from the workplace. However, the regulation 
does not give any guarantees for workers themselves, 
which would motivate them to exchange their con-
tracts for flexible ones.
Some obstacles inherent in the regulation, such as 
the ambiguity of implementation, prevent individuals 
and companies from putting it into effect. Employers 
fear that application of the regulation will increase 
the burden on them to monitor the work of employ-
ees. Some have also expressed reluctance to modify 
the internal rules of the organization in line with the 
flexible work system.49 Finally, the Regulation cur-
rently does not allow everyone to benefit from flex-
ible working.
Recommendations
 - Verify the procedures and benefits of the regulation
The Ministry of Labor should conduct a study on 
the application of the Flexible Work Regulation with 
companies and institutions, in order to discuss the 
social and economic benefits, to improve the lim-
ited understanding of the regulation, and to over-
come some of its obstacles, such as the ambiguity 
of implementation. This can also help determine the 
kind of incentives that can be offered to institutions 
and individuals who could benefit from flexibility. 
Moreover, the Ministry of Labor should measure the 
effectiveness of the flexible work scheme, especially 
regarding youth economic participation.
The Ministry must conduct a review of the regula-
tion in different fields and sectors. It should involve 
unions to identify which sectors are appropriate for 
flexible work contracts and give organizations suffi-
cient time to verify their procedures. It should also 
support organizations in modifying their internal 
rules to fall in line with flexible working.
The Ministry should review the complaints and expe-
riences of workers who have converted their con-
tracts during the past year to ensure that the regula-
tion secures decent jobs for individuals and supports 
labor-stimulating environments.
Given its benefits, flexible 
work can be expected to 
continue to grow
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 - Promote the new flexible regulation
The Ministry of Labor, the National Committee for 
Flexible Work,50 and social security institutions have 
the responsibility to promote the regulation through 
programs, sessions, and media platforms, as well as 
by disseminating it among companies and unions. 
This will allow organizations to recognize the bene-
fits of the regulation.
 - Make legislative changes in the legal texts
Legal committees in the Jordanian parliament should 
be encouraged to work in partnership with the Min-
istry of Labor and the National Committee for Flex-
ible Work to examine the following points to further 
enhance existing legislation:
 - legal texts should leave enough space for all 
employers to agree on flexible labor contracts and 
numbers based on their own needs and working 
conditions. For example, a technology company 
may be successful by employing ten workers on 
flexible contracts, without the need for workers 
with non-flexible employment contracts;
 - replace the condition of three years’ prior employ-
ment with expiry
 - of the probation period; and
 - amend the categories to include all workers 
without exception by deleting the passage in 
the current regulation which limits its applica-
tion to “workers who have been employed by the 
employer for three consecutive years and the 
workers with family responsibilities are pregnant 
women or workers who take care of a child or care 
for a family member or older person due to dis-
ability or illness, regular university workers, and 
workers with disabilities.”
Bara’ah Batainah works as a Youth Hub coordi-
nator at the Liwan youth space in Amman, which 
aims to provide opportunities for youth and vol-
unteers to connect them with other stakeholders 
50 Headed by the Minister of Labor and membership representatives of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, the Ministry of Public 
Sector Development, the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Supply, the Legislation and Opinion Bureau, the Civil Service Bureau, the Higher Council for 
Population, the Social Security Corporation, the Jordan Industrial Cities Company, the Jordanian National Committee for Women and a member of the 
Jordan Chamber of Industry, the General Federation of Trade Unions, and Jordan and the Friendship Foundation.
who can support their engagement and activ-
ism, thus providing an arena to build solidarity 
around youth issues across Jordan. She holds a 
BSc in Surveying and Geomatics Engineering from 
Al-Balqa Applied University in Jordan.
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YOUTH INCLUSION 
REVISITING PILLAR 4 – A YOUNG 
AND EQUAL CITY OF THE AMMAN 
RESILIENCE STRATEGY THROUGH 
THE LENS OF PARTICIPATORY AND 
INCLUSIVE APPROACHES
Rana Aytug
The Amman Resilience Strategy serves as a roadmap 
for the city to attain resilience in the face of physi-
cal, social, and economic challenges. It presents five 
pillars and corresponding goals and actions. Pillar 4 
of the Amman Resilience Strategy focuses on Amman 
as a young and equal city and it sets out to integrate 
and engage young people equally and to support 
youth through cultural campaigns. While this pillar 
acknowledges Amman’s diverse identity and its large 
youth population, there appears to be a shortfall in 
conveying how the Greater Amman Municipality 
(GAM) aims to implement its goals through actions 
that are genuinely bottom-up and participatory, and 
inclusive of Amman’s diverse community, including 
its marginalized, refugee, and displaced populations. 
As GAM carries forward implementing Pillar 4 of the 
Amman Resilience Strategy, it should consider mobiliz-
ing Amman’s diverse youth community and establish-
ing clear links between youth and institutions through 
building trust, transparency, and accountability. Three 
action points are proposed: support a diverse, inclu-
sive, and accountable youth council; amplify potential 
impact of campaigns; and utilize public spaces. 
Jordan has historically served as a regional migra-
tion crossroad. Its last population census recorded a 
population of 9,531,712, of whom 2,918,125 (31 percent) 
are foreign nationals1 (Syrians 1.3 million; Egyptians 
0.6 million; Palestinians 0.6 million; Iraqis 130,000; 
Yemenis 31,163; Libyans 22,700; and 197,385 from 
1 F. De Bel-Air, “Migration Profile: Jordan,” EUI Migration Policy Centre, November 2016, p. i <http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/44065/MPC_
PB_20160 6.pdf?sequence=1> (accessed July 4, 2019).
2 Ibid., p. 4.
3 Ibid., p. i.
4 K. Górak-Sosnowska, Studies on Youth Policies in the Mediterranean Partner Countries Jordan, EuroMed Youth III Programme, 2009, p. 11 <http://www.
youthpolicy.org/national/Jordan_2009_Youth_Policy_St udy.pdf> (accessed July 4, 2019).
5 “Youth Well-Being: Policy Review of Jordan,” EU-OECD Youth Inclusion Project, Paris, 2018 <http://www.oecd.org/countries/jordan/jordan-youth.htm> 
(accessed July 4, 2019).
6 “Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” United Nations, 2014 <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/
transformingourwor ld> (accessed July 4, 2019).
7 “Security Council, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2250 (2015), Urges Member States to Increase Representation of Youth in Decision-Making at All 
Levels,” UN Security Council, December 9, 2015 <http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12149.doc.htm> (accessed July 4, 2019).
8 Ibid.
other nationalities).2 As of September 2016, Jordan 
has hosted more than 2.7 million refugees and has 
the highest refugee-to-population ratio.3 Its capital 
city Amman is home to around four million residents 
(more than 42 percent of the country’s total popula-
tion), encompassing citizens from all over the coun-
try, producing a population that is diverse in terms 
of economic, social, and legal status, ethnicity, and 
religion.4 The Development Centre of the Organiza-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development 
reports that Jordan is a very youthful country with 
close to 70 percent of the population being under the 
age of thirty.5
The multitude of opportunities youth in their com-
munities present towards building socially inclusive, 
resilient, and peaceful communities has received 
increasing attention at the international, national, and 
local level. Among the UN’s Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) are the aims to “make cities inclusive, 
safe, resilient, and sustainable” and to “substantially 
increase the number of cities and human settlements 
adopting and implementing integrated policies and 
plans towards inclusion.”6 In order to support inclu-
sive approaches, Jordan proposed and adopted UN 
Resolution 2250, which stresses “the importance 
of creating policies for youth that would positively 
contribute to peacebuilding efforts, including social 
and economic development, supporting projects 
designed to grow local economies, and provide youth 
employment opportunities and vocational train-
ing, fostering their education, and promoting youth 
entrepreneurship and constructive political engage-
ment.”7 Attention to the role of cities and integrating 
diversity-based and youth-inclusive approaches are 
integral to building resilience in cities. The Jordanian 
government recognizes the importance of develop-
ing its young population in its National Vision and 
Strategy Jordan 2025 and through the on-going 
discussions on a National Youth Strategy.8 Given its 
successful implementation, the Amman Resilience 
Strategy (ARS) provides a platform that can con-
tribute to implementing overlapping international, 
national and local goals such as those presented in 
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the SDGs, UN Resolution 2250, National Vision and 
Strategy Jordan 2025, and National Youth Strategy.
Pioneered by the Rockefeller Foundation, 100 Resil-
ient Cities (100RC) was set up to support cities in 
becoming more resilient to the physical, social, and 
economic challenges they face.9 Urban resilience 
is defined by 100RC as “the capacity of individuals, 
communities, institutions, businesses, and systems 
within a city to survive, adapt, and grow no matter 
what kinds of chronic stresses and acute shocks they 
experience.”10 In December 2014, Amman was selected 
to join the 100RC network, and received technical 
support and resources from 100RC to develop and 
implement its City Resilience Strategy as well as to 
create a new Chief Resilience Officer position.11
Following six years of operation, in April 2019 the 
Rockefeller Foundation announced that it would 
transition the work of 100RC into different path-
ways.12 While the first phase of 100RC has come to an 
end as of August 2019, practitioners were encouraged 
to consider three areas of focus: implementation, 
institutionalization, and measurement.13 100RC could 
be seen as a launchpad and now it is up to partici-
pating cities to independently carry through, allocate 
other resources, and implement their actions.
Pillar 4 of the Amman Resilience Strategy
Pillar 4 of the ARS focuses on Amman as a Young 
and Equal City and sets out to integrate and engage 
young people equally, and support youth through 
cultural campaigns.14 The first goal “aims to build 
an inclusive and empowered youth community who 
are engaged in key city issues, and involved in deci-
sion-making and governance to create the leaders of 
tomorrow.”15 The second goal aims to “capitalize on 
our youth’s potential and ensure young people have 
the opportunities they need to learn, work together 
and build a strong, resilient future city,” and “focuses 
on youth empowerment, awareness and cross-sec-
tor networking.”16 While Pillar 4 of the ARS clearly 
acknowledges Amman’s diverse identity and large 
youth population in theory, it is not clear how GAM 
9 “Amman Resilience Strategy,” (n.d.), p. 20 <https://www.100resilientcities.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Resilience-Strategy-Amman-English.pdf> 
(accessed July 4, 2019).
10 “What Is Urban Resilience?”, (n.d.) <http://100resilientcities.org/resources/> (accessed July 4, 2019).
11 “Amman Resilience Strategy,” p. 20.
12 M. Berkowitz, “An Update from 100 Resilient Cities,” 100 Resilient Cities, April 1, 2019 <https://www.100resilientcities.org/update-from-100rc/> 
(accessed August 7, 2019).
13 M. Berkowitz, “A Closing Note from Michael Berkowitz, President of 100 Resilient Cities,” 100 Resilient Cities, July 31, 2019 <https://
www.100resilientcities.org/update-from-100rc/> (accessed August 7, 2019).
14 Ibid., p. 93.
15 Ibid., p. 94.
16 Ibid., p. 98.
aims to implement its goals through actions that are 
genuinely bottom-up and participatory, and inclusive 
of Amman’s diverse community, including its margin-
alized, refugee, and displaced populations.
Best practices support youth being involved in orga-
nizational decision-making processes, from planning 
to implementation and evaluation. Pillar 4 of the ARS 
needs to place a greater emphasis on inclusion of 
Amman’s diverse youth demographic. For example, 
the action to form a youth council does not refer 
to the structure, flow of information, or key task(s) 
of this council. In line with this, Pillar 4 places an 
emphasis on supporting cultural, future city trends 
and preventing youth extremism campaigns, how-
ever, it is not clear how these topics are chosen and 
whether they form a part of a wider platform. When 
campaigns are planned, the target, tactics, and strat-
egy of the campaign need to be decided democrati-
cally by the Youth Council. Furthermore, campaigns 
are one tool to increase awareness around the impor-
tance of engaging young people. However, they need 
to form a part of a wider platform of an outreach plan 
that includes sustainable projects, workshops and 
trainings, exchange programs, and cross-cultural 
visits that feed back to build and maintain active cit-
izenship.
Recommendations
Pillar 4 of the ARS should place greater emphasis on 
including Amman’s diverse youth demographic. Youth 
should be more actively involved to help strengthen 
their sense of social accountability towards their 
city. This would grant them the necessary platform 
to develop their skills and resources to contribute to 
shaping the city they want. 
The ARS benefits from exercising youth-inclusive 
approaches through opening up the decision-making 
process and providing young people with the tools 
and resources needed to meaningfully engage with 
the issues that affect them. While youth-inclusive 
approaches counter youth disengagement, the risk 
of disillusionment remains high. GAM is responsible 
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not only for offering the rhetoric of participation, but 
also for ensuring that it effectively and consistently 
acts to implement the ARS. For this reason, it is cru-
cial that GAM reinforces the importance of youth 
inclusion and participation in its ARS and is explicit 
with regards to how their involvement is vital to its 
successful implementation. Participation should be 
an integrated and guiding principle in every aspect 
of implementation. 
 - Mobilize Amman’s diverse youth community
Full participation of young people requires moving 
from acknowledging their diversity to presenting 
platforms that encourage youth mobilization, partic-
ularly marginalized, refugee, and displaced popula-
tions. Disadvantaged and marginalized youth often 
need to be further encouraged to become actively 
engaged. Any evaluation of GAM’s youth participa-
tion and involvement in decision-making mecha-
nisms needs to address the barriers in place to young 
people’s involvement. These often include issues sur-
rounding geographical barriers, unbalanced power 
relations, mistrust, socio-economic exclusion, and 
prejudices at various levels, both between young 
people and the authorities and also within youth 
groups. Logistics should be examined in terms of 
their influence on youth participation. For example, 
meetings should consider timing and transportation 
possibilities to ensure wide participation. Similarly, 
outreach platforms calling for participation should 
be diversified between online and offline sources 
to reach a wider audience. Opportunities should be 
provided for capacity-building and engagement in 
formal structures, such as youth councils, as well as 
informal structures including short-term activities 
and projects. These structures help build links with 
excluded young people and raise their awareness of 
GAM’s activities, which could lead to sustained par-
ticipation in the future.
 - Establish clear links between youth and institutions 
through building trust, transparency, and account-
ability
Trust in government entities is a cornerstone in the 
effective implementation of the values and aspira-
tions to be a youthful and equal city. Building trust, 
transparency, and accountability is crucial for sup-
porting and encouraging young people to take and 
maintain an active role in their communities. Young 
people are motivated to participate when their needs 
and interests are acknowledged and met. Maintaining 
engagement over the long-term is important and it is 
therefore essential that feedback mechanisms are in 
place to offer young people a thorough understand-
ing of the process involved. The reception and pro-
cessing of ideas, issues, or recommendations raised 
by young people should be transparent and account-
able. Youth participation needs to be integrated into 
GAM’s working culture through accountability mech-
anisms. One way to achieve this is by establishing 
clear links between youth and institutions, for exam-
ple by enabling the youth council to raise issues to 
the city council agenda, and requiring the city coun-
cil to formally respond.
 - Support a diverse, inclusive, and accountable youth 
council
A youth council should be formed (for those aged 
14-35) that extends from the existing Children’s 
Municipal Council at GAM, with inclusive representa-
tion of age variation, gender, ethnicity, and religious 
diversity; migrant youth should also be included. A 
chief youth resilient officer should be appointed to 
serve as a link between the chief resilient officer 
and their team, and the Youth Council. This person 
would ideally be appointed by GAM and account-
able to the mayor. This would help ensure that the 
voices, demands, and aspirations of youth are equally 
important to other bodies under the GAM umbrella 
and that youth take an active part in the design and 
delivery of community-based policies, projects, and 
services related to the ARS and beyond. Short- and 
long-term projects and activities should be provided 
to ensure inclusion of youth willing to commit at 
varying levels.
 - Amplify potential impact of campaigns
Pillar 4 emphasizes cultural, future city trends and 
the prevention of youth extremism. GAM should 
ensure clarity on how these topics were chosen 
or whether they form part of a wider, sustainable 
platform. When campaigns are planned, the target, 
tactics, and strategy should be decided democrati-
cally by the Youth Council. This will help ensure that 
young people take ownership and responsibility for 
the issues that concern them. Community awareness 
of outreach campaigns can be supported by online 
programs (including existing social media platforms 
and websites) and offline activities, such as festi-
vals, exhibitions, and public hearings. Campaigns 
should form a part of a wider outreach platform that 
includes sustainable projects, workshops and train-
ings, and exchange programs centered around the 
value of civic responsibility.
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 - Utilize public spaces
Public spaces, particularly in diverse environments 
such as Amman, are both the sites of social conflicts 
and also the places where encounters, exchange, and 
integration can happen. Subsequently, youth involve-
ment and engagement in the urban context can 
enable social inclusion and cohesion. Public spaces 
across the city should be utilized as sites to develop 
programs and informal/formal initiatives including 
cultural, social, and sports-related initiatives. Pro-
grams should be promoted to capitalize on cultural 
exchange, and encourage interaction and engage-
ment between diverse communities. For example, 
educational/skill development programs, taking 
place across diverse geographical locations and 
taught by migrant and host community members, 
can help encourage cultural exchange and the col-
laborative opportunities that contribute to building 
integration and social inclusion. When such projects 
are implemented, they should be documented online 
and offline, and this documentation should be pub-
licly accessible and prompt and encourage discus-
sion. This would help raise awareness surrounding 
ongoing efforts and encourage future involvement 
and the exchange of constructive feedback loops.
Rana Aytug joined the Centre for Trust Peace and 
Social Relations (CTPSR) at Coventry University in 
May 2017 where she is currently pursuing a Ph.D. 
through a CTPSR scholarship in partnership with 
the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations. Her 
research interests are focused around youth civic 
engagement, urban diversity, and peacebuilding. 
She holds a MSc in Spatial Planning from the Ger-
man Jordanian University and a BSc in Architec-
ture from the Applied Science Private University 
in Jordan.
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YOUTH SERVICES SUSTAINABILITY 
IN THE ZAATARI REFUGEE CAMP
Bothaina Qamar
The eighth year of the Syrian crisis has witnessed a 
shift from a humanitarian emergency response to a 
protracted crisis response. As a result, radical adjust-
ments were made to humanitarian funding allocated 
to support program interventions and youth services 
in the Zaatari refugee camp in northern Jordan. This 
funding cut placed the quality of services provided at 
risk, while programs themselves began to close down, 
without proper planning or consideration for their 
safe closure. The absence of youth services can impact 
negatively at the micro level (on youth and their com-
munities), and can eventually cause a potential risk at 
the national level. To address this issue, the humani-
tarian development nexus approach should be used to 
build on the efforts of humanitarian responses and best 
practices from the past nine years in youth services in 
the Zaatari camp. This would engage multiple stake-
holders through strengthening national grassroots 
involvement in youth services at the camp, adopting 
innovative approaches for funding streams and part-
nership models, and investing in Jordanian and Syrian 
youth leadership capacities.
Jordan is a middle-income country, ranked 80 out of 
188 countries.17 Its population is almost 10 million, of 
whom 52.2 percent are aged under 25. A shift in the 
population age structure is leading to a demographic 
dividend,18 which is projected to peak by 2040 due to 
a reduction in the total fertility rate, late marriage, 
and the use of contraception. Realization of this 
projection, however, is only possible if demographic 
changes match economic opportunities for youth. 
While significant progress has been made on edu-
cation and health, other areas lag behind, including 
poverty reduction, employment, gender parity, and 
the environment.19 This is largely due to exogenous 
factors including global financial recession, regional 
instability, and the influx of refugees.
17 “Human Development Report 2015,” UNDP <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2015_human_development_re port.pdf> (accessed July 29, 2019).
18 The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) defines demographic dividend as “the economic growth potential that can result from shifts in a 
population’s age structure, mainly when the share of the working-age population (15 to 64) is larger than the non-working-age share of the population (14 
and younger, and 65 and older).” “Demographic Dividend,” United Nations Population Fund <https://www.unfpa.org/demographic-dividend> (accessed July 
29, 2019).
19 “Jordan MDG Report 2015,” internal UN document.
20 UNHCR Jordan Fact Sheet, 2019 <http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR percent20Jordan percent20Fact percent20Sheet percent20-
percent20February percent202019.pdf> (accessed July 12, 2019).
21 “Country program document 2017,” internal UNFPA document.
22 “Jordan 2015 Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF),” <http://www.coordinationtoolkit.org/?p=1748> (accessed July 12, 2019).
23 Figures from UNHCR Operations Portal, 2019 <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/36> (accessed July 29, 2019).
Jordan has accepted refugees from successive con-
flicts, evidenced by a non-Jordanian population of 
3 million including refugees and immigrants. From 
2011 on, the Syrian crisis changed Jordanian popu-
lation dynamics and investments. Currently, Jordan 
hosts 1.3 million Syrians, of whom around 762,420 
are UNHCR registered.20 According to the United 
Nations Population Fund (UNFPA),21 the large num-
ber of refugees is putting pressure on public services 
and systems. In parallel, the needs of vulnerable Jor-
danian citizens have grown rapidly, with increased 
competition for resources, straining the national 
government’s ability to meet the needs of its citi-
zens. The 2015 Vulnerability Assessment Framework 
(VAF)22 found that 86 percent of refugees are now liv-
ing below the Jordanian poverty line of 68 Jordanian 
Dinars per capita per month.
The Jordan demographic dividend is not only influ-
enced by Jordanian youth. Children make up over 
half of all Syrian refugees in the country, with 322,395 
registered Syrian refugees under the age of 18. Youth 
(defined by the UN as those aged 15-24) Syrian refu-
gees total 128,181 in urban and camps settings.23 The 
ongoing conflict has had deep implications for the 
lives of children and youth. In the light of this, sev-
eral UN agencies as well as international and national 
NGOs, with the support of Jordanian government, 
have been working to provide vital services that aim 
to minimize the negative impact of forced displace-
ment on families and their children. These services 
include the provision of formal and informal educa-
tional programs, health services, water delivery, san-
itation and hygiene promotion, livelihood protection 
programs, specialized case management for gen-
der-based violence and child protection programs for 
children with disabilities, and psychosocial support 
through child, youth, and adolescent friendly spaces, 
in addition to resilience building programming.
These services target refugees in the three formal 
camps and in various host communities. The Zaatari 
camp serves as a valuable case study for two main 
reasons. First, youth services in Zaatari present a 
positive best practice that should be accompanied 
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with a strategic exit strategy that utilizes previous 
years’ efforts and achievements, and builds on les-
sons learnt and challenges. Second, the existence 
of the Youth Task Force under the Zaatari manage-
ment structure, formed in 2014 to coordinate youth 
services in Zaatari and their work, includes annual 
updates and coordination for youth services in the 
camp. Access to such information on youth services 
contributes to this paper as a model for youth ser-
vices in other camp contexts.
The Zaatari Camp and Youth
The Zaatari refugee camp, situated in the northern 
governorate of Al Mafraq, remains the largest refugee 
camp in Jordan with a population of more than 75,285 
people.24 According to UNHCR, 19.6 percent of the 
population in Zaatari is aged between 15 and 2425 and 
according to REACH (2015), the vast majority of those 
aged 16-24 in Zaatari camp is currently unemployed 
(92.4 percent).26 Furthermore, 83.2 percent of youth 
aged 19-24 have not completed either high school 
or university. This displays the harsh reality experi-
enced by a large segment of the refugee population 
who are left to deal with the lack of opportunities.
The humanitarian response in Zaatari was remark-
able in terms of the quality, quantity, and innovation 
of youth services due to the stable and confined envi-
ronment, as well as donor interest. Several youth ser-
vices and projects were implemented as a response 
to the lack of educational services, jobs, and general 
opportunities for Syrian youth. A mapping exercise of 
services and projects for youth in Zaatari identified 
53 centers, which makes Zaatari over-served com-
pared to surrounding poor and vulnerable villages.27 
Youth services are specifically designed to support 
young people and their families to meet particular 
needs, and are often run from youth or community 
centers, schools, local councils, places of worship, 
or migrant and refugee Resource Centers.28 Based 
on UNHCR 2017 data, it is estimated that more than 
300 youth-focused activities are provided in Zaatari 
including sports, non-formal education, and life-
skills capacity training with a special focus on child 
labor and child marriage.29 Other activities include 
24 UNHCR Registration Data and 3RP-Monitor, 2019 <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/53> (accessed July 12, 2019).
25 Ibid.
26 “Comprehensive Child Focused Assessment – Za’atari Refugee Camp,” REACH, June 2015 <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/
Comprehensiv e%20child%20focused%20assessment%20Zaatari%20refugee%20camp. pdf> (accessed July 29, 2019).
27 Youth Task Force presentations, unpublished, 2017.
28 “Transforming Youth Work,” UK Department for Education and Skills, 2001 <https://www.cyc-net.org/pdf/youthservice.pdf> (accessed July 12, 2019).
29 “Initial findings of youth activities baseline assessment,” UNHCR, unpublished, 2017.
30 Stefano Severe, “Support essential to Syrian refuges’ voluntary return,” The Jordan Times, March 10, 2019 <http://www.jordantimes.com/opinion/
stefano-severe/support-essential-syrian-refugees percentE2 percent80 percent99-voluntary-return> (accessed July 12, 2019).
youth committee awareness sessions, information 
technology, recreational activities, and vocational 
trainings.
Changes in Funding Patterns for Zaatari Camp 
Youth Services
The latest couple of years have witnessed a shift in 
the narrative concerning the Syrian crisis response: 
budget cuts are pushed and projects have been scaled 
down, indicating the end of this phase of the human-
itarian program cycle. The Jordan Response Plan 
(JRP) to the Syria Crisis 2019-2020 was announced 
as Jordan’s response. The development of the JRP 
into a resilience plan is still under discussion with 
the government. While this natural development 
was expected, sustainability strategies are not clear 
when it comes to refugee services. Since the reopen-
ing of the border crossing at Jaber in October 2018, 
more Syrian refugees have started their journey back 
to Syria, totaling over 12,000 at the end of February 
2019.30 While a notable increase, this constitutes only 
2 percent of the Syrian refugees registered in Jordan, 
and many will stay in Jordan for a longer period of 
time, resulting in the need for support and access to 
services.
All youth services provided in Zaatari are addressed 
in the JRP under multiple sectors including pro-
tection, livelihood, and education. However, Jordan 
response actors have only received 38.4 percent of 
the aid required to finance the JRP for 2018. Accord-
ing to the JRP’s website, some $954 million was deliv-
The current phase of the 
humanitarian program 
 cycle is ending
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ered out of the total slightly exceeding $2.5 billion for 
that year.31
Financial cuts by the donor community have 
impacted youth services in Zaatari. The number of 
centers providing youth services dropped from 53 in 
2017 to 37 in 2019. In the past year, the Youth Task 
Force (YTF) witnessed the impact of budget cuts on 
many active organizations, which ended up either 
scaling down services or shutting down centers. 
For example, UNFPA reduced the budget for the 
 Questcope/UNFPA Youth Center by 25 percent in 
2019 compared to the previous year. The Fundacion 
Promocion Social de la Cultura (FPSC), which worked 
with youth with disabilities around theater and 
empowerment, have left the camp and stopped their 
programming due to funding cuts. Other YTF mem-
bers have unofficially reported budget cuts affecting 
their services. Gradual exit strategies and integration 
into public services are not yet clear or concrete.
Implications of Scaling Down Youth Services
Decreasing the support for youth services can have 
serious implications for refugee youth, their sur-
rounding communities, as well as at the national level. 
The youth sector can provide an important support 
system for young people experiencing transitions by 
facilitating their social inclusion, participation, and 
personal development, assisting with language and 
communication skills, teaching active engagement, 
and assisting with their emotional and psycho-cul-
tural development and well-being. Youth services can 
further ensure they are properly referred to special-
ized case management services when they face vio-
lence and abuse. Youth services have touched many 
Syrian refugee youth lives. Noor, a 17-year-old female 
31 “Only 38 percent of aid required for Jordan Response Plan received this year,” The Jordan Times, December 31, 2018 <http://www.jordantimes.com/
news/local/only-38-aid-required-jordan-response-plan-received-year> (accessed July 12, 2019).
32 Interview with the author, conducted in March 2019 via UNFPA and Questscope, where young people were requested to share messages for donors on 
the budget cuts.
33 “A future at risk. Cuts in youth services,” UNISON, 2016 <https://www.unison.org.uk/content/uploads/2016/08/23996.pdf> (accessed July 12, 2019).
34 Ibid.
35 Resolution 2250 (2015), UN Security Council, December 9, 2015 <https://undocs.org/S/RES/2250(2015)> (accessed July 29, 2019).
Syrian refugee living in the Zaatari camp, said “I dis-
covered my talents in the youth center by engaging 
in many activities. Please do not deprive us of them.”32
Marginalization and disengagement among youth 
can have a negative impact on communities. If youth 
services are to be stripped from the program, young 
people will have nowhere to turn, and there will be 
no-one qualified or trained to support them in the 
issues that they are experiencing.33 This will lead 
to more anti-social behavior, depression, and poor 
mental health among youth. Parents also need to 
know that their children are safe and not the vic-
tims of risky behaviors such as using drugs or being 
bullied. Youth centers are safe spaces where youth 
who are confined in one place are able to hang out, 
receive support, and seek out advice or mentoring as 
they see fit.34
Government and Community Engagement in 
Humanitarian Response and Youth Services Pro-
vision
Recognizing the threat to stability and development 
posed by the rise of the radicalization of young peo-
ple, the UN Security Council urges states under Res-
olution 2250 (2015)35 to consider ways to create a 
meaningful voice for the youth in decision-making at 
the local, national, regional, and international levels. 
Jordan recognizes the importance behind meaningful 
engagement with youth at different levels. 
The National Youth Empowerment Strategy led by 
the Ministry of Youth (M0Y) is a comprehensive sev-
en-pillar strategy, providing a road map responding 
to youth challenges in Jordan. The strategy refers 
to targeting disadvantaged young people, which 
includes refugees, to achieve national development 
and security. Additionally, the MoY is the umbrella 
for the National Coalition on Youth Peace and Secu-
rity 2250 in Jordan, whose vision is to play an effec-
tive role in building and amplifying the momentum 
generated by Jordan’s past and present leadership in 
actualizing the 2250 agenda. 
Royal and national NGOs play a major role in com-
plementing government programs, providing youth 
with services, and organizing diverse youth activ-
NGOs play a major 
role in complementing 
 government programs
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ities across the country. Religious and charitable 
organizations also provide support to Jordan’s most 
vulnerable youth groups. They are generally com-
munity-based and active at the local level, and most 
run local youth centers and organize extracurricular 
activities.36 Most of these organizations do not have a 
presence in Zaatari due to the high presence of inter-
national humanitarian organizations.
The MoY is the government entity responsible for 
youth development and policies. Its role is to foster 
youth development and promote youth participation 
in national development processes. Yet the MoY does 
not have an active presence in refugee camps, which 
is due to the government position of not engaging the 
MoY in camp services. However, the current changes 
in humanitarian responses pose a question on the 
sustainability of provided services, the normative and 
advisory role of the MoY on youth services, and the 
role the international community plays in supporting 
the national NGOs, local community based organi-
zations (CBOs), and government in ensuring quality 
services for youth living in Jordan.
Several countries hosting refugees have worked on 
providing positive examples in supporting youth ser-
vices. Most of the examples tackle host communities 
or operate at the policy or strategy level. Examples 
include the Council of Europe Action Plan on pro-
tecting refugee and migrant children (2017-2019),37 
adopted by the Council of Ministers, and the 2015-
2016 Erasmus+ inclusion and diversity strategy 
focused on disadvantaged youth, and the integra-
tion of migrants and refugees. Similarly, the EU Work 
Plan for Youth 2016-2018 focuses on the need for 
stronger cross-sectoral cooperation to address the 
challenges raised by increasing numbers of asylum 
seekers and their participation and social inclusion. 
In Malta, youth workers are encouraged through the 
new youth policy (2015-2020) to create social cohe-
sion and the participation of asylum seekers aged 
13-30, and to better integrate them into the activi-
ties of NGOs and community life.38 One example of 
government action comes from Greece, where the 
state is beginning to take over the management and 
financing of aspects of the reception and integration 
36 “Youth Well-being Policy Review of Jordan,” OECD Development Centre, EU-OECD Youth Inclusion Project, Paris, 2018.
37 Lana Pasic, “Young Refugees’ Transition to Adulthood Literature. Review and Policy Brief,” Youth Partnership between the European Commission and 
the Council of Europe, 2018 <https://pjp-eu.coe.int/documents/1017981/9488616/Refugees+transition+to+adult hood.pdf/9a064fa1-ee97-be3f-84fd-
5a27d85e15a6> (accessed July 12, 2019).
38 Ibid.
39 “Transition to a government-run refugee and migrant response in Greece,” Joint Agency Briefing Paper, December 2017 <https://drc.ngo/
media/4154531/joint-ngo-roadmap-12122017.pdf> (accessed July 12, 2019).
40 According to the OCHA, strengthening the humanitarian-development nexus was identified by the majority of stakeholders as a top priority at the 
World Humanitarian Summit. “Humanitarian and Development Nexus in Protracted Emergencies,” UNDP, 2016 < http://www.europe.undp.org/content/
geneva/en/home/partnerships/h umanitarian-and-development-nexus-in-protracted-emergencies.html> (accessed July 12, 2019).
system.39 Because of this, many international NGOs 
that came to assist with the humanitarian emergency 
are now downsizing or preparing to exit the country 
entirely.
However, no concrete examples that document sus-
tainability for youth services in a refugee camp con-
text are available. If given the chance, Jordan can be 
the first to develop a framework that will not only 
sustain services for refugees impacted in their own 
country, but also a framework that can be imple-
mented in various contexts.
Recommendations
Like other vital public services, youth services should 
be as equally supported and diverse as the young 
people in Jordanian society. Stakeholders and deci-
sion-makers should build on the efforts of human-
itarian responses from the past nine years, and to 
strategically plan holistic youth service provisions 
that engage multiple stakeholders in ensuring sus-
tained youth services that can serve also social cohe-
sion.
 - Strengthen national grassroots involvement for 
youth services in the camp
International humanitarian actors and donors are 
encouraged to support active implementation of 
the humanitarian-development nexus approach40 by 
engaging with more local organizations and actors, 
as well as the Jordanian Ministry of Planning and 
International Cooperation and the UNHCR, to facil-
itate national specialized youth NGOs presence in 
Zaatari. This can help support the transition process 
technically and financially, and utilize national capac-
ities in youth service provision. Similar interventions 
have recently been initiated by UNHCR for gen-
eral services in the camp, in collaboration with the 
Crown Prince Foundation, Queen Rania Foundation, 
and Ruwad Al Tanmya. This transitional process will 
require international support in terms of funding and 
technical expertise for national counterparts. This is 
particularly needed in terms of working with refugee 
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populations to better understand their vulnerability 
and legal context.
The process of national transition and building inte-
gration of public services should start from a grass-
roots level. The Youth Task Force and camp man-
agement should facilitate discussion around the 
transition process, and assess national organizations’ 
willingness, challenges, and capacities in engaging 
in the humanitarian response and youth services 
provision. Decentralization law provides an outlet 
to engage with the local community and decision 
makers in Mafraq, and create a channel with Syrian 
refugees. This process should be informed by clear 
assessments conducted by the Youth Task Force in 
the Zaatari camp that describe the youth services 
scene, and identify existing models that should be 
sustained as well as duplicate services that can be 
merged.  UNHCR is leading a community mapping 
assessment for community-based organizations in 
the Mafraq area; the findings could help in identifying 
local service providers for transition activities.
The MoY can engage in an advisory role as the offi-
cial umbrella for youth work in Jordan, setting the 
normative standards in this area. The Greek exam-
ple provides a model in which the government 
transitions to humanitarian services, and adoption 
of this could be explored further by the Jordanian 
government. In order to promote social cohesion 
and successful integration, Jordan could follow the 
Greek government, which is working on engaging all 
stakeholders, including relevant ministries, mayors, 
municipalities, civil society, host community groups, 
and representatives of the asylum-seeking and ref-
ugee communities in the design of a strategic social 
inclusion/integration plan, and in the planning and 
implementation of integration measures.
 - Adopt innovative approaches for funding streams 
and partnership models
Innovative approaches in utilizing pool funding under 
future national resilience plans should be utilized. 
Joint projects and programs could decrease opera-
tional costs and enhance efficiency. This can entail 
the merging of more than one service and the provi-
sion of “One-stop shops” in several physical locations 
that provide holistic services for youth, instead of 
scattered interventions. One example is the “Mobile 
Youth Centers” that are sensitive to young girls’ 
accessibility constraints, and reach out to neglected 
geographical areas in the camp. Such merges can 
lead to the reduction of management expenses and 
operational costs carried by different organizations, 
and ensure continued service provision.
Another dimension is engaging with the private sec-
tor and philanthropists who are interested in sup-
porting youth programming, not only as sources of 
funding, but also as partners engaged in joint pro-
gramming. Many companies and organizations are 
already supporting youth focus programming such 
as Zain, Orange, Abdul Hameed Shoman Foundation, 
and many others. For example, Zain is supporting 
ZINC labs all over Jordan promoting youth innova-
tion and social and business enterprise. International 
organizations should support local capacities to 
mobilize new sources of funding, and build partner-
ships with private sector organizations engaged in 
youth work and youth services.
 - Invest in Jordanian and Syrian youth leadership 
capacities
The current legal framework limits and restricts 
Syrian refugees from forming civil society organiza-
tions. However, cooperatives can be founded among 
Syrians in collaboration with Jordanian counter-
parts. Humanitarian actors should mobilize advocacy 
efforts to discuss alternatives with the Ministry of 
Social Development and MoY for Syrian leadership 
within the camp, granting them more agency to cre-
ate sustainable solutions for youth services.
The process should be inclusive for both Syrian ref-
ugee youth in the camp and Jordanian youth in sur-
rounding areas. Both Jordanian and Syrian youth 
carry strong sets of skills and assets. Programs and 
interventions built on an assets-based approach and 
skills exchange will not only translate into produc-
tivity, but also enhance social cohesion and building 
strong communities. Many youth services in Zaatari 
have relied on local Syrian capacities throughout 
the years. Youth workers from the Syrian refugee 
community in Zaatari have been trained to provide 
high-quality services. Examples include handling 
management processes in centers and services such 
as the Norwegian Refugee Council, International 
Relief and Development, and Questscope. Similarly, 
many Jordanian youth are engaged in the humanitar-
ian response, youth work, and activism, in addition to 
their legal access to many opportunities and services.
Working together with Jordanian and Syrian youth 
towards creating sustainable structures should adopt 
comprehensive capacity building on proposal writ-
ing, fundraising and resource mobilization, project 
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management, and so on. Income-generating modal-
ities from within the camp could be one supporting 
stream for service provision. Although the camp is 
currently closed with movement restrictions for 
both Jordanians and Syrians, it is paramount to work 
toward a pioneer model in service provision for all 
Syrian youth in Zaatari, and Jordanians in the sur-
rounding areas. The vision is to increase the plat-
forms of engagement between Jordanians and Syr-
ians, and provide opportunities and services for 
vulnerable youth from different backgrounds.
Bothaina Qamar is a UNFPA youth program 
analyst. She is a development practitioner with 
more than ten years of experience in managing 
and coordinating humanitarian and development 
projects and programs in various organizations 
including UN Women, CARE International, and 
Right to Play.
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THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES
AVOIDING THE NIGHTMARE OF 
JORDAN’S DESTABILIZATION 
– A HOLISTIC APPROACH FOR 
EU INSTITUTIONS AND MEMBER 
STATES TO SUPPORT A KEY ALLY IN 
THE MIDDLE EAST
Eugenio Dacrema
Over the last year, Jordanian cities have witnessed a 
wave of street protests unprecedented in size since 
2011. Discontent among the population has grown 
dramatically due to the steady deterioration of the 
economy and several austerity measures introduced 
by the government to cope with a widening budget 
deficit. Such measures exacerbated the difficulties of 
the last two decades as the country tries to achieve a 
full transition from a semi-rentier economic model to 
a full-fledged market economy. Moreover, over the last 
year, discontent caused by socioeconomic issues has 
been coupled with increasing concerns over the Trump 
administration’s intention to propose a resolution for 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that could damage 
some of Jordan’s most essential interests and stability. 
Jordan is crucial for Europe’s interests in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. The country has emerged as an island 
of stability in a very troubled region and as a reliable 
partner for the EU on numerous issues. Hence, it is of 
primary importance for the EU to take the necessary 
steps to avoid further destabilization in Jordan. The EU 
and its member states can intervene along three main 
lines to achieve this target: one focused on the short-
term, aimed at supporting Jordan’s stance vis-à-vis the 
Trump administration’s plan for Israel and Palestine; 
and two medium-term strategies aimed at supporting 
Jordan’s efforts to enhance the efficiency of its econ-
omy and labor market.
In a region shackled by conflicts and tensions, Jordan 
has emerged as an island of stability and moderation. 
Over its recent history, the country has served as a 
unique interlocutor for most regional and interna-
1 “Jordan Poll Reveals Low Trust in Government; Increasing Economic Hardship,” International Republican Institute, November 2, 2018 <https://www.iri.
org/resource/jordan-poll-reveals-low-trust-government-increasing-economic-hardship> (accessed July 8, 2019).
2 Hassan A. Barari, “The new wave of protests,” The Jordan Times, June 5, 2018 <http://jordantimes.com/opinion/hassan-barari/new-wave-protests> 
(accessed July 8, 2019).
3 Curtis Ryan, “Jordanians worry that the ‘deal of the century’ will come at their expense,” Washington Post, June 1, 2019 <https://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/2019/06/01/jordanians-worry-that-deal-century-will-come-their-expense/?utm_term=.777665a68bac> (accessed July 8, 2019).
4 Ronen Yitzhak, “Between reform and Islam: The Arab spring in Jordan 2011–2014,” Democracy and Security 14:1 (2018), pp. 24-44. 
tional actors, playing a positive role in the most cru-
cial disputes and conflicts of the Levant. Jordan also 
constituted an example of successful political and 
economic reforms, providing a blueprint for other 
Middle East countries to follow. However, over the 
last decade, the path of reforms has slowed down 
while social discontent has grown dramatically due 
to mounting socioeconomic difficulties. In 2018 and 
2019, numerous peaceful protests took place in sev-
eral Jordanian cities while trust in the government 
and the monarchy has steadily decreased to histor-
ical lows.1
Today’s popular discontent is rooted in the country’s 
ongoing – but so far incomplete – transition from a 
semi-rentier economic model to a full-fledged mar-
ket economy. Despite the many deep reforms intro-
duced during the 1990s and 2000s, the transition 
has been slowed down by numerous regional and 
international crises. Coupled with a dramatic demo-
graphic increase, these factors have led to growing 
unemployment – especially among youth – and a 
steady worsening of the general population’s living 
standards. In particular, the recent wave of protests 
started after the introduction of several measures 
aimed at reducing the budget deficit by cutting sub-
sidies and social welfare, and augmenting fiscal pres-
sure.2 Moreover, beside these grave socioeconomic 
difficulties, over the next months, Jordan is likely to 
face further discontent caused by the Trump admin-
istration’s plan to solve the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict, the so-called “Deal of the Century.” Although 
the plan has not yet been officially presented, it is 
rumored to contain numerous measures highly dam-
aging for Jordan’s interests and internal economic 
and demographic stability.3
Jordan’s Economic Deterioration and Short-Term 
Causes of the Protests
Since spring 2018, Jordan has witnessed several waves 
of street protests. Their frequency and size have 
been unprecedented since the demonstrations of 
2011, when the “contagion effect” of the Arab Spring 
extended to Jordan and made several observers fear 
for the stability of the Hashemite monarchy.4 Such 
protests were sparked by recent economic measures 
implemented by subsequent Jordanian governments, 
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but have their roots in the long-term deterioration 
of the country’s economic model (see Graph 1 below).
Figure 1: GDP per capita growth 
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The recent protests were sparked in spring 2018 by 
the introduction of a new income-tax that, according 
to the government, aimed to achieve the bud getary 
targets requested by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and attached to a new loan to cover the 
country’s significant fiscal deficit.5 However, although 
the new income tax only impacts the upper-middle 
classes, the protests have attracted participants from 
all social strata, reflecting a mounting economic mal-
aise caused by the steady deterioration of the coun-
try’s overall economic conditions. This trend has 
been exacerbated over the last years by the intro-
duction of subsequent measures aimed at enhancing 
fiscal pressure – through both direct and indirect 
taxes – and at cutting subsidies and public services.6 
In addition to street protests, harsh critiques against 
the government have also increased dramatically on 
social media even after physical protests and sit-ins 
ceased taking place.7 Trust in the government has 
fallen to historical lows and many expect new, bigger 
waves of demonstrations in the next months.8
5 Suleiman Al-Khalidi, “Jordan’s parliament passes IMF-backed tax law to reduce public debt,” Reuters, November 18, 2018 <https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-jordan-economy-tax/jordans-parliament-passes-imf-backed-tax-law-to-reduce-public-debt-idUSKCN1NN0IK> (accessed July 8, 2019).
6 Suleiman Al-Khalidi, “Jordan ends bread subsidy, doubling some prices, to help state finances,” Reuters, January 26, 2018 <https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-jordan-economy-subsidies-bread/jordan-ends-bread-subsidy-doubling-some-prices-to-help-state-finances-idUSKBN1FF2CP> (accessed July 8, 
2019).
7 Tom Perry and Suleiman Al-Khalidi, “Jordan faces wave of dissent as government’s troubles mount,” Business Insider, November 26, 2018 <https://
www.businessinsider.com/r-jordan-faces-wave-of-dissent-as-governments-troubles-mount-2018-11?IR=T> (accessed July 8, 2019).
8 “Jordan Poll Reveals Low Trust in Government.”
9 S. Greenwood, “Jordan’s ‘New Bargain:’ The Political Economy of Regime Security,” Middle East Journal 57:2 (2003), pp. 248-268.
10 Laurie Brand, Jordan’s Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance-Making (New York, 1995).
11 Greenwood, “Jordan’s ‘New Bargain’.”
Jordan’s Unique Rentierism and its Long Decline
The current socio-economic malaise has its roots 
in both external and domestic factors that have 
impacted the country’s ongoing transition from a 
semi-rentier system to a full-fledged market econ-
omy. Jordan initiated the transition in the 1990s after 
a protracted economic crisis caused by the end of the 
oil-boom years.9 During the preceding two decades, 
Jordan had been one of the main recipients of eco-
nomic aid from the Gulf’s oil-rich monarchies, who 
were interested in supporting Jordan’s stance against 
Israel and using the country as a territorial buffer 
between Israel and the Arabian Peninsula. During 
those years, the country used the significant inflows 
of petrodollars to build modern infrastructures and 
to develop an over-sized public sector which quickly 
became the economy’s main employer. The small size 
of the country’s economy and the massive amounts of 
aid flowing in during that period transformed Jordan 
into a unique sort of (semi-)rentier state: rent was 
not based on the trade of oil or gas but on foreign aid 
obtained due to the country’s unique geographical 
and political position.10
However, when financial support from the Gulf came 
to an almost complete end in the late 1980s, Jordan’s 
leadership was compelled to carry out a foreign 
policy U-turn and to sign a peace treaty with Israel 
in 1994. This move allowed Jordan to obtain new 
streams of financial support from the West, especially 
from the US. Moreover, the renewed close relation-
ship with Western countries – and Western-spon-
sored international economic organizations such as 
the IMF and the World Bank – allowed the country 
to present itself as a safe recipient for international 
private investments, which were meant to stimulate 
the development of a competitive private sector able 
to balance the over-sized public one.11
Over the following years, the Jordanian government 
introduced several economic reforms aimed at spur-
ring private sector expansion. Such efforts attained 
remarkable results until the mid-2000s. However, 
since the 2008 global financial crisis, a chain of inter-
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national and regional predicaments has undermined 
the country’s socioeconomic stability, leading to a 
slowdown of the reform process. In 2008, the global 
financial crisis led to a period of credit crunch for 
most developing economies, and the 2011 Arab Spring 
protests spurred investors’ fears over the political 
stability of most Middle East regimes, including Jor-
dan.12 In subsequent years, the conflicts that erupted 
in Syria and Iraq led to massive inflows of refugees 
into Jordan – 650 thousand Syrian refugees are for-
mally registered, and almost 1.2 million are actually 
living in the country according to national estimates 
that include the high numbers of non-registered 
Syrians present today on Jordanian territory.13 The 
tourism sector suffered dramatically while basic 
assistance for refugees became a heavy burden on 
the country’s budget and infrastructures. Further-
more, instability around Jordan’s borders hindered 
international investments in the country and blocked 
the main land routes for trade. As a result, the state 
budget remained dependent on foreign aid to cover 
its deficit. The amount of aid directed into the coun-
try over the last decade – although augmenting in 
absolute terms – has been insufficient to compensate 
for the dramatic demographic increase witnessed by 
Jordanian society, the massive inflow of refugees, and 
the damage to the tourism and trade sectors pro-
duced by the instability in Syria and Iraq. This led the 
Jordanian government to ask the IMF once again for 
help and to increase significantly the fiscal pressure 
on the population – especially in the form of indirect 
taxes. This has reverberated on the purchasing power 
of average households while cuts in subsidies hit the 
income of the poorer strata particularly hard.
12 “The Economic Consequences of the Arab Spring,” Atlantic Council, February 13, 2014 <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/issue-briefs/the-
economic-consequences-of-the-arab-spring> (accessed July 8, 2019).
13 “Jordan Census Counts 1.2 Million Syrians,” Voice of America News, January 31, 2016 <https://www.voanews.com/a/jordan-census-counts-1-point-2-
million-syrians/3170432.html> (accessed July 8, 2019).
Figure 2: Net official development assis-
tance and official aid received as share 
of the GDP 1969-2017 (current US$)
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The Three Main Nodes Affecting Jordan’s Economy
In sum, despite noteworthy results in economic 
diversification and private sector development over 
the previous decades, the transition process has 
slowed down in recent years and significant unsolved 
problems lie at the roots of the social malaise that 
has caused the current period of social tension. Such 
problems can be summarized into three main points. 
The first is the ongoing deterioration of state insti-
tutions and citizens’ trust in them. This has been 
exacerbated by the loss in purchasing power of 
public sector salaries. In fact, the public sector has 
remained over-sized compared to the private sector, 
despite efforts to diversify the economy. Neverthe-
less, the pace of public job creation has slowed down, 
accompanied by a steady loss of purchasing power 
for most public sector employees. This has led to a 
widespread increase in corruption, which further 
undermines public trust in state institutions.
Second, the Jordanian system shows the ongoing 
presence of an imperfect dual labor market, typical 
of rentier economies. Young Jordanians entering the 
labor market have built their professional expecta-
tions on the experience and welfare of previous gen-
erations. This leads many of them to aspire to secur-
ing public sector jobs – which in the past constituted 
the main form of employment – and to look at the 
private sector as the second-best option. In some 
instances, cultural factors lead new entrants to refuse 
work that is better paid than more traditional public 
sector jobs due to the social stigmatization attached 
to some kinds of professions (especially blue-collar 
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and service-sector jobs). Furthermore, the educa-
tion system has been only partially reformed in order 
to match the requirements of the private sector. As 
a result, dependency rates among young Jordani-
ans have been steadily increasing over recent years 
along with the unemployment rate, especially among 
youth (see Graph 3). The private sector has produced 
a limited number of high-quality posts able to attract 
young Jordanians, while most recently created pri-
vate sector jobs went to low-skilled immigrants 
(especially from Asia and poorer Arab countries such 
as Egypt).14 Although an increasing number of Jor-
danians is employed in the private sector compared 
to the past, structural and cultural reasons hinder 
the achievement of an optimal employment balance 
between the public and private sectors.15
Figure 3: Employment to population 
ratio, ages 15-25, total (percent) (mod-
eled ILO estimate)
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The third problematic node is the economy’s Dutch 
disease, another typical feature of rentier states. Jor-
dan’s average salaries remain relatively high when 
compared to those of other countries in the region 
not endowed with significant hydrocarbon resources, 
such as Egypt and pre-war Syria. Furthermore, unlike 
countries with higher average salaries, such as Saudi 
Arabia, Jordan suffers from scarce domestic invest-
14 Camille Dupire, “Jordanian labour market suffers from ‘abundant’ foreign workforce – study,” The Jordan Times, October 5, 2017 <http://www.
jordantimes.com/news/local/jordanian-labour-market-suffers-abundant’-foreign-workforce-—-study> (accessed July 8, 2019).
15 According to documents released by the Jordanian Ministry of Labor, the public sector today still accounts for more employees than the service and 
manufacturing sectors combined. “Jordanian Labor Market in Numbers (2012-2016)” [in Arabic], Jordanian Ministry of Labor, 2017 <http://www.mol.gov.jo/
Echobusv3.0/SystemAssets/PDFs/AR/Jordani an percent20Labour percent20Market percent20in percent20Numbers percent20(2012-2016).pdf> (accessed 
July 8, 2019).
16 Mohammad Gazal, “Jordan falls two spots in Global Competitiveness Report,” The Jordan Times, October 20, 2018 <http://www.jordantimes.com/
news/local/jordan-falls-two-spots-global-competitiveness-report> (accessed July 8, 2019).
17 Ali Younes, “Will Gulf aid package help resolve Jordan’s economic crisis?,” Al Jazeera, June 12, 2018 <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/06/gulf-
aid-package-resolve-jordan-economic-crisis-180612095819844.html> (accessed July 8, 2019).
18 Ian Black, “Why Israel is quietly cosying up to Gulf monarchies,” The Guardian, March 19, 2019 <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2019/mar/19/
why-israel-quietly-cosying-up-to-gulf-monarchies-saudi-arabia-uae> (accessed July 8, 2019).
19 “US envoy Greenblatt: Israeli-Palestine conflict is not the core regional problem,” Middle East Monitor, September 4, 2018 <https://www.
middleeastmonitor.com/20180904-us-envoy-greenblatt-israel-palestine-conflict-is-not-the-core-regional-problem/> (accessed July 8, 2019).
ment capacity and high prices for basic production 
factors such as energy. The combination of these 
elements makes the country’s business environment 
insufficiently competitive for international investors 
interested in labor-intensive industrial sectors. Such 
elements have curbed the expansion of the private 
sector, especially in labor-intensive activities capable 
of absorbing high numbers of young unemployed.16
Jordan and the “Deal of the Century”
Such systemic problems have been exacerbated by 
the increasingly limited capacity of the Jordanian 
leadership to obtain significant economic and polit-
ical support from traditional international allies and 
donors – in particular, from the Gulf monarchies.17 
This has been due to the steady deterioration of the 
country’s relevance in regional politics, which has 
led to Jordan’s diminishing leverage vis-à-vis other 
regional powers and current and potential interna-
tional supporters. While in the past Amman could 
play a decisive role in several regional issues due to 
its privileged relations with Israel, the West, and all 
relevant regional actors, today such relations have 
no longer the same strategic value. Today, Israel has 
direct channels of communication and coordination 
with regional players, such as the Gulf monarchies, 
that bypass Jordan.18
Furthermore, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – which 
for much of the post-war period constituted the core 
of Middle Eastern politics – is no longer considered 
a primary issue.19 In addition, Jordan has no longer a 
determining role in the management of this conflict 
as it did in the past. On the contrary, over the last 
year, Jordan has mostly been a passive player in the 
context of the soon-to-be-announced “Deal of the 
Century” – the peace-plan elaborated by the Trump 
administration in coordination with Tel Aviv and 
Riyadh to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Although the plan has not yet been officially pre-
sented, the details that have emerged so far outline 
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a risky scenario for Jordan’s interests.20 The plan is 
said to include a de facto dismissal of the two-state 
solution, with the formation of a lesser Palestinian 
state to be linked to Jordan through some sort of 
confederal system. The plan would also allegedly end 
the Hashemite monarchy’s tutelage on Jerusalem’s 
Islamic holy sites, which has the potential to further 
undermine the monarchy’s credibility. The monar-
chy’s acceptance of the 1994 peace treaty was based 
on the creation of an independent Palestinian state 
– and the socioeconomic and demographic stability 
of the country – which would be further undermined 
by a confederation that includes several million more 
Palestinians in Jordanian society. In fact, Palestinians 
already constitute almost 70 percent of the overall 
Jordanian population, and the current demographic 
equilibrium was only achieved after the resolution of 
tensions between Palestinians and the Transjorda-
nian population – the traditional core support base 
of the Hashemite monarchy – which even caused a 
brief civil war in 1970. Further demographic margin-
alization of the Transjordanian population would lead 
to the definitive dismantling of the balance that has 
guaranteed the country’s social stability over recent 
decades. The dominant control that the Transjordan-
ians exert today on the public sector – and especially 
on its most sensitive structures, such as the army 
and the security forces – would become impossible 
to maintain, jeopardizing the very integrity of the 
monarchy’s core base. Furthermore, the inclusion 
of a large, young population – from territories that 
have been neglected for decades and already show 
high levels of youth unemployment – would repre-
sent a further burden for the country’s already over-
whelmed infrastructures and labor market.
Jordan and the EU
Jordan has been a close ally of the EU and a reliable 
partner in many scenarios. The country is part of 
the Neighborhood Policy and has signed subsequent 
treaties with the EU in key economic, security, and 
cultural areas. Grave destabilization in Jordan would 
cause a major blow to Europe’s interests in the Levant 
and to the EU’s credibility as a trustworthy partner. 
Moreover, instability in Jordan would further degrade 
20 Z. Harel, “Concern In Jordan about ‘Deal Of The Century,’ Possible Harm To Jordan’s Special Status In Jerusalem,” Middle East Media Research Institute, 
April 8, 2019 <https://www.memri.org/reports/concern-jordan-about-deal-century-possible-harm-jordans-special-status-jerusalem> (accessed July 8, 
2019).
21 “Jordan,” European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, European Commission, 2018 <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-
enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/jordan_en> (accessed July 8, 2019).
22 “Commission implementing decision of 6.12.2018 on the annual action programme (Part 2) in favour of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for 2018,” 
European Commission, December 6, 2018 <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/c_2018_8530_jordan_aap_2018_part_2_
merged_document.pdf> (accessed July 8, 2019).
23 Michael Hochberg, “Jordan’s Energy Future: A Path Forward,” Middle East Institute, August 19, 2015 <https://www.mei.edu/publications/jordans-
energy-future-path-forward> (accessed July 8, 2019).
the already dramatic situation in the Levantine region 
and endanger key European security and economic 
interests.
Over recent decades, EU missions and documents 
have analyzed Jordan’s socio-economic situation and 
its development, providing key outlines of the coun-
try’s most pressing problems.21 For instance, several 
EU reports recognize the reduction of the mismatch 
between the requirements of the private sector and 
the skillset of labor-market entrants as key to solv-
ing the country’s employability issues.22 EU countries 
have also been engaged in supporting the Jordanian 
government’s effort to reform the education system 
and to improve coordination between private com-
panies and universities. The two main goals here 
are: the modernization of university education and 
research programs in order to better match the 
needs of private companies; and to encourage more 
continuous and effective private sector engage-
ment with R&D instruments, and to coordinate in 
this regard with academic institutions. Such efforts 
have achieved some results, but EU support has been 
sparse and mostly project and/or sector-based.
Furthermore, several documents released by EU 
institutions have recognized the cost of produc-
tive factors and the scarcity of investments as two 
of the main problems in Jordan’s economy. They are 
especially felt by start-ups and SMEs, whose com-
petitiveness is dramatically hampered. In particular, 
energy has emerged as the single most expensive 
factor, constituting a barrier to further development 
of the country’s industrial sector and becoming an 
increasingly heavier burden for the budgets of Jor-
danian households. This has been caused by Jordan’s 
lack of domestic resources and the increasing diffi-
culties the government has encountered when trying 
to obtain procurements from its neighbors.23
Recently, the EU has been supporting Jordan’s effort 
to achieve energy independence using new technolo-
gies and alternative (especially renewable) sources. 
However, EU contributions have been sparse and 
not distributed according to an overall homogeneous 
plan aimed at supporting Jordan’s efforts to enhance 
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its energy independence. Moreover, while the EU 
has promoted and created credit lines for financial 
start-ups and medium enterprises – which employ 70 
percent of the Jordanian private-sector workforce – 
their bankability remains limited. Most local financial 
institutes prefer to invest in the few big private com-
panies active in the country and both credit institu-
tions and SMEs still lack the necessary know-how 
to establish a healthy system of relations and trust 
allowing for local banks to efficiently stimulate the 
local private sector.24
Finally, Jordan and the EU have always shared similar 
positions regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
In particular, both have always shown great sup-
port for the two-state solution proposed by the Oslo 
process.25 Hence, the main elements of the Trump 
administration’s proposal contradict Jordan’s stance 
as well as that of the EU. Jordan and most European 
countries already expressed their opposition to 
Trump’s decision to move the US embassy from Tel 
Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018. However, on that occasion, 
the EU’s and Jordan’s declarations and initiatives 
occurred in parallel and without coordination.
Recommendations
The EU and its member states have the instruments 
to effectively support Jordan in the months and years 
to come and avoid further dangerous instability in 
the country and in the region. They can intervene 
along three main lines: one political and effective in 
the short-term, and two medium-term strategies 
concerning the country’s economic development.
 - Support the Jordanian leadership in its opposition 
to the “Deal of the Century” (short-term)
Establishing a direct channel of communication and 
coordination between Jordan and the EU in order to 
coordinate future initiatives in opposition to Trump’s 
peace plan would strengthen the Jordanian lead-
ership’s stance domestically and also in relation to 
other regional and international actors. The EU can 
achieve this objective by including the Jordanian 
leadership in its own initiatives, issuing common 
declarations in support of the two-state solution, and 
devising shared policies on the issue.
24 Ibid.
25 “FM underlines EU role in resolving Palestinian-Israeli conflict,” Jordanian Embassy to the US, May 18, 2019 <http://jordanembassyus.org/news/
fm-underlines-eu-role-resolving-palestinian-israeli-conflict> (accessed July 8, 2019).
26 See endnote 21.
 - Enhance support for vocational-training programs 
and private-sector employment (medium-term)
The EU needs to rethink its support through a more 
holistic and homogeneous approach based on a 
broad understanding of the Jordanian labor mar-
ket’s needs and requirements, as stressed by the 2018 
European Commission’s Annual Programme for Jor-
dan.26 Vocational training coupled with the provision 
of better communication between private sector and 
academic institutions should be at the core of this 
approach. Furthermore, such interventions should 
be accompanied by marketing and social media cam-
paigns with a twofold goal: to modify widespread 
social perceptions regarding employment in certain 
fields and enhance private companies’ perception of 
the benefits of R&D programs, and a more continu-
ous and effective engagement with academic insti-
tutions.
 - Enhance the overall competitiveness of the Jorda-
nian economy (medium-term)
The EU needs to increase its (so far limited) efforts to 
enhance the bankability of SMEs and startups. This 
can be achieved by creating ad-hoc credit lines using 
EU funding. However, even more importantly, such 
interventions need to be made sustainable by provid-
ing SMEs and public and private financial institutions 
with the adequate financial tools and know-how. This 
would enhance the bankability of the former and 
create a functional credit sector able to support the 
long-term creation of new jobs through the promo-
tion of Jordanian entrepreneurship.
Eugenio Dacrema is the acting Co-Head of the 
MENA Center at the Italian Institute for Interna-
tional Studies (ISPI). At the time of the workshop, 
he worked as a research fellow at the same insti-
tute. His research focuses on the socioeconom-
ics of the Mashreq countries, in particular Syria, 
Jordan, and Lebanon. He writes for numerous 
national and international outlets such as the 
Atlantic Council, Syria Untold, Corriere della Sera, 
Eastwest, and Il Foglio.
Chapter II: International Cooperation
55No. 5 | January 2020 – first published in July 2019
REPORT
REALIZING THE OPPORTUNITY OF 
THE EU-JORDAN ASSOCIATION 
AGREEMENT – HOW MORE 
JORDANIAN AND NON-JORDANIAN 
PRODUCERS CAN TAKE PART
Mohammed Al Husari
Jordan has recently signed improved versions of the 
EU-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 2016, with 
two further improvements in 2017 and 2018. The 
FTA allows many Jordanian firms preferential access 
to the EU market by eliminating customs duties on 
their products if they hire Syrian refugees as a small 
percentage of their workforce. Not many Jordanian 
firms have taken part, and the country’s trade deficit 
remains negative without much improvement. The 
EU-Jordan FTA is a source of great advantage if cap-
italized on, which can be achieved by designing and 
executing a deliberate strategy to promote producers 
who wish to export to the EU. Policies in support of 
this include attracting foreign direct investment from 
firms in other countries that already export to the EU 
with tariffs, creating a special fund to finance projects 
backed by low European interest rates anticipating 
revenues in Euros and, more ambitiously, creating a 
high-productivity growth industry with linkages to the 
economy supported by infrastructure and semi-subsi-
dized energy.
In the last three years, Jordanian and European pol-
icy makers have been improving the rules concerning 
Jordanian producers to encourage further exports to 
the EU, as part of the general EU response to assist 
Jordan during its current economic crises and the 
large influx of Syrian refugees, which has pressured 
the economy and the government budget. However, 
the timing of these decisions and efforts is key for 
Jordan’s economy. There have been few times in 
history where the economy is as challenged as it is 
today. Its origins can be traced to the 2008 global 
financial crisis. Sharp increases in oil and commod-
ity prices followed the crisis in 2011, coinciding with 
the Arab Spring, which affected security in the region 
and hit Jordanian tourism (10 percent of GDP). Fur-
thermore, the closing of the borders with Iraq and 
Syria halted exports and affected logistics and con-
sumer sectors, at the same time as the Syrian ref-
ugee inflows (16 percent of the population) strained 
27 Department of Statistics, Jordan <http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/> (accessed July 4, 2019).
28 “Central Government Debt, Percent of GDP,” IMF <https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/CG_DEBT_GDP@GDD/C HN/FRA/DEU/ITA/JPN/GBR/
USA> (accessed July 29, 2019).
29 “EU and Jordan adopted partnership priorities and compact,” European Council, December 20, 2016 <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2016/12/20/eu-jordan-partnership-priorities-and-compact/> (accessed July 29, 2019).
public resources. The effects have pressured annual 
GDP growth, which was averaging 6-8 percent pre-
2008 and dropped to 3 percent from 2011 onwards 
before falling further: the latest figure is 1.8 percent. 
The unemployment rate has risen from 12 percent in 
2014 to 18.7 percent today.27
Moreover, the government has to contend with a 
challenging budget. The government debt to GDP is 
at its highest it has ever been, at 95 percent.28 The 
government has also been reigning in its budget defi-
cit and increasing taxes in a very unpopular law that 
led to protests in 2018 and the replacement of the 
prime minster. Recently, the Gulf Cooperation Coun-
cil did not renew a five-year financial support pack-
age worth $3.6bn that ended in 2017, further straining 
government finances.
One of the most important strategies put in place 
to address these issues was Vision 2025, a ten-
year blueprint targeting increase in GDP growth, 
increased industrial contribution to GDP, lowering 
public debt to 47 percent, among other targets. More-
over, USAID launched a program in 2014 that will run 
to September 2019 called the Jordan Competitive-
ness Program (JCP) – which focuses on addressing 
the competitiveness of Jordanian firms with projects 
targeting higher exports to various markets including 
East Africa, the US, and the EU – and a project target-
ing local entrepreneurship and driving FDI and local 
investment. Tied to this is another program specifi-
cally targeting exports, the National Export Strategy 
(2014-2019), with a focus on key sectors: fresh fruits 
and vegetables, paints, management consulting ser-
vices, prepared and preserved meat, electrical wires 
and cables, architecture, and engineering.
Jordanian policymakers have also been making 
inroads in the EU-Jordan FTA, which has seen con-
siderable improvements since the 2016 Compact.29 
The political effort exerted by ambassadors and pol-
icymakers on both sides is not insignificant. How-
ever, the response of local Jordanian producers has 
been less than satisfactory, with only six firms tak-
ing part in the new initiative. The trade deficit with 
the EU stood at €3.2bn in 2018, and has been rela-
tively steady since 2002 when the FTA was first put in 
place in its basic form, ranging between €2.4bn and 
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€3.2bn. The EU is the seventh main export destina-
tion for Jordanian products.30
The EU-Jordan FTA today
As part of a wider effort by the EU to engage with its 
neighbors, particularly in the Mediterranean region, 
Jordan and the EU signed the FTA in 2002, allowing 
some Jordanian producers to sell their products to 
the EU without tariffs. This relationship has since 
undergone a series of developments further enhanc-
ing the FTA, with each improvement expanding the 
scope of participants and eligible firms. The 2016 
Compact is the most recent of these developments 
and is aimed at improving the lives of Syrian refu-
gees by lowering the threshold for rules of origin and 
opening up work permits for Syrian refugees.
Two consecutive rounds of discussions in Brussels in 
2017 and 2018 made more Jordanian firms eligible to 
participate. Today, any Jordanian company that hires 
a minimum of 15 percent of its production-related 
workforce and uses less than 70 percent of non-orig-
inating goods in its final products is eligible to sell to 
the EU with no duties. Following the London confer-
ence in February 2019, it was agreed that if Jordan 
issued 60,000 work permits to Syrian workers, Jor-
danian companies would not need to hire Syrians to 
be able to take part.
The Weak FTA Response: High Energy Costs and 
Poor Competitiveness
The energy picture plays a major role in the compet-
itiveness of industries and producers. Jordan’s main 
issue is the extra capacity on the grid from exist-
ing long-term contracts with electricity generation 
facilities. This hinders the shift towards renewable 
energy as the extra capacity is not needed. Jordan 
30 “Jordan and the European Union,” Delegation of the European Union to Jordan, May 12, 2013 https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/jordan_en/1357/
Jordan percent20and percent20the percent20EU> (accessed July 4, 2019).
31 “Saudi Arabia: Economic indicators and trade with the EU,” European Parliament, November 2017 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/
ATAG/2017/608780/EPRS_ATA(2017)608780_EN.pdf> (accessed July 4, 2019).
has tried to sell this extra capacity to neighboring 
countries. So far, Syria has not agreed to connect the 
two grids, Saudi Arabia does not need the supply, the 
West Bank already is connected, while Egypt has a 
two-way agreement only to balance extra capacity. 
Hence, Jordan has few options to export the extra 
capacity.
Moreover, the average cost of production is around 
18 cents per kilowatt. Households pay around this 
figure, agriculture and industry are heavily subsi-
dized and pay around 8 cents and 13 cents respec-
tively, while the two entities footing the bill are the 
government and commercial tariffs. However, large 
commercial companies are shifting towards the use 
of solar panels to reduce their energy bills, thereby 
causing a deficit and further losses to the National 
Electric Power Company (NEPCO). Earlier in 2019, 
connecting solar-generated power was severely lim-
ited.
With this picture in mind, a number of questions 
arise. First, if the subsidized industrial sector were to 
generate its own electricity from renewable sources, 
would this reduce the burden on NEPCO? The answer 
is yes, but only in the long-run. Currently, NEPCO is 
paying the bill whether there is demand or not, hence 
there is no incentive in the short- or medium-term 
to support an industrial shift to renewable energy. 
However, a new initiative scheduled for completion 
in late 2020 run by the Chambers of Industry to gen-
erate 100MW of renewable energy through a limited 
liability company with factories as the shareholders 
is currently running on schedule, with the first regis-
trations taking place late June 2019.
To demonstrate the weak competitiveness of Jorda-
nian producers, a comparison with neighboring Saudi 
Arabia is fruitful. According to 2017 figures, Saudi 
exported €4.37bn in non-oil goods (mainly chemi-
cals and plastics, 25 percent and 47 percent respec-
tively)31 to the EU, compared with Jordanian exports 
of €0.3bn to the EU. Saudi Arabia’s advantages are 
cheaper energy costs and economies of scale through 
large investments in capacity. Its industrial electricity 
prices are around 3 cents (2 piasters) compared with 
Jordan’s 13 cents (9 piasters). Currently, Saudi Arabian 
products face a 6.5 percent tariff in the EU. Many 
Jordanian products and Saudi products are currently 
competing around similar prices delivered in the EU 
The response of local 
 producers to the improved 
FTA is  dissatisfactory
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with the 6.5 percent tariff on Saudi products offset-
ting the higher production costs in Jordan.
Given that a large chunk of Saudi Arabia’s non-oil 
exports is in plastics (47 percent), it is worth doing 
the math for this specific sector concerning econo-
mies of scale and energy. Because energy is cheaper 
in Saudi Arabia, plastics production amounts to 
roughly 7 percent of the total cost for a typical pro-
ducer in Jordan, whereas it is roughly 3 percent in 
Saudi Arabia. The economies of scale advantage for 
larger Saudi producers is estimated at around 4 per-
cent. The 6.5 percent tariff on Saudi products offsets 
these advantages, and if Jordanian producers can 
catch up on the economies of scale by investing in 
large machinery, this should lower costs and pro-
vide 4 percent lower production costs. On the whole, 
Jordanian products can be cheaper by 2.5 percent. 
In a market that trades similar to commodities, 2.5 
percent is a significant advantage. This calculation 
assumes that Jordan does nothing on energy costs.
Examples of Export Growth Policies
There have been many instances in modern history 
where governments have adopted active industrial 
policies with great success. In 1931, US companies 
GM and Ford dominated the Japanese market for 
automobiles. The Ministry of Commerce and Indus-
try established a committee to look into establish-
ing domestic automobile manufacturing. It took 
eight years and a law to force the use of domestic 
parts along with sharp tariffs on imported parts to 
bring Toyota and Nissan to dominance in 1939.32 In 
Asia, Korea is another striking example. In the early 
1970s, the country went from no experience in steel 
or shipbuilding to building one of the biggest steel 
mills and the largest shipyard in the world. Hyundai 
later became a global auto maker. It was political will-
power that drove Korea to the technological frontier 
of the world.33
More recently, it has been acknowledged that the US 
silicon valley boom could not have happened with-
out the large defense programs during the Cold War, 
which linked domestic industries to procurement. 
32 “Item 7. Toyoda Automatic Loom Works Designates a Licensed Company under the Automotive Manufacturing Industries Law,” Toyota Global <https://
www.toyota-global.com/company/history_of_toyota/75years/text/taking_on_the_a utomotive_business/chapter2/section2/item7.html> (accessed July 4, 
2019).
33 F. Hasanov and R. Cherif, “The Return of the Policy That Shall Not Be Named: Principles of Industrial Policy,” IMF working paper, 2019
34Mariana Mazzucato, The Entrepreneurial State (London, 2013).
35 Jerry Hirsch, “Elon Musk’s growing empire is fueled by $4.9 billion in government subsidies,” Los Angeles Times, May 30, 2015 <https://www.latimes.
com/business/la-fi-hy-musk-subsidies-20150531-story.html> (accessed July 4, 2019).
36 Victor Mallet, “Battery venue seeks EU approval for €1.2nb state aid,” Financial Times, May 2, 2019 <https://www.ft.com/content/ee4f24ca-6cda-11e9-
a9a5-351eeaef6d84> (accessed July 4, 2019).
The technology in Apple’s iPhone, in particular the 
touch screen displays, GPS, internet, and Siri were 
initiated from public research funding.34 Even Tesla 
and SpaceX are reported to have benefited and con-
tinue to benefit from US government subsidies to the 
tune of $4.9bn through government contracts, loan 
guarantees, and grants to build factories.35
On May 2, 2019, a battery-making consortium for 
electric vehicles was announced in the EU, led by 
France and Germany using a mixture of private sector 
investment and state subsidies of €1.2bn. The pro-
ject aims to build a pilot project and two factories to 
manufacture batteries for the European car industry 
and export in the future. This is induced by the fear 
of German and French policy makers that with the 
rise of electric vehicles, the supply chain will shift to 
Asia and cause the loss of millions of European jobs.36 
Though the project still has legal hurdles to pass in 
relation to breaching EU competition law, it reflects 
the visible “hand of the state” in supporting domestic 
strategic industries.
Jordan has also benefited from a large industrial 
policy. Following the 1994 peace treaty with Israel, 
Jordan created industrial parks (called Qualifying 
Industrial Zones or QIZs) which collaborated with 
Israel to benefit from the existing US-Israeli FTA 
in the textiles industry. Such zones attracted large 
FDI from Chinese and Indian textiles manufacturers. 
Even though Jordan signed its own FTA with the US 
later in 2005, thereby allowing it to export to the US 
with no duties and without the special QIZ label, the 
physical zones remain to this day.
A recently published IMF working paper (March 
2019) titled “The Return of the Policy That Shall Not 
Be Named: Principles of Industrial Policy’’ by IMF 
economists Fuad Hasanov and Reda Cherif looks at 
industrial policies supported by the state. Their key 
findings, supported by empirical evidence, are that 
the success of the Asian miracles is due to: the sup-
port for domestic producers in sophisticated indus-
tries beyond those that already exhibit a comparative 
advantage; a strong orientation towards export; and 
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pursuit of fierce competition (no support for an inef-
ficient producer).37
The paper also specifies three “gears” to indus-
trial policy. The first, called snail crawl, is a gradual 
approach to solving market failures that focuses on 
incentivizing firms to locate in certain industrial 
zones and setting up export promotion agencies 
(the Jordan Enterprises Development Corporation, 
JEDCO), among others. The second gear is called the 
leapfrog, in which the state promotes strong sectors 
within the economy that may exhibit comparative 
advantages, builds on current production capabili-
ties, and promotes new diversification opportunities. 
The fastest gear is called the moonshot approach, 
which pursues ambitious goals and radical measures. 
It creates new industries and helps them grow, with 
the government investing in non-existent infrastruc-
ture, and usually constitutes a risky approach. Most 
examples mentioned above fall into this category 
(Japan, Korea, Singapore), along with projects such as 
putting a man on the moon, for example.
The determinants of which gear is in place depends 
on three factors: productivity growth, innovation, 
and export sophistication. Sophisticated industries 
and products are defined as products that have high 
productivity growth and spillovers into the trad-
able sector. The major argument for looking beyond 
industries with a comparative advantage is that those 
industries already have the support they need and 
naturally attract investment on their own. Accord-
ing to the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) of 
Ricardo Hausmann,38 Korea showed no comparative 
advantage in early 1970s, even though it is competi-
tive in this field today.
Recommendations
The EU-Jordan FTA is an advantage that has not been 
utilized to its full potential, because the market and 
37 Hasanov and Cherif, “The Return of the Policy That Shall Not Be Named.”
38 Ricardo Hausmann et al., The Atlas of Economic Complexity: Mapping Paths to Prosperity (Cambridge MA, 2013).
the economics do not favor Jordanian producers 
compared to other producers in different countries. 
In order to encourage more Jordanian producers to 
become exporters to the EU, a large and ambitious 
strategy is needed that looks beyond current capac-
ity and production capabilities in Jordan. A strategy 
should be adopted at the highest levels of govern-
ment and the relevant ministries to bring to life an 
industrial hub that is competitive and able to export 
to the EU. The first step is for the government to 
launch a program with clear export targets to the EU 
to capitalize on the current FTA. Under this umbrella 
and institutional weight, a number of steps can be 
taken.
 - Establish an executive committee
The executive committee and a board of trustees 
would create the institutional umbrella to carry out 
the goals of the strategy along with monitoring the 
key performance indicators and reporting on them. 
The executive committee would launch and mar-
ket an official program (e.g. the Jordan-EU Export 
Program, JEEP), and may also host events (such as a 
conference) outlining the plan and attracting discus-
sion and conversation to improve aspects of it. The 
committee should be made up of the key stakehold-
ers looking after Jordan’s industry: the Ministry of 
Industry, Trade and Supply, the Ministry of Planning, 
Chambers of Industry, and JEDCO.
 - Revise Jordan’s energy policy
Given the energy sector problems outlined earlier, 
there is no easy solution to improving the energy bill 
for producers. One idea is to use the extra capacity 
to sell to exporters to the EU. However, this contra-
dicts WTO rules on subsidizing exporters. A feasi-
ble yet politically difficult approach is to specify an 
industrial zone in which electricity is subsidized fur-
ther. A good candidate is the Aqaba economic zone 
with many producers already focusing on exports. 
Another more feasible approach is to allow producers 
in these zones to produce electricity from renewable 
energy and streamline the process of doing so, as 
well as removing any restrictions currently in place.
 - Promote Research & Development
Building on the USAID Jordan Competitiveness Pro-
gram’s work in aiding Jordan’s accession to the Pat-
ent Cooperation Treat (PCT), thus contributing to 
A program with clear 
 export targets to the EU    
is needed
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protecting intellectual property, R&D cooperation 
between scientific labs and institutions such as uni-
versities and the Royal Scientific Society should be 
improved to promote innovation. Currently, the Royal 
Scientific Society, a very well-equipped institution, 
charges more for some tests than private sector labs 
in Europe, which demotivates Jordanian firms or 
forces them to invest heavily in testing equipment. 
This is usually a hefty investment they are not willing 
to make. A special program and carefully designed 
mechanism are required to encourage firms to inno-
vate and experiment without heavy costs.
Given that exporters in developing countries are 
often accused of sticking to low value-added prod-
ucts addressed as “treadmilling” in the global value 
chains (GVC) literature, there is an established great 
need for a policy that promotes innovation. More-
over, the WTO rules are lenient on subsidizing R&D 
for exporters.
 - The EU Trade Fund: offer preferential credit and 
financing to projects that will be exporting to the 
EU
Given that revenues are based on the Euro, this fund 
can offer Euro loans that carry a much lower inter-
est rate than lending in Jordanian Dinars (0-2 per-
cent versus 7-10 percent). The fund should be run as 
a private fund with profit making in mind, and can 
include investors such as USAID, the Central Bank 
of Jordan (CBJ), and private banks. It should be run 
as a venture capital fund or a lender. Thus, the fund 
can also be used to support R&D by financing testing 
equipment or to provide testing credits in existing 
Jordanian institutions.
 - Invite FDI geared around exporting to the EU
This can focus on existing exporters to the EU from 
different countries that have tariffs imposed on 
their products. Moving to a location where there are 
zero tariffs makes them more competitive in Jordan, 
where the QIZ experience is a precedent. With a ded-
icated marketing initiative run by the executive com-
mittee, this will attract FDI into Jordan. This requires 
a targeted effort to identify large companies and pro-
ducers for whom it would make sense to make this 
shift.
Jordan had adopted and executed a number of 
national strategies and has built and continues to 
build the experience to do so in the last decade. 
Despite the results and perhaps the mistakes that 
occurred, the knowledge built by the ministries, 
chambers of industry, investment and trade pro-
motion authorities, the CBJ, and the private sector 
involved is quite significant. Implementing a strategy 
to promote EU trade is thus well within the experi-
ence of current policymakers.
Mohammed Al Husari is a Jordanian-UK business 
owner with extensive experience managing an 
industrial start-up in Jordan focused on exports 
to the EU. His practical experience as the com-
mercial manager and vice chairman of Al Shohra 
Plastics has given him in-depth expertise on the 
barriers to industrial development in the Middle 
East. He holds an MSc in Economics from the Uni-
versity of Edinburgh.
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THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
IN ACTION – THE DOUBLE-
SPEED DYNAMICS OF GRANTING 
HUMANITARIAN VISAS FOR EXILED 
POPULATIONS IN JORDAN
Hela Manadile
As the neighboring country of several regional crises 
(Palestinian, Iraqi, and Syrian), Jordan has drastically 
developed its welcoming capacities to carry the human 
cost of political instabilities in the Middle East. Facing 
the challenge of continually absorbing waves of refu-
gees, the Hashemite kingdom’s socio-economic frame-
work and resources urgently need external solidarity 
to cope with such population movements. The United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
stands at the forefront of relief through its refugee reset-
tlement program towards third host countries. But while 
European governments belatedly try to manage waves of 
migrant caravans on their territories, organizing inter-
national protection from the very country of origin or 
neighboring ones could be more effective in achieving 
migration crisis management. Granting visas to asylum 
seekers before they decide to use the illegal route is one 
way to select in advance legitimate requests, and avoid 
thousands of dead as well as human smuggling and traf-
ficking.
The eighth anniversary of the Syrian crisis reveals 
lessons to be learned about the management of 
intensive human displacement and the application of 
the international public law norm on the “responsi-
bility to protect” (R2P).39 Indeed, sovereign states of 
the United Nations Organization carry the legal obli-
gation to protect their populations against genocides, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Should 
they fail in a proven way, the international commu-
nity first encourages and helps this state to abide by 
its responsibility, and then, if necessary, takes over 
the process diplomatically, peacefully, and through 
humanitarian actions.
39 Resolution A/RES/60/1. 2005 World Summit Outcome adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization on September 16, 2005.
40 Stephanie Nebehay, “War crimes evidence in Syria ‘overwhelming’, not all can be pursued: U.N.,” Reuters, March 26, 2018 <https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-warcrimes-idUSKBN1H22GN> (accessed July 5, 2019).
41 Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect, May 15, 2019 <http://www.globalcr2p.org/regions/syria> (accessed July 16, 2019).
42 The foreign policy principles applied during George W. Bush’s presidency advocated for unilateral preemptive wars against imminent threats, here 
applied to the plan to democratize the Great Middle-East.
43 UNHCR Yearbooks June 2018 <www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html> (accessed July 5, 2019).
44 Unlike internally displaced people (IDPs), refugees are those who have left their home country.
45 United Nations Refugee Agency, Fact Sheet Jordan, June 2018, <http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Jordan%20 Fact%20
Sheet%20-%20June%202018.pdf> (accessed July 16, 2019).
46 Jordan Response Plan for the Syria crisis 2016-2018, Jordanian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation.
Regarding the Syrian situation, Bashar Al Assad’s 
regime proved the limits of its responsibility to pro-
tect its people as evidenced by the use of chemical 
weapons and mass crimes against detainees.40 Indeed, 
since 2013, the United Nations Security Council has 
passed twenty-four resolutions on Syria,41 apart from 
the twelve times Russia imposed its veto. According 
to the “duty of interference,” when a state reaches 
such a level of violence, it is losing its complete sov-
ereignty. Thus, the principle of sovereignty is rede-
fined according to the duty of protecting one’s peo-
ple. However, pro-war interpretations of the duty of 
interference have led to unilateral military actions, 
such as the Bush doctrine applied in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.42 Still, peaceful, non-military, and multilateral 
actions exist to relieve a population from internal 
violence, such as humanitarian convoys, exit corri-
dors, and diplomatic mediation.
Concerning exiled populations seeking protection 
outside their state, there is no specific international 
norm – including the 1951 Geneva Convention on 
refugees and stateless people and its 1967 additional 
protocol – that sets the rule of distribution among 
welcoming countries.43 Non-binding commitments 
are generally based on states’ good faith and good 
will. Syria now has the largest number of refugees 
worldwide (6.3 million out of a total global refugee 
population of 25.4 million),44 representing approx-
imately one refugee in five. Eventually, the shared 
responsibility to protect a fortiori falls to Syria’s 
neighboring countries (Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, and 
Iraq).
Containing Human Lives: Issues Facing the Jorda-
nian Host Community and its Syrian exiles
According to the UNHCR’s June 2018 figures, Jor-
dan carries the second highest share of Syrian refu-
gees per capita – after Lebanon – and has welcomed 
666,294 registered Syrian “guests” among its 9.7 mil-
lion population.45 The Jordanian government esti-
mates around double this figure, at 1.4 million Syr-
ians, living in the country.46 Syrian refugees in Jordan 
are mainly settled in urban areas of the Kingdom, and 
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a little over 100,000 others live in three camps (Zaa-
tari, Azraq, and Emirati-Jordanian camps). The entry 
of these refugees was ensured by air and terres-
trial humanitarian corridors until an attack against 
Jordanian customs in 2016, which led the Jordanian 
authorities to close the border before re-opening 
some crossing points. Satellite images have shown 
exiled Syrians’ cemeteries alongside the Syrian-Jor-
danian desert border as Deraa area populations fled 
their government’s offensive without finding any 
exit. Amnesty International estimated the size of this 
blocked population as up to 75,000 people in 2016.47 
Indeed, in the confusion of the conflict, civilians are 
paying the human cost of the war against terrorism 
and against Daesh in Jordan.
The fact that this humanitarian burden has not been 
shared on the international level, and that developing 
countries have been left to shoulder the burden, has 
had dramatic consequences. The principle of open-
ing humanitarian corridors challenges theses neigh-
boring countries’ own safety and territorial integrity. 
Between host communities and refugee groups, the 
lack of welcoming capacities (such as housing, health, 
and schools) feeds xenophobia and abuse of the vul-
nerable.
Indeed, the presence of an unplanned extra popula-
tion has had arduous socio-economic consequences 
on Jordan. Concerning vital facilities, Jordan is in the 
top ten countries with water shortages, and water 
consumption increased by 40 percent with the Syr-
ians’ arrival. In February 2018, UNHCR needed USD 
274.9 million to support all refugees in Jordan, but 
only collected USD 17.8 million (6 percent of total 
needs). This lack of voluntary contributions from 
states and private donors undoubtedly impacted the 
host country’s public finances.48 Facing such an eco-
nomic challenge, the Jordanian government had to 
reduce its “cost of hosting” Syrian refugees, which 
it estimated at USD 10 billion since the beginning 
of the conflict.49 Consequently, in March 2018, the 
government increased the cost of health care in the 
47 “Frontière jordano-syrienne. 75 000 réfugiés piégés en plein désert dans des conditions effroyables,” Amnesty International, September 15 2016 
<https://www.amnesty.org/fr/latest/news/2016/09/syria-jordan-border-75000-refugees-trapped-in-desert-no-mans-land-in-dire-conditions/> (accessed 
July 16, 2019).
48 “UNHCR Jordan Factsheet – February 2018,” Reliefweb, February 22, 2018 <https://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/unhcr-jordan-factsheet-february-
2018>(accessed July 16, 2019).
49 “Jordan says hosting Syrian refugees has cost $10 billion,” France 24, October 10, 2017 <https://www.france24.com/en/20171010-jordan-says-
hosting-syrian-refugees-has-cost-10-billion> (accessed July 16, 2019).
50 Taylor Luck, “Jordan’s Syrian Refugees Economic Gamble,” Middle East Institute, May 24 2016 <https://www.mei.edu/publications/jordans-syrian-
refugee-economic-gamble> (accessed July 16, 2019).
51 “UNHCR Factsheet Jordan.”
52 “The living conditions of Syrian refugees in Jordan: Results from the 2017-2018 survey of Syrian refugees inside and outside camps,” FAFO Institute for 
Applied International Studies, 2019.
53 “Asylum conditions that drive the family to marry their girls who are under 18 years of age to get rid of their financial burden and protect the family 
honour.” UNICEF Regional Study on Child Marriage – Jordan Country Brief, 2017, p.8.
Kingdom. The national debt has doubled since the 
beginning of the Syrian crisis, reaching 50 percent of 
Jordan’s GDP. Unemployment reached 14 percent in 
2016 with a 30 percent increase in youth unemploy-
ment. Cities welcoming Syrian communities face up 
to a 300 percent rise in rents. Still, the Syrian conflict 
has revealed Jordan’s unviable domestic policies and 
economic structures in the long-run.50
From the Syrian refugees’ point of view, UNHCR cash 
financial assistance and World Food Program ali-
mentary vouchers are not sufficient. As only 123,000 
work permits have been issued for Syrian refugees 
in Jordan since 2016, this population cannot fully 
count on self-reliance.51 Refugees’ low income leads 
to decreased access to vital medical treatments and 
malnutrition. Refugees with chronic diseases depend 
on non-governmental organizations’ services for 
their medical follow-up. This population is all the 
more vulnerable as 48 percent of Syrian refugees in 
Jordan are children.52 Child marriage53 is becoming 
a norm as smuggling Syrian teenage brides is dis-
creetly organized in the Arab world. As 22 percent 
of Syrian refugee households are headed by women, 
prostitution appears to be both a loophole and a trap. 
A generation of stateless people has come into being, 
as refugees’ children are born and raised in closed 
camps and are not registered by the Syrian authori-
ties. Another generation dies between barbed wire as 
resettlement solutions have not been found and the 
conflict continues.
The lack of  international 
burden-sharing has 
 dramatic consequences
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Shifting European Perceptions of Anarchic Refu-
gee Displacement
As Jordan is not a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Con-
vention, the UNHCR resettlement program mainly 
focuses on the most vulnerable, including the dis-
abled, wounded, and large families. It also enables the 
lengthy process of transferring refugees to third host 
countries in the developed world (such as Australia, 
the United States, and Canada). However, a large part 
of the Syrian exiled population comes from the coun-
try’s middle class and does not fulfil priority resettle-
ment criteria. UNHCR still advocates the expansion 
of the list of welcoming third countries and quotas 
for refugee resettlements worldwide. Its comple-
mentary pathways through education programs 
also aim to be more inclusive for refugee students 
and their families by offering them UNHCR partner 
scholarships (for instance, Masters scholarships in 
Japanese universities). However, the majority still find 
no resettlement solutions. They then apply for visas 
to join their family or friends in a developed country 
but Western embassies may deny their requests.54 
Most Syrian refugees exiled in Jordan would then 
use illegal ways to settle in Europe. This behavior is 
a global tendency as almost 90 percent of refugees 
settled in the EU reached its borders via a smuggler.55 
Developed countries could no longer consider send-
ing international financial aid and had to combat the 
problem at home.
In 2015, the migration crisis in Europe was seen 
through politicians’ eyes as a threat of human flow 
bringing jihadists from the war field or as “economic 
migrants,” whom governments were unwilling to 
welcome or protect, since economic hardship is not 
54 For example, a Syrian family from Aleppo applied for a visa in order to request asylum at the Belgian embassy in Lebanon and received a refusal. The 
European Union Court of Justice confirmed the Belgian decision stating that the refusal was not contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights – 
Case C-638, March 7, 2017.
55 “L’UE et la crise migratoire,” European Commission, July 2017 <http://publications.europa.eu/webpub/com/factsheets/migration-crisis/fr/> (accessed 
July 16, 2019).
56 Article 1 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines as a refugee as someone who ‘owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and 
is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”’
covered by the definition of a refugee according to 
the 1951 Geneva Convention.56 From Europe’s point 
of view, the civil society and political focus was on 
how to welcome refugees once they had reached the 
continent, often by dangerous means.
Having left camps in the Near East and now in close 
proximity to European citizens, refugees’ voices 
eventually started to gain wider impact. Through 
social networks, European social workers, and pub-
lishing books, videos, and articles on their danger-
ous journeys, refugees in the Western world are 
highlighting the absurdity of having let them arrive 
by themselves. They have shone a light on a certain 
complicity of the international community who, due 
to its lack of action and reactivity, have let mafia 
smuggling systems grow richer and more empow-
ered, committing murders, rapes, kidnappings, family 
separation, and inhuman treatments with impunity. 
Instead of rebuilding their lives and integrating in the 
host country with better material capacities, refu-
gees spend billions of dollars to reach a safer third 
country, which often represents the transfer of their 
entire life savings and properties to the parallel crim-
inal economy. Considering this context, states’ strat-
egy of sending humanitarian financial aid instead of 
welcoming people is no longer the only option.
Transit Issues Leading to Situations of Terrae Nul-
lius (Lands with no Master) inside Europe
Meanwhile, other refugees are still on the road in 
Europe because they want to choose their host 
country. For instance, those aiming to reach com-
munity and family in the UK face the geographical 
obstacle of an insular state. They stay in transit at the 
French-British border which, between 2015 and 2017 
hosted the largest informal camp in Europe, the “Jun-
gle” in Calais. These war refugees – many from Iraq 
and Syria – are punished twice because on the other 
side of the Channel, the British authorities deny them 
a humanitarian transfer, and in France, the police use 
daily coercion to close down illegal encampments, 
squats, and irregular immigration activities.
Finally, since the beginning of this migration crisis, a 
minimum of ten thousand unaccompanied children 
Financial aid instead of 
welcoming people is no 
longer the only option
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have gone missing in Europe during their journey.57 
The shared responsibility to protect has certainly 
failed, especially for the most vulnerable refugees. Yet 
within the framework of the Common European Asy-
lum System, the Dublin III Regulation already enables 
humanitarian transits from one signatory state to 
another following family links (Articles 9 and 10) or 
for reasons of vulnerability (Article 17). Thus, family 
reunification for asylum seekers is indeed considered 
by EU member states, but only as a last resort and 
once applicants are already on EU territory. Should 
the family member settled in Europe not be a stat-
utory refugee, conditions for his exiled family to be 
granted a visa would depend on his financial capacity 
to welcome them and their capacity to integrate.
Positive Initiatives have Still not Established Safer 
Routes to Protection
As a best practice actor, Canada has developed pri-
vate visa sponsorships to accelerate refugees’ inte-
gration into society and welcome them without wait-
ing for state accommodation to be built or found. The 
Canadian government announced that it had wel-
comed fifty thousand Syrian refugees from 2015 to 
2018.58 This may not be directly linked to the drown-
ing of Alan Kurdi, a Syrian child, who washed up on 
the Turkish shore in September 2015. Nevertheless, 
Alan’s parents had tried to reach their Canadian rel-
atives legally before taking the illegal way after a visa 
refusal.
France has only recently considered this form of pri-
vate support while facing 100,000 asylum seekers in 
2017 who had to be sheltered during the asylum pro-
cess. Family visas are rarely considered. The French 
government revealed that in 2016, it had granted 
2,745 visas for Syrian asylum seekers and 1,369 for 
Iraqis.59 Meanwhile, the National Office for the Pro-
tection of Refugees and Stateless People (OFPRA) 
developed external missions for identifying Syrian 
refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. However, 
many stories reported in the news have counter-
acted these efforts. For example, Stephan Pelissier, 
a French citizen, was condemned in 2017 by a Greek 
tribunal for smuggling migrants as he tried to drive 
57 Figures sourced from EUROPOL agency, shared by the UN Regional Center of Information for Western Europe, December 17, 2017 <https://www.unric.
org/en/latest-un-buzz/30889-lost-in-migration> (accessed July 16, 2019).
58 Kareem Shaheen, “Shock of the cold: 50,000 Syrian refugees learn to survive -20C in Canada,” The Guardian, January 6, 2019 <https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/06/syrian-refugees-in-canada-surviving-the-winter> (accessed July 16, 2019).
59 Maryline Baumard, “Le difficile accès aux visas humanitaires pour les Syriens et les Irakiens,” Le monde, January 16, 2017 <https://www.lemonde.fr/
proche-orient/article/2017/01/16/le-difficile-acces-aux-visas-humanitaires-pour-les-syriens-et-les-irakiens_5063139_3218.html> (accessed July 16, 
2019).
60 For instance, nationals from considered “safe” countries such as the Balkans could be deported to their country of origin before the court’s final decision 
in appeal.
61 May Bulman, “Surge in child refugees in Calais as conditions reach ‘breaking point’,” Independent, April 20, 2019 <https://www.independent.co.uk/
news/uk/home-news/child-refugees-calais-france-border-immigration-home-office-a8876391.html> (accessed July 16, 2019).
his parents-in-law to France. His wife’s family indeed 
risked the illegal route after having been refused a 
visa. In parallel, while welcoming more war refugees, 
Emmanuel Macron’s government is tightening up the 
national asylum laws to accelerate the deportation of 
certain categories of rejected asylum seekers.60
In Germany, almost one million asylum seekers have 
been registered in 2015. Angela Merkel’s advocacy 
efforts did not produce a binding distribution of 
migrants in the EU during the crisis. Instead, she paid 
a political price in terms of popularity and re-elec-
tability. According to this particular dimension of 
public opinion, developing visas for refugees would 
not seem to be a priority, but rather the phenomenon 
of migrant replacement. Indeed, as millions of Euros 
are dedicated to Syrian integration, another wave 
of migrants (for instance, from the Maghreb area) is 
fleeing deportation from Germany to their country of 
origin as the context changes for long-term undocu-
mented migrants. These already settled illegal would 
apply for asylum in Germany’s neighboring countries 
because of the restrictions induced by the new arriv-
als of refugees.
Furthermore, legal processes of reunification recently 
have been offered to a degree by European author-
ities in the continent’s hot spots (Greece, Italy, and 
Spain), which enable refugees’ relocation according 
to family links in Europe. This relocation process uses 
EU solidarity to share the humanitarian pressure 
building up at hotspots. National refugee protection 
offices organize local missions and interview asylum 
seekers (e.g. from Greece) to select refugees willing 
to settle in their country according to family links or 
cultural/linguistic affinity. The British authorities, 
by means of the 2015 Dubs amendment, has said it 
would welcome over 220 unaccompanied children in 
transit in Europe and aspired to host a limit of 480. 
Some members of parliament hoped for a total of 
3,000, considering the scale of the crisis.61 In Janu-
ary 2018, the signing of the Sandhurst Treaty led to 
more coercion from the French and British author-
ities against illegal border crossing, while ignoring 
the humanitarian reasons behind this migration phe-
nomenon.
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On a larger European scale, the EU-Turkey March 
2016 migrant deal raises an ethical question. The 
agreement led to the transfer of around 7,000 Syr-
ians from Turkey to Greece following the principle 
of “one for one”: for every Syrian deported back to 
Turkey from a Greek island, one Syrian in Turkey will 
benefit from a regular resettlement in the EU.62 In 
exchange, Turkey – which already shelters 3.5 million 
Syrians – received €6 billion for refugees’ facilities, 
but was also asked by the EU to strengthen its border 
controls. This deal questions the principle of non-re-
foulement that state parties to the Geneva Con-
vention should abide by. Indeed, the EU considers 
Turkey to be a “safe third country,” while the latter 
only grants temporary protection to Syrians. When 
Turkey ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention, Turkey 
applied a geographical reserve limited to European 
refugees.
Finally, on December 2018, the European Parliament 
approved a proposal to call on the European Com-
mission to present a legislative proposal on visas for 
asylum claimants at EU embassies. Awareness-raising 
is indeed taking place among the continent’s higher 
decision makers. If the European Commission follows 
the direction of the European parliament, this would 
represent a step forward.
Empirical assessments lead to the conclusion that 
neighboring countries cannot handle the socio-eco-
nomic pressure of managing the human cost of inter-
nal conflicts, such as the Syrian one. Durable solu-
tions for durable wars are urgently needed as full 
integration of the exiled populations in limitrophe 
territories is not an option. Such a suffocating situa-
tion for neighboring countries could be mitigated if 
diplomatic bodies changed their practices and built 
humanitarian bridges between neighboring countries 
and the industrialized world for both solidarity and 
security reasons.
62 “EU-Turkey Statement: Questions and Answers.” European Commission, March 19, 2016 <europe.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-963_en.pdf> 
(accessed July 16, 2019).
Recommendations
As a result of their own good will and international 
pressure, some countries have granted interviews 
and then visas for asylum seekers. But these initia-
tives should not stay anecdotal, and good practices 
should be promoted to safely and rapidly resettle 
these populations.
 - Generalize humanitarian visas
Ministries of foreign affairs should effectively sup-
port exiled people in Jordan by opening their diplo-
matic bodies to humanitarian visa applications and 
interviews. Providing their embassies with the capac-
ity to process such services would help substantiate 
the issuing of humanitarian visas.
Since the principle of solidarity is not a binding prin-
ciple, realpolitik needs to find arguments related to 
national interests. Facing its porous borders, the EU 
cannot use coercion to manage uncontrolled flows 
of migrants. In terms of security arguments, grant-
ing visas is a win-win process, as the final host coun-
try can select and investigate the population it will 
protect and welcome on its land. By selecting their 
hosts in advance, third countries can help main-
tain domestic public order by reducing the risk of 
terrorists, jihadists, or war criminals entering their 
territory. This could lead to greater security cooper-
ation between Jordan and developed countries. For 
public opinion, governments who develop humani-
tarian visas would prove they have “already taken 
their share of the burden,” while success stories of 
reunited families would benefit popular perception of 
the authorities. However, this strategy will not make 
states recover full territorial integrity, since protect-
ing borders is a complex mechanism that includes 
coercion. But a generalized practice of granting 
visas for asylum seekers could finally become a game 
changer in migration logic. Indeed, as voluntary 
return to their home country now exists as an option 
for Syrian refugees in 2019, the lessons learnt from 
this crisis should be applied to less well-known waves 
of exiles, such as Iraqis or Yemenis. Human smug-
gling persists because the international community 
is allowing a space for it to thrive.
Humanitarian visas could also be granted and 
adapted to exiled populations already connected cul-
turally, privately, and professionally to a third country 
that could host them.
European embassies should 
offer humanitarian visas
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 - Facilitate privately sponsored visas
There is no mandatory international quota or distri-
bution of refugees to relieve neighboring countries. 
Nevertheless, several third countries are particularly 
well-placed for their historical, cultural, or fam-
ily connections with the refugees. Former colonial 
powers like the UK nowadays include diasporas who 
could act as facilitating agents to host and integrate 
refugees in their society. Religious institutions also 
represent a privileged partner who could sponsor all 
refugees equally, not only saving the Arab-Christian 
minority or the persecuted Yezidis but also including 
Sunni Muslim refugees who are particularly targeted 
by the Alawite regime in Syria. 
Finally, private visa sponsors could include compa-
nies willing to employ exiled individuals. Refugees 
should be protected for persecutions they have faced 
and not for their potential contribution to a host 
society. Still, in developed countries, professional 
sectors that lack skilled labor could find a way to ally 
necessity and solidarity as long as regulations on for-
eign workers are relaxed.
 - Support visa applications by exiled students
Refugees in Jordan often invest their last savings 
in education (mostly European languages) so that 
their children can apply for student visas in devel-
oped countries. These refugees can often be found 
at the French Institute or British Council where, 
after reaching a certain competence, they can apply 
to Western universities. These cultural diplomacy 
actors should also be part of the negotiations on 
crisis management. In France for instance, universi-
ties offer specific free programs for already settled 
refugees, and these programs should be offered as 
bridges to those who have not yet reached Europe. 
Combined student humanitarian visas could be a par-
ticularly promising solution for young asylum seekers 
so that Syrian youth in Jordan do not become a “lost 
generation.”
Hela Manadile works in refugee law as a protec-
tion officer – chief of section (emergency housing 
for migrants) in a governmental asylum office. In 
parallel, she founded MIDDLEMEN – Justice with-
out Borders. As the president of this French NGO, 
she advocates for the development of a universal 
jurisdiction tool for victims of war crimes, geno-
cides, and crimes against humanity who received 
refugee protection in France and are willing to 
fight the impunity of past crimes (in their country 
of origin or during their exile). She holds a Ph.D. in 
Geopolitics and Human Rights from the University 
of Valencia (Spain, 2014).
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ISRAEL/PALESTINE
JORDAN’S OPTIONS IN THE WAKE 
OF THE FAILURE OF THE TWO-
STATE SOLUTION
Hassan A. Barari
It is difficult to avoid the realization that the two-state 
solution, the optimal solution for Jordan, may no lon-
ger be an option. Indeed, Israeli domestic politics has 
become the key impediment to the two-state solution. 
This should be bad news for Jordanians who feel that 
the failure of the two-state paradigm will have grave 
consequences for Amman in years to come. Amman 
should not be oblivious to this predicament and should 
therefore be ready to grapple with this unfolding 
reality. It should rebuild its regional alliances to mit-
igate the impact of the failure of the two-state solu-
tion, reduce its bilateral relations with Israel and seek 
he support of the Arab League and the international 
community to keep funding the UN Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East 
(UNRWA).
President Trump is expected to roll out his peace 
plan for the Middle East in 2019. The “deal of the 
century,” which does not mention a two-state solu-
tion and abolishes the right of return, is opposed by 
Jordanians. As Jordanians in general call for peace 
between the Palestinians and Israel, no one talks with 
any level of certainty about the elephant in the room: 
the future presence of Palestinian refugees in Jordan. 
Implicit in the Arab Peace Initiative is the Arabs’ read-
iness to give Israel a veto power over the refugees’ 
right to return. Other than reiterating the mantra 
that the two-state solution is the optimal scenario 
for Amman, politicians do not allude to the conse-
quences of a likely failure of this paradigm for Jordan.
Jordan is portrayed, especially in Western countries, 
as a moderate country that has been an anchor of 
peace and stability in the region. Even Israeli poli-
cymakers refer to Jordan as the best of neighbors 
(or best of enemies). This being said, Israeli policy- 
makers have been too obsessed with internal dynam-
ics that will eventually make a two-state outcome 
close to impossible. Consequently, Jordan will have to 
1 Arnon Soffer, Israel, Demography 2000-2020: Dangers and Opportunities [in Hebrew] (Haifa University: Center for National Security Studies, 2001).
prepare for a failure of the two-state paradigm. Short 
of doing so, Jordan will run the risk of being taken off 
guard and thus mismanaging the failure of the two-
state scenario.
In Jordan, some believe that the country’s national 
security would be compromised if the Palestinians 
fail to establish an independent and viable state of 
their own. They suspect that Israel will avoid the 
bi-national state. Moreover, if Israel seeks to keep 
land minus population, Israel may resort to expelling 
the Palestinians. Transfer would be a nightmare for 
Jordanians. One of the main concerns in Jordan is 
that Amman’s traditional allies may put pressure on 
Jordan to accept a solution that will run against its 
national interests.
Israeli Domestic Politics
Given the dramatic shift towards the right in Israeli 
politics, any peace agreement that entails Israeli ter-
ritorial concession in the West Bank and East Jeru-
salem is a hotly debated issue. Therefore, the notion 
of a two-state solution is hardly visible in the Israeli 
public discourse. Any prime minister who fails to take 
this into account may not survive politically and, in 
the case of Rabin, physically. Rabin was assassinated 
in 1995 by a right-wing Israeli student for signing the 
Oslo accords. For this reason, part of the problem is 
Israeli domestic politics. In 2000, Israel came up with 
what could be termed as the Herzliya Consensus, 
which represents an agreement among the Zionists 
regarding the grave demographic threat embodied in 
the looming Palestinian majority in the area between 
the Mediterranean and the Jordan River. Professor 
Arnon Soffer from Haifa University played a crucial 
role in articulating the demographic picture. His 
main thesis is that Jews will constitute only 42 per-
cent of the population of historical Palestine with a 
total population of 15.2 million by the year 2020.1
Given successive Israeli governments’ adamant rejec-
tion of the idea of a bi-national state, as floated by 
some Palestinian academics and intellectuals, Israelis 
may do what it takes to preempt what they perceive 
as a terrifying development. Public debate and polls 
in Israel indicate that Israelis perceive bi-nation-
alism and security as the country’s most pressing 
challenges. The working assumption among Israelis 
is that maintaining Israeli control over the Palestin-
ian territories in the absence of a political two-state 
solution will result in a de facto bi-national state with 
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Jews constituting a minority. That said, Israel has yet 
to take the steps necessary to facilitate the estab-
lishment of a Palestinian state. But as long as Israeli 
policies towards the peace process are held hostage 
to the demands of the settlers, the chances of taking 
such a logical step are low. A quick look at the set-
tlement activities demonstrates how settlers inform 
Israel’s policies that are detrimental to the peace pro-
cess.
Much more troubling is that some Israelis, such as 
Giora Eiland (a former Israeli military general and a 
top security expert) have suggested a new paradigm 
for resolving the conflict with the Palestinians. The 
new argument is that given the developments over 
the last decade and a half, the chances for a viable 
Palestinian state are slim. Reflecting this new think-
ing, Eiland published a study promoting what he calls 
the regional solution.2 According to this scenario, the 
West Bank will be ruled by Jordan. He argues that if 
Israel were to pull out from the West Bank, Hamas 
would take over within a short period of time. Indeed, 
a Palestinian state in the West Bank run by Hamas 
could pose unbearable security challenges for Israel. 
Eiland bases his argument on the notion that if secu-
lar Palestinians living in the West Bank had to choose 
between Hamas or Jordan, they would certainly 
choose Jordan.
Jordan on the Receiving End
It is hard to find an explicit or implicit advantage for 
either the Palestinians or the Jordanians in such a 
regional solution. While Eiland thinks that this is the 
best alternative to the two-state solution, his pro-
posal does not sufficiently consider Jordan’s internal 
sensitivities. In fact, a more activist Jordanian role in 
the Palestinian territories is very likely to have grave 
ramifications for the Kingdom’s domestic equilib-
rium. The last thing Jordan needs is to be seen as if it 
were replacing the Israeli occupation or fulfilling the 
role of the Palestinian Authority. The bottom line is 
that Jordanians will not accept any solution short of 
a two-state solution, and any other alternative will be 
always viewed in Jordan as another strategic threat 
to its long-term well-being.
The apparent failure of the peace process has led 
many analysts to ponder what role Jordan, if any, can 
play in the West Bank. Many also question whether 
Jordan should intervene and, if so, under what con-
ditions. Such questions tend to link Jordan’s moves 
2 Giora Eiland, Regional Alternatives to the Two-State Solution (Bar-Ilan University: The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 2010).
in the region to the changing dynamics in the Pal-
estinian political arena. For some Israeli politicians, 
the Palestinians’ failure to unite behind one strategy 
should lead, inter alia, to direct or indirect Jordanian 
involvement in the West Bank. But this view shows a 
lack of appreciation regarding the evolution of Jor-
dan’s strategic thinking over the last two decades. 
Projecting Jordan as a fence-sitter, waiting to step 
in should the Palestinians fail in their state-building 
endeavor, fails to capture the complexity of Jordani-
ans’ threat perception.
Most Jordanians argue openly that a two-state solu-
tion is the best option. Over the years, a national 
consensus has emerged that the failure of the two-
state paradigm would pose a threat to Jordan’s 
national security. Ironically, Jordanians have yet to 
outline what their country would do if an indepen-
dent Palestinian state does not materialize. In other 
words, what is Jordan’s “Plan B” for dealing with the 
West Bank if the Palestinian Authority (PA) collapses 
and mayhem ensues – or worse, if Hamas takes over 
in the West Bank? Or what if the status quo contin-
ues unchecked for years to come? In any case, var-
ious outside observers have come up with answers 
of their own. As a result, two troublesome ideas 
have resurfaced in discussions over the past three 
decades: namely, a confederation between Jordan 
and the Palestinians, and the so-called “Jordanian 
option,” in which parts of the West Bank would be 
returned to Jordanian control.
Neither of these Israeli ideas reassures Jordanians. 
Therefore, it has become axiomatic for Jordanians to 
say that their country faces one threat: Israeli poli-
cies towards the peace process. Indeed, a plethora 
of articles have been published to emphasize this 
particular point. It is important to clarify how Jor-
Jordanians will 
not accept anything 
short of a two-state 
solution
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danians perceive the threat posed by the persistent 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict or by any solution other 
than a two-state one. Like the majority of Israelis – 
who support an independent Palestinian state as a 
means to ensure the Jewish and democratic nature 
of Israel and to avert a one-state solution – Jordani-
ans support a two-state approach in order to avert 
the possibility of Jordanian-Palestinian unification. It 
is a common argument among Jordanians that uni-
fication with the unviable remaining parts of Pales-
tine would render Jordanians a minority in their own 
country – a doom-and-gloom scenario for most of 
them.
The running argument in Jordan these days is that 
Israel seeks to resolve its demographic nightmare 
at the expense of Jordan. Indeed, a growing number 
of Jordanians believe that Israel is seeking to revive 
the concept of the Jordanian option which, if it ever 
materializes, would chip away at any chance for 
Pales tinians to exercise their right to self-determi-
nation. The predicament that both Israel and Jordan 
have to contend with, albeit for different reasons, is 
that the demographic time-bomb is ticking west of 
the Jordan River. The lack of a solution will lead to a 
Palestinian majority in the area between the Medi-
terranean and the River, thus converting Israel into 
a bi-national state. According to this line of thinking, 
Israel might go as far as to force the transfer of Pales-
tinians to Jordanian territory in order to uphold a 
Jewish majority in Israel. Such an act, if it ever comes 
into fruition, will clearly tip the delicate demographic 
balance in Jordan. Still, such a pessimistic scenario, 
logical as it may sound, can be averted only by estab-
lishing a Palestinian state within the 1967 border. For 
this reason, Jordan has meticulously and scrupulously 
lobbied world leaders, particularly the US, in favor of 
a two-state solution as the only recipe for stability 
and security of Jordan in the changing region. Thus 
far, Jordan has not been successful in pushing for a 
two-state solution.
Recommendations
Casting politics aside, the two-state solution serves 
the interests of both Jordan and Israel. Unfortunately, 
time is running out on the two-state solution and 
Jordan should therefore act on the assumption that 
it will not come about. 
 - Make it clear that Jordan will not accept resettling 
Palestinian refugees and that the refugees are to 
return
King Abdullah II has announced this position on vari-
ous occasions but there is a need to raise Jordanians’ 
awareness of the need to help refugees practice the 
right of return. A step in that direction entails grant-
ing the refugees Palestinian passports. To do so, Jor-
dan should seek the blessing of the Arab League and 
the Islamic Conference Organization so that a Pales-
tinian passport is recognized as a travel document for 
all refugees.
 - Focus on the Arab scene
It is of vital interest to establish common ground 
among Arab leaders when it comes to the Arab-Is-
raeli conflict endgame. American engagement in the 
conflict remains critical. In Israel, there is unanimity 
among various political parties that the US is the only 
third party that can influence the situation. Unfor-
tunately, President Trump has proved that he is not 
interested in a two-state solution as defined by the 
Clinton parameters. Here, Arab leaders should warn 
the American administration that it is losing its status 
as an honest broker.
 - Seek the support of the Arab League and the inter-
national community to keep funding UNRWA 
The US has announced it would defund the UN Relief 
and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the 
Near East (UNRWA), which has mitigated the impact 
of hosting Palestinian refugees. Since the US is the 
biggest contributor to the UNRWA budget, Jordan 
must act to secure other states to fill in.
 - Reduce bilateral relations with Israel
Doing so would send a clear message that Israel can-
not have healthy normalization while denying the 
Palestinians a state of their own. Furthermore, Jordan 
needs to reconsider security cooperation with Israel.
 - Make it clear that Jordan would not play any role in 
the West Bank
Implicit in Israeli policies towards the Occupied Ter-
ritories is that one day Jordan will have to step in 
to take control of the residues of the West Bank. In 
other words, Israel’s rejection of a two-state solution 
is rooted in its perception that Jordan would be ready 
to play a role. For this reason, it is of paramount 
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importance for Jordan to make it perfectly clear that 
under no circumstance will it play any security or 
political role in the occupied Palestinian territories.
Hassan Barari is a professor of International Rela-
tions at the University of Jordan and a columnist 
at The Jordan Times. He is the author of many 
books and articles published in peer-reviewed 
international journals.
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PALESTINIAN VOICES AND AGENCY 
IN THE TIME OF THE “DEAL OF THE 
CENTURY” – BUILDING STRONGER 
NARRATIVES AND NETWORKS
Tamara Taher
As the political situation in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories (OPTs) and the Palestinian question in the 
MENA region face increased tension and human and 
collective rights violations, Palestinians are excluded 
and sidelined from the political arenas where inter-
national and regional actors are planning decisions 
on the Israel-Palestine conflict. Yet Palestinian agency 
and narratives continue to exist, and can be located 
by viewing the situation through a bottom-up lens, 
one that focuses on their action in civil society and the 
question of memory. In Jordan, support for Palestinian 
rights and existence is widespread. Greater support 
for and attention to the Palestinian narrative is key 
to a political solution that addresses the grievances 
of actors in the Israel-Palestine question. This can be 
achieved through the promotion of cultural and educa-
tional work on Palestinian issues, by better network-
ing between civil society organizations and actors in 
Jordan, the region, and around the world who address 
the dimensions of Palestinian collective memory and 
human rights, and finally, through the interaction of 
such actors with stakeholders on different levels, from 
regional to international organizations.
As the Palestinian people in different geographical 
areas and around the world commemorate the 71st 
anniversary of the Nakba in May 2019, their demands 
for recognition, self-determination, and rights are 
sidelined and ignored by the international commu-
nity and in the region. The situation in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories (OPTs) and in Palestinian refu-
gee camps in neighboring countries is characterized 
by growing challenges and difficulties. The deteriora-
tion of the Palestinian condition over recent decades 
has thus led many to define the “catastrophe” today 
as a continuous process (Nakba mustamirra), instead 
of seeing it as a past event to simply remember.
3 “US to reveal economic part of Palestine peace plan in Bahrain,” Al Jazeera, May 20, 2019 <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/05/reveal-
economic-part-palestine-peace-plan-bahrain-190519191752420.html> (accessed July 9, 2019).
4 “Palestinian state likely not in US proposed peace plan: Report,” Al Jazeera, April 15, 2019 <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/04/palestinian-
state-proposed-peace-plan-report-190415102708404.html> (accessed July 9, 2019).
5 Several regional and international news agencies, papers, and commentaries have written about this, including The Washington Post, Al Jazeera, RT, 
Telesur, The Guardian, Middle East Monitor, and so on. See, for example, “US ambassador: Israel has right to annex parts of West Bank,” The Guardian, June 8, 
2019 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/08/us-ambassador-israel-david-friedman-west-bank-annexation> (accessed July 9, 2019).
6 “US-led Bahrain meeting on Palestine,” Al Jazeera, June 26, 2019 <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/led-bahrain-workshop-palestine-latest-
updates-190624092422392.html> (accessed July 9, 2019).
7 Daoud Kuttab, “Jordanians protest against Bahrain economic workshop,” Arab News, June 23, 2019 <http://www.arabnews.com/node/1514346/
middle-east> (accessed July 9, 2019).
8 “‘Palestine is not for sale’: Palestinian Representative to UK slam Kushner peace plan,” Euronews, June 25, 2019 <https://www.euronews.
com/2019/06/25/palestine-is-not-for-sale-palestinian-representative-to-uk-slams-kushner-peace-plan> (accessed July 9, 2019).
As well as regional conflicts, cuts in funding for the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Pales-
tinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), and Israeli 
policies approving the construction and expansion 
of illegal settlements in the West Bank, Palestin-
ians also endure the twelve-year siege of the Gaza 
Strip and the US administration’s recent positions on 
Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, as well as its plans 
regarding the regional peace process. Almost three 
decades after the Oslo Peace Accords, the recently 
proposed US “deal of the century,” which resonates 
with the positions of the newly re-elected Likud 
party in Israel, reiterates the obliteration and denial 
of Palestinian rights, existence, and grievances, while 
also disregarding international, humanitarian, and 
human rights law. While the plan has not yet been 
officially released, it is expected to be published over 
the summer,3 and some details have been revealed 
via US administration comments. Over the past few 
months, the international and regional press have 
often focused on the deal in terms of economic 
opportunities and investment,4 and discussed its 
disregard of Palestinian statehood and other major 
political issues.
Another alarming development for Palestinians is 
the likely US support for Israeli annexation of illegal 
settlements in the West Bank.5 At the Bahrain Con-
ference in Manama on June 25-26, 2019, where the 
US unveiled the economic part of the deal,6 Pales-
tinians all around the world voiced their opposition 
to the plan, and pro-Palestinian rallies were held in 
many cities, including Amman7 and many others in 
the MENA region, often using the slogan: “Palestine 
is not for sale.”8
In this complex situation, in which the Palestinians 
are also affected by political and territorial frag-
mentation, there is little space left in political and 
international arenas for their perspectives, political 
demands, and narratives to be heard. Nor is there any 
opportunity to achieve a viable and sustainable solu-
tion that recognizes and pursues their fundamental 
rights, including the right of return, stated in the 
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Excluding Palestinians 
from decision-making has 
not meant the absence of 
their agency 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 of 
December 11, 1948.
Palestinian Voices in Civil Society
The exclusion of Palestinians from decision-making 
processes concerning their cause and their lives, 
both on the individual level and as a people, has not 
meant the absence of their agency and determina-
tion. Their narrations, aspirations, and demands can 
be found and highlighted if a bottom-up approach to 
politics and society is adopted, and if the role and 
space of “civil society” is acknowledged as a political 
one.
Using such a lens can allow for the location of dif-
ferent narratives and practices concerning the Pales-
tinian question with respect to the referenced top-
down decisions. This would open up the space and 
bring attention to the active Palestinian role by look-
ing at civil society actors, grassroots organizations, 
intellectuals, artists, and initiatives that foreground 
the lived and inherited experiences of Palestinians, 
their actual needs, their ideas on the Palestinian 
question, and the political situation they currently 
endure. These actors prove the Palestinians’ ability 
to reclaim their right to narrate their own stories 
instead of continually being spoken for.9 Their voices 
are relevant in that they help construct counter-he-
gemonic discourses and practices with respect to 
the top-down politics and narratives that deny their 
existence. In their ability to narrate their experience, 
histories, places, and connection to the villages and 
cities of Palestine, Palestinians all over the world 
prove that their existence is their resistance.
These kind of actors and narratives can be found in 
different spaces, not only inside the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip, but also in the surrounding countries 
and in the Palestinian shataat (diaspora). This variety 
of geographical positions and experiences produces 
diversified narratives on the Palestinian question 
and the Israel-Palestine conflict which highlight the 
relevant issues that Palestinians live and conceive 
differently according to their contexts. For several 
reasons, Jordan today is an important and significant 
space for such actors. Not only is it inhabited by a 
large number of Palestinian refugees registered with 
9 E. Said, “Permission to Narrate,” Journal of Palestine Studies 3 (1984), pp. 27-48.
10 “Where we Work,” United Nations Relief and Works Agency <https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/jordan> (accessed July 10, 2019).
11 Suzanna Goussous, “University students around Jordan express solidarity with Palestinian resistance,” The Jordan Times, October 13, 2015 <http://
www.jordantimes.com/news/local/university-students-around-jordan-express-solidarity-palestinian-resistance> (accessed July 10, 2019).
12 One example is the solidarity campaign with Al-Aqsa at the University of Jordan.
13 M. Ghazal, “Campaign connects donors directly with Gazans in need,” The Jordan Times, August 9, 2014 <http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/
campaign-connects-donors-directly-gazans-need> (accessed July 10, 2019).
the UNRWA (hosting ten refugee camps),10 as well as 
a high number of Jordanian citizens of Palestinian 
origin who have connections to families in the OPT 
cities and villages, but it is also a relevant regional 
actor that holds the custodianship of the holy sites in 
Jerusalem. Jordan is thus one of the regional contexts 
significantly affected by the outlines of the “deal of 
the century.”
Palestinian Memory, Narratives, and Practices in 
Jordanian Civil Society
Jordanian society has expressed solidarity with the 
Palestinian people’s plight on countless occasions 
over the past decades, and mobilizations and support 
are found across all sectors of Jordanian life, from 
the public to the private sphere. Whenever tension 
heightens in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip or Jeru-
salem, Jordanian society has mobilized to support 
the Palestinian population in different ways, through 
rallies, demonstrations in cities and in universities 
across the country,11 and longer-term campaigns in 
support of Jerusalemites and Muslim and Christian 
holy sites in Jerusalem.12 Many campaigns have also 
been undertaken to support Palestinians in the Gaza 
Strip by providing them with daily needs, financial 
support, or urgent assistance during Israeli offen-
sives. One example of such was the “One Family 4 
Gaza” campaign in 2014, which aimed to put Pales-
tinian families who had lost their homes and needed 
urgent help in contact with donors in Jordan who 
could provide them with financial aid.13
Initiatives and projects in support of Palestinian heri-
tage, memory, and rights are not confined to specific 
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occasions or events, but take place on a wider and 
longer term in Jordanian civil society, taking differ-
ent shapes and forms, proving a deep connection 
between the Jordanian and Palestinian people. Civil 
society and educational institutions in Jordan orga-
nize numerous initiatives and projects that develop 
and aim to preserve and pass on Palestinian mem-
ory and history. Exhibitions such as 2012’s Matha law 
baqaina14 (What if we remained?), a photographic 
showcase of the rich pre-1948 cultural, social and 
economic Palestinian life, and 2017’s Qul ya Teir (Tell, 
o bird),15 which focused on Palestinian oral history 
and stories, are only two examples from a long list of 
projects that narrate Palestinian experiences before 
and after the Nakba to resist what Israeli historian 
Ilan Pappe has defined as “memoricide.” This term 
describes the Israeli attempt to empty Palestinian 
history and memory of the places and spaces they 
lived in before being driven out of their villages and 
homes in 1948.16
These projects are often developed and exhibited 
not only in Jordan, but also in the West Bank, in 
other countries of the region, and around the world. 
Another example is Tarek Bakri’s work on photo-
graphs and geographical memories of Palestinians, 
which he collects and presents as an archive of Pales-
tinian personal and collective stories entitled Kunna 
wa ma zilna (We were and still are),17 an exercise in 
resistance by existence. Bakri, who lives in Jerusalem, 
has been invited to present his work and the stories 
of the Palestinians he met over the years to audiences 
and classes in schools in Amman, in exhibitions and 
initiatives inside the West Bank, in cities and coun-
tries around the region, and at European universities 
(including a number of Italian cities).
Many other cultural initiatives focus on the narra-
tion of Palestinian heritage and history through art, 
dance, theater, and embroidery, and they feature at 
both private and public occasions. Some interest-
ing cases can be found in the work of the Al Quds 
Group for Palestinian Folklore, established in Amman 
14 “‘Matha Law Baqaina’ reveals the falsification of the history of Palestine” [in Arabic], Al Jazeera, July 10, 2012 <https://www.aljazeera.net/news/
cultureandart/2012/7/10/--بقينا-لو-ماذا2019). 13, August (accessed >يكشف-تزوير-تاريخ-فلسطين 
15 “Palestinian Oral Memory in the exhibition ‘Qul ya Teir’” [in Arabic], Raialyoum, July 14, 2017 <https://www.raialyoum.com/index.php/قو-معرض-في-
الفلسطينية-الشفوية-الذاكرة/> (accessed August 13, 2019).
16 Ilan Pappe, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (London, 2006).
17 “‘We were and still are’ photographic documentation of the history of Palestine,” Al Jazeera, 24 January, 2018 <https://www.aljazeera.net/news/
alquds/2018/1/24/-توثيق-زلنا-وما-كنا2019). 13, August (accessed >فوتوغرافي-لتاريخ-فلسطين 
18 Al Quds Group for Palestinian Folklore Facebook page <https://www.facebook.com/pg/alqudsgroup/about/?ref=page_interna l> (accessed July 10, 
2019).
19 Ibid.
20 Report on the Al Funoun initiatives [in Arabic], summer 2015 http://el-funoun.org/sites/default/files/lnshr_llktrwny_lthmn.pdf (accessed July 10, 
2019).
21 Tammey for Youth Development Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/Tammey.Org/
22 Palestine Costume Archive <http://palestinecostumearchive.com/refugee_camps.htm> (accessed July 10, 2019).
in 1982, which aims to “emphasize and spread Pales-
tinian popular heritage abroad,”18 and which performs 
very frequently in Jordan as well. The group tells Pal-
estinian stories, traditions, and memories in “perfor-
mances (including musicals, brief dance sketches, 
and songs) [that] symbolize the history of Palestine 
and its people’s struggle for their legitimate right to 
return to historic Palestine.”19 Finally, another initia-
tive that has linked Palestinian dabka (folk dance) with 
the development and personal and collective growth 
of its participants is the Ad-Dabka wa maharat al 
Hayat (Dabka and life skills) project,20 organized by 
the Ramallah-based folklore group Al Funoun, in col-
laboration with Tammey for Youth Development21 in 
Amman.
These projects and actors prove that Palestinian nar-
ratives and agency can be found and supported when 
a bottom-up approach is adopted when viewing and 
analyzing the Palestinian question today. Many other 
actors, at an even more grassroots level – such as 
organizations in Jerusalem and the OPTs who often 
interact with associations and spaces in Jordan and 
beyond – show how the development and preserva-
tion of Palestinian memory is also linked to civil soci-
ety support for and solidarity with actors aiming to 
impact on the economic and agricultural level inside 
the OPTs. Many initiatives working on embroidery, 
for example, actively engage with women’s groups 
and organizations in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, 
and refugee camps around the region.22 Similarly, 
some projects in the OPTS on Palestinian agricultural 
cooperatives or the promotion of organic products 
sometimes find spaces and occasions to present their 
work in Amman. These initiatives preserve, practice, 
and narrate Palestinian memory of indigenous seeds, 
flora, and agricultural techniques linked to the local 
climate, countering not only dominant narratives and 
political conditions in the OPTs but also dominant 
economic and development models centered on the 
neoliberal paradigm.
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All these initiatives and different kinds of actions and 
subjects are an indication of Palestinian resilience 
and existence in different spaces and places through-
out 71 years of the ongoing Israel-Palestine conflict. 
While on the regional and international political level, 
narratives about the peace process and the fate of 
the parties involved in the conflict are outlined from 
above – using a top-down approach that pays little 
attention or consideration to the real and lived needs 
and aspirations of millions of individuals – looking 
at civil societies in the region and in Jordan opens 
up space for people’s perspectives, efforts, and posi-
tions.
Such initiatives and actors, though, cannot have a 
meaningful impact if they are not organized, inter-
linked, and connected in a more systematic way. 
Palestinians in the region and in Jordan have been 
able to preserve and prove their connection to their 
land and their history for decades. During a time 
of multiple new illegal Israeli settlements on their 
lands, expulsion from Jerusalem, and plans to further 
deprive Palestinians of their human and fundamental 
rights, working on the construction of stronger and 
broader knowledge of Palestinian narratives and his-
tory is one way to counter hegemonic projects aimed 
at excluding them completely from decision-making 
on their lives. Palestinians exercise an active role in 
demanding and calling for their rights, and in tell-
ing their history and re-appropriating it as an active 
means of their political agency.23
Recommendations
Geographical and political fragmentation are issues 
at the heart of the Palestinian condition today, which 
means that connecting and working together, as well 
as organizing wider and more in-depth knowledge, 
are fundamental steps towards improving the effec-
tiveness and outreach of Palestinian voices. Paying 
attention to the kind of experiences outlined above 
is thus particularly important, as longer-term and 
more systematic, interconnected, and better orga-
nized support for Palestinian cultural and memory 
work is a key element for strengthening the Pales-
tinian narrative. Making Palestinian narratives matter 
regionally and internationally would open up space 
for effective Palestinian political action concerning 
their condition and demands. Such an outcome may 
eventually lead to pressuring states in the region, as 
well as the international community, to take a stand 
23 R. Rubeo, “A People’s Historian: Ramzy Baroud on Journalism and History and Why ‘Palestinians Already Have a Voice,’” Counterpunch, June 8, 2017 
<https://www.counterpunch.org/2017/06/08/a-peoples-historian-ramzy-baroud-on-journalism-and-history-and-why-palestinians-already-have-a-
voice/> (accessed July 10, 2019).
and support their demands and rights more actively. 
At the same time, these groups and actors need to 
focus on passing on and consolidating knowledge 
about Palestinian history and memory to younger 
generations.
 - Educate on Palestine
Exhibitions of photographs, oral history projects, and 
initiatives focusing on folklore, heritage, and geog-
raphy need to be shown in schools and universities 
more often, and this need can be addressed by dif-
ferent actors. Student groups and associations can 
engage creatively with universities’ and schools’ 
administrations in selecting and organizing such 
events, while teachers at all levels of the education 
system can invite experts, artists, and associations 
who work on such projects to their classes. These 
actors can further engage young people by making 
their activities and exhibitions interactive or more 
accessible through discounts and offers on tickets 
and participation.
 - Share knowledge and make archives accessible
Cultural organizations and publishers – in Jordan and 
the region – should promote the creation of online 
archives and resources, or publications, where peo-
ple can access and find references to the information 
presented in exhibitions about Palestinian heritage, 
history, and memory (one example could be Darat Al 
Funun which often works on these topics with exhi-
bitions or museums). This could also be promoted 
by universities around the country or through local 
or international research centers who work on the 
question of Palestine. Useful contributions could also 
be carried out by local and regional media outlets and 
channels, which often already pay attention to these 
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initiatives. In the Jordanian context, local TV chan-
nels could work on making educational shows and 
programs on Palestinian heritage and history, featur-
ing Palestinian artists, exhibitions, cultural associa-
tions, and so on.
 - Enhance networking from the local to the interna-
tional level
Associations, groups, organizations, and exhibitions 
working on Palestinian memory, space, history, and 
heritage need to create networks and connections 
with groups working on similar topics and issues in 
other countries in the region, the OPTs, and around 
the world. This can help bring the attention of a 
wider global audience to the issues at the heart of 
the Palestinian condition today. Such networks can 
be promoted, for example, around topics such as “fair 
trade,” as in the case of the promotion and connec-
tion of Palestinian agricultural cooperatives and their 
products with similar initiatives around the world.
 - Create occasions to meet
The organization of meetings between groups from 
different countries and regions could help create 
spaces and times to learn about and discuss the 
Pales tinian question today. This is often done by 
Pales tinian communities and organizations in Europe 
or the US. Annual or specific issue conferences are 
organized and attended by numerous and different 
actors (civil society organizations, academics, stu-
dents, practitioners, experts, members of communi-
ties, activists, and so on) who thus have an oppor-
tunity to discuss and learn about Palestinian issues, 
address main themes concerning human and funda-
mental rights, and meet and listen to scholars and 
experts on the matter. Similar meetings for actors 
working on Palestine in the region can offer a way of 
widening knowledge about Palestinian history, cur-
rent issues, and challenges. They can also represent 
platforms that offer new ways of thinking about the 
Palestinian question and of imagining political, eco-
nomic, and social practices and solutions.
 - Address the international community through 
engagement and involvement of international 
organizations and NGOs
Civil society actors need to engage international 
organizations, associations, NGOs, and diplomatic 
figures in their cultural and intellectual initiatives 
on Palestine and Palestinian experiences and rights, 
in order to widen their audience and attract the 
attention and action of the international community. 
Involving and co-organizing with such actors could 
open up space for Palestinian voices in the interna-
tional arena and bring them to the attention of inter-
national actors. At the same time, engaging such 
international actors could help inform their positions 
on the question of Palestine in a more grounded way, 
and make them more attentive and able to address 
the real needs and aspirations of the Palestinians.
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